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Abstract 
Purpose 
To develop a model that describes the clients' management process of strategic 
outsourcing of services during its on-going phase. The study identifies and explores 
problems that occur during this phase and which influence outsourcing's effectiveness. 
The research studies an under-explored area and develops knowledge about the 
management of outsourcing during the on-going phase of continuous operation. 
Research design 
The investigation focused on strategic outsourcing - of industrial maintenance - in a 
single sector where such maintenance is of strategic importance, namely, in the pulp and 
paper industry; however, it is expected to be of value to other industries and services. 
The first part was exploratory, based on a single case study, and focused on the 
construction of the model in an inductive fashion. The second part further tested the 
ability of the model to describe the management of strategic outsourcing through three 
case studies. 
Findings 
Management of the strategic outsourcing of services consists of a number of 
activities which influence each other and operate concurrently at different hierarchical 
levels. The management process of this `stable' phase entails continuous learning and 
evolution. In each of the activities there are ineffective elements which originate in 
management problems. Such problems are identified and explored in the research and 
were found to originate in practices employed either by the clients or the suppliers. 
Research limitations/implications 
All case studies were conducted within one group of companies, though each 
company had independent management and the outsourcing was implemented 
differently. This approach enables the discussion about the appropriateness of the 
findings to describe what happens in the outsourcing of industrial maintenance in the 
pulp and paper industry. Moreover the research design enables the findings to have an 
expected value to the outsourcing of other services and in other industries. Finally, a 
research agenda based on the findings is suggested. It is expected to guide further 
exploration of the findings and to motivate the exploration of new tendencies in 
outsourcing practices. 
Practical implications 
The model can help outsourcing managers better understand the complexity, 
dynamism and problems of their own outsourcing management process, and improve 
their practices accordingly based on the findings. 
Originality/value 
The thesis addresses the on-going management of strategic outsourcing of services. 
Most literature provides insights into outsourcing strategy and high-level decisions 
(such as make/buy). Significant and dynamic activity and problems were seen to be 
occurring during this on-going phase. 
UU 
Acknowledgements 
Supervision 
My supervisors - Professor Peter Sackett and Professor Stephen Evans - have been a 
great support and I am grateful to them. Dr. Charles Wainwright also provided valuable 
help in the beginning of the research. 
Industrial collaborators 
I am indebted to all those who enabled and participated in the research, who offered 
their professional support and gave their time generously and freely. In particular I 
would like to thank: 
" Eng. Gil Mata, Dr. Jorge Armindo Teixeira, and Dr. Joao Manuel for their 
support and help in guaranteeing access to companies; 
" Eng. Guilherme Pedroso, Eng. Simöes Felgar, Eng. Pedro Coelho, Eng. 
Oscar 
Arantes, Eng. Helder Mendonca, Eng. Lamy Laranjeira, Eng. Kent Berglund, 
Eng. Anssi Marttila, among others for their contributions throughout the 
research. 
Family and friends 
Last - but not least -a big thank you to my family and friends: 
9 My parents, Rosalina and Fernando, for their constant love and support - as 
always; 
My grandmother, `Avö Ceu', for her constant concern and love; 
" My girlfriend, Laura, for her great understanding, support and love during 
these years of distance; 
" My friends, Eduardo Redondo and Jorge Juliäo, other Cranfield doctoral 
students with whom I lived our PhD adventures almost as a family; 
The Chen family for their support in the last part of the PhD. 
m 
Author profile 
Goncalo was born in Viseu, north Portugal. In 1996, at 17 years old, he went to 
Lisbon to undertake his Mechanical Engineering diploma (5 year degree; 1996-2001) 
from the Instituto Superior Tecnico (IST), Universidade Tecnica de Lisboa (UTL). 
During his degree he had an Initiation of Scientific Investigation scholarship (2000- 
2001) from the Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT) - part of the Portuguese 
Ministry for Science and Technology (MCT) - to work as a research assistant in the 
Institute of Mechanical Engineering (IDMEC), concerning mechanical design. IDMEC 
is a non-profit association of science and technology which is one of the leading 
Portuguese mechanical engineering investigators and plays a role in the coordination of 
Portuguese R&D. At the end of this funding, Goncalo had another scholarship (2001) - 
this time from the Portuguese Ministry of Education - for the final project of the degree. 
The project was related to the design of a chassis made of composite materials for a 
semi-trailer and was undertaken in IDMEC, in collaboration with `Carrocarias 
Honorio', the biggest Portuguese semi-trailer company. Parallel to this academic study 
and research, in 2000 Goncalo also had a work selected to be presented at the XI Forum 
Universitärio de Estudos Europeus, which took place in Salvador da Bahia and 
Fortaleza, Brasil. 
In the middle of the degree Goncalo decided that he wanted to take up the challenge 
of a PhD, but it was not until the final year that he decided to do a PhD related to 
business and in direct contact with industry. Moreover, he was keen to experience life 
in another country, and the language influenced the choice of England. So, in October 
2001, Goncalo started his PhD at Cranfield University, sponsored through another FCT 
scholarship (2002-2005). During the PhD he was invited to be part of a committee of 
the Portuguese Association of Industrial Maintenance (APMI), which focused on the 
general theme of outsourcing. 
Goncalo has recently been accepted as postdoctoral researcher in Said Business 
School, University of Oxford. 
V 
Representative publications 
Academic journals 
" Monteiro-Duarte, G., Evans, S., and Sackett, P. J., "Outsourcing management: 
problems affecting the service delivery", International Journal of Operations & 
Production Management, submitted. 
" Monteiro-Duarte, G., Evans, S., and Sackett, P. J., "Towards a model for 
management of services critical outsourcings", Supply Chain Management: An 
International Journal, submitted. 
Practitioner journals 
Monteiro-Duarte, G., Sackett, P. J., and Evans, S., "Outsourcing: One style does 
not fit all", Manufacturing Engineer, Vol. 83, No. 4,2004, pp. 44-48, ISSN 
0956-9944. 
Monteiro-Duarte, G., Sackett, P. J., and Evans, S., "Step by step: breaking 
outsourcing down into manageable phases", Engineering Management, Vol. 14, 
No. 6,2004, pp. 28-30, ISSN 0960-7919. 
Conferences reviewed papers 
" Monteiro-Duarte, G., Sackett, P. J., and Wainwright, C. E. R., "Strategic 
outsourcing performance management: realising concurrency in the production- 
maintenance relationship", Proceedings of the 10`h International Conference on 
Concurrent Engineering (CE2003), Madeira - Portugal, July 2003, pp. 1187- 
1194, ISBN 90-5809-624-6. 
" Monteiro-Duarte, G., Sackett, P. J., and Wainwright, C. E. R., "Strategic 
outsourcing performance management", Proceedings of the 1 S` International 
Conference of Manufacturing Research (ICMR2003), University of Strathclyde, 
Glasgow - UK, September 2003, pp. 499-503, ISBN 1-86058-412-8. 
Conferences working papers 
. Monteiro-Duarte, G., Sackett, P., and Wainwright, C. E. R., "Strategic outsourcing 
performance management: a maintenance case study", Proceedings of the British 
Academy of Management annual conference (BAM 2003), Leeds Business School, 
Harrogate - UK, September 2003, ISBN 1-898883-89-0. 
Monteiro-Duarte, G., Evans, S., and Sackett, P. J., "Outsourcing management: The 
gaps to overcome for success", Proceedings of the British Academy of 
Management annual conference (BAM 2004), University of St. Andrews, St. 
Andrews, Scotland - UK, August 2004, ISBN 0-9549608-1-5. 
Monteiro-Duarte, G., Evans, S., and Sackett, P. J., "Management of Outsourcing: 
An exploratory model", Proceedings of the 71h Irish Academy of Management 
annual conference, Trinity College, Dublin - Ireland, September 2004, ISSN 
1649-248X. 
vu 
Contents 
I. Introductory part 1 
1. Introduction 3 
1.1. Focus of the research 
5 
1.2. Research design 6 
1.3. Overview of the chapter 
7 
2. Review of the literature 9 
2.1. Presentation of the literature review 
9 
2.2. Definition of outsourcing 
9 
2.3. Benefits and risks of outsourcing 12 
2.4. Process of outsourcing 
14 
2.4.1. Competence analysis 15 
2.4.2. Assessment and approval 16 
2.4.3. Contract negotiation 17 
2.4.4. Project execution and transfer 17 
2.4.5. Managing relationship 18 
2.4.6. Contract termination 20 
2.5. Types of outsourcings 
20 
2.5.1. Traditional vs transformational outsourcing 21 
2.5.2. Manufacturing vs service outsourcings 27 
2.6. Research aim, objectives and novelty 28 
2.6.1. Research aim 
28 
2.6.2. Research objectives and deliverables 29 
2.6.3. Novelty of the research 
30 
2.7. Overview of the chapter 31 
3. Research Design 33 
3.1. Research problem 33 
3.1.1. Research topic and research questions 33 
3.1.2. Type of research 34 
3.1.3. Research objectives 35 
3.2. What the study is designed to achieve 37 
3.3. Research strategy 37 
3.3.1. Philosophy of the research 38 
3.3.2. Research tactic 39 
3.3.2.1. Research approach 39 
3.3.2.2. Sampling decisions 40 
3.3.3. Division of the research 41 
3.3.3.1. Exploratory phase 42 
3.3.3.2. Reinforcement phase 43 
3.4. Exploratory phase 45 
3.4.1. Objective 45 
3.4.2. Type of case study 45 
3.4.2.1. Limitations of the type of case study 46 
3.4.2.2. Techniques used to minimise the limitations 46 
3.4.3. Case selection 48 
3.4.3.1. Criteria for case selection 48 
3.4.3.2. How the chosen case satisfied the criteria for case selection 49 
3.4.4. Data sources 49 
3.4.5. Data type 50 
3.4.6. Researcher's role 51 
ix 
3.4.7. Data collection 52 
3.4.8. Data analysis 53 
3.4.8.1. Outsourcing management process model 54 
3.4.8.2. Outsourcing management problems 56 
3.5. Reinforcement phase 59 
3.5.1. Objective 60 
3.5.2. Type of case study 60 
3.5.3. Case selection 60 
3.5.4. Data sources 61 
3.5.5. Data type 62 
3.5.6. The role of the researcher 62 
3.5.7. Data collection 62 
3.5.8. Data analysis 65 
3.6. Research quality 67 
3.6.1. Construct validity 67 
3.6.1.1. General concerns 67 
3.6.1.2. Specific case 68 
3.6.1.3. Countermeasures 68 
3.6.2. Internal validity 69 
3.6.2.1. General concerns 69 
3.6.2.2. Specific case 70 
3.6.2.3. Countermeasures 70 
3.6.3. External validity 71 
3.6.3.1. General concerns 71 
3.6.3.2. Specific case 71 
3.6.3.3. Countermeasures 72 
3.6.4. Reliability 73 
3.6.4.1. General concerns 73 
3.6.4.2. Specific case 73 
3.6.4.3. Countermeasures 74 
3.7. Overview of the chapter 75 
4. Presentation of the case studies 77 
4.1. Exploratory phase 77 
4.1.1. Main characteristics of the single case study 77 
4.1.1.1. Client 77 
4.1.1.2. Supplier 78 
4.1.1.3. Main rationale for the outsourcing 78 
4.1.1.4. Contract signed 79 
4.1.1.5. Contract duration 79 
4.1.1.6. Scope of contract 79 
4.2. Reinforcement phase 80 
4.2.1. Main characteristics of Case A 80 
4.2.2. Main characteristics of Case B 80 
4.2.2.1. Client 80 
4.2.2.2. Supplier 81 
4.2.2.3. Main rationale for the outsourcing 81 
4.2.2.4. Contract signed 82 
4.2.2.5. Contract duration 82 
4.2.2.6. Scope of contract 82 
4.2.3. Main characteristics of Case C 82 
4.2.3.1. Client 82 
4.2.3.2. Supplier 83 
4.2.3.3. Main rationale for the outsourcing: 83 
4.2.3.4. Contract signed 84 
4.2.3.5. Corcactdtratim 84 
4.2.3.6. Scope of contract 84 
4.3. Overview of the chapter 84 
X 
II. Outsourcing management model 85 
5. Introduction to the outsourcing management model 87 
5.1. Research problem 87 
5.2. Research approach 87 
5.3. Structure of the presentation of the findings 90 
5.4. Small note concerned with language 91 
5.5. Overview of the chapter 91 
6. Outsourcing management process model 93 
6.1. Outsourcing management levels 93 
6.2. Description of the outsourcing management process 94 
6.2.1. `Environment' level 95 
6.2.1.1. Outsourcing context 95 
6.2.1.2. Outsourcing strategy 96 
6.2.1.3. Supplier strategies and desires 97 
6.2.2. 'Negotiations' level 98 
6.2.2.1. Client strategies and desires 98 
6.2.2.2. Agreements 100 
6.2.3. `Operations' level 102 
6.2.3.1. Supplier's understanding 102 
6.2.3.2. Service delivered 103 
6.2.3.3. Measured and perceived service 104 
6.2.3.4. Contractual reward system 105 
6.2.3.5. Supplier evaluation, feedback and actions 105 
6.3. Discussion 108 
6.4. Overview of the chapter 112 
7. Outsourcing management problems 113 
7.1. Management gaps and problems 113 
7.2. Gap 1 115 
7.2.1. Outsourcing's strategy poorly defined 115 
7.2.2. Agreements' scopes poorly defined 117 
7.2.3. Incomplete or bad definition of desires 118 
7.2.4. Lack of regular revision of strategy and desires 119 
7.3. Gap 2 121 
7.3.1. Lack of negotiations' effectiveness 121 
7.3.2. Specifications poorly defined 124 
7.3.3. Inflexibility of outsourcing contracts 126 
7.4. Gap 3 128 
7.4.1. Ineffective communication of the expectations 129 
7.5. Gap 4 131 
7.5.1. Supplier is unable to deliver a service correspondent to its understanding of the 
specifications 132 
7.5.2. Supplier's performance is affected by its own objectives 133 
7.5.3. Client changes its behaviour towards the outsourced activity 134 
7.6. Gap 5 135 
7.6.1. Client's bias in perceiving the service 136 
7.7. Gap 6 138 
7.7.1. Reward system not appropriate to the situation 138 
7.8. Gap 7 140 
7.8.1. Client does not give much importance to outsourcing's management 140 
7.8.2. Incorrect use of a measurement system 142 
7.8.3. Lack of quality of the feedback 145 
7.9. Gap 8 147 
7.9.1. Internal resistance to outsourcing's success 148 
7.9.2. Supplier does not have liberty to work 149 
7.9.3. Outsourcing management team not suited for its role 151 
7.10. Gap 9 154 
XI 
7.10.1. Ineffective communication 154 
7.10.2. Bad relationship between parties 156 
7.103. Power imbalance 157 
7.10.4. Lack of trust 158 
7.10.5. Existence of conflicts 159 
7.11. Comment on data not supporting findings 161 
7.11.1. Gap 1 161 
7.11.1.1. Outsourcing's strategy poorly defined 161 
7.11.1.2. Agreements' scopes poorly defined 161 
7.11.1.3. Lack of regular revision of strategy and desires 162 
7.11.2. Gap 4 162 
7.11.2.1. Client changes its behaviour towards the outsourced activity 162 
7.11.2.2. Supplier's performances are affected by its own objectives 162 
7.11.3. Gap 7 163 
7.11.3.1. Incorrect use of a measurement system 163 
7.11.4. Gap 8 163 
7.11.4.1. Internal resistance to the outsourcing's success 163 
7.11.4.2. Supplier does not have liberty to work 163 
7.11.5. Gap 9 164 
7.11.5.1. Existence of conflicts 164 
7.12. Discussion 165 
7.13. Overview of the chapter 169 
III. Closing section: 171 
8. Conclusion 173 
8.1. Overview 173 
8.1.1. Outsourcing management process model 174 
8.1.2. Outsourcing management problems 175 
8.2. Contribution to knowledge 176 
8.3. Strength and potential weaknesses of the approach 178 
8.3.1. Strengths 178 
8.3.2. Potential weaknesses 179 
8.4. Recommendations for future research 180 
8.5. Recommendations for practitioners 182 
8.6. A final comment 183 
9. References 185 
IV. Appendixes 195 
A. Appendix A 197 
B. Appendix B 199 
C. Appendix C 229 
xH 
I. Introductory part 
Aim: Introduction to the research 
Chapter 1- Introduction 
1. Introduction 
In today's rapidly-changing environment, organisations are looking for new ways to 
gain competitive advantage. Outsourcing is one of them, and was considered by 
Harvard Business Review to be one of the most important management ideas and 
practices of the past 75 years (Sibbet and Harvard Business Review's staff, 1997). It 
permits organisations to enhance effectiveness by focusing on their own core 
competences, while having specialised providers with better performance and more 
effective cost structures responsible for other functions (Jennings, 2002; Blumberg, 
1998). 
In the post-war period, horizontal and vertical integration and conglomeration 
diversification were recommended by many academics and management gurus. Their 
arguments were that these strategies would give firms the potential to achieve 
economies of scale and corporate synergies; horizontal integration would provide 
opportunities for greater market power, vertical integration would offer greater control 
of the firm's overall supply chain, and conglomeration would offer the potential for 
greater stability and security through an increased product and market range. 
By the 1970s and, even more strongly, by the 1980s the vulnerable nature of the huge 
corporation became highly visible, and a consensus that corporate strategies should 
focus on fewer activities was reached. This consensus resulted in the emergence of a 
new organisational form; companies concentrated on a nucleus of core activities in- 
house, while the rest was supplied through contracts with other organisations 
(Domberger, 1998). 
Hence, while previously firms acquired and merged with other firms that were not 
competitors at the same stage of the supply chain (adjusting the firm's boundary to 
include new elements of their supply chain - vertical integration - or elements of other 
supply chains, unrelated to their original supply chain - conglomeration), they started to 
divest their own businesses which appeared to have no logical place within their 
boundaries. Vertical integration permitted firms to enlarge their boundaries along their 
principal supply chain, and they started to downsize, contracting out or outsourcing 
some activities of the supply chain. The majority of contracted out or outsourced 
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activities corresponded to support services and products. These services and products 
often belonged to firm's secondary supply chains which, although not a part of the 
supply chain that delivers the market offering, were necessary for the firm to function. 
In horizontal integration firms operating at the same supply chain stage (competitors) 
merge. Hence, the boundaries of the firms remain almost the same in terms of the scope 
of activities undertaken, but the market power of the firm will increase with its scale. In 
fact, the intensifying competition and increasing costs of technological innovation have 
led to an enlargement of acquisitions and merger activity (Lonsdale and Cox, 2000). 
Firms are constantly adding new activities to their structure, finishing others or 
changing the way they are supplied (through cooperation with other firms, for example). 
Hence, the boundaries of these firms are continuously changing. Organisations re- 
evaluating the way they operate in the marketplace are trying to reposition themselves 
higher in the value chain to gain competitive advantage. So, as part of the process of 
moving up the value chain, companies are trying to reduce costs and improve 
efficiency. In order to achieve that they are undergoing organisational changes 
(Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2000), concentrating on core activities while they transfer 
some non-core activities to external suppliers (Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000). 
Core competencies are skills or knowledge sets, not products or functions; flexible, 
long-term platforms that are capable of adaptations or evolution. They are limited in 
number - generally two or three - and are a unique source of leverage in the value 
chain; areas where the company can dominate/perform activities important to the 
customer better than others, elements important to customers in the long run, and 
embedded in the organisation's systems (Quinn and Hilmer, 1994). These 
competencies are the activities that provide long-term competitive advantage to a 
company. The boundaries between what is considered core or non-core activity is 
blurred. Thus the nature of outsourced activities is becoming more diversified. 
The transfer of activities to external organisations means that the performance of a 
company is dependent on its own internal capabilities, and also those of its suppliers. 
Due to this increasing inter-dependency with suppliers, the competitive advantage of an 
organisation depends on the relationships and linkages that it constructs with external 
companies (Park et al, 2001; Spekman et al, 1999). So externalisation, or the ability to 
connect quickly and meaningfully with business partners and customers to rapidly 
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improve the quality of goods and services is becoming a competitive imperative, and 
companies are abandoning their previous self-contained and vertically integrated 
structures to move to a more virtual structure, in which they rely on business partners to 
fulfil major parts of their supply and value chain requirements. This effort to 
externalise and become an extended enterprise bears an extraordinary similarity to the 
Japanese Keiretsu model (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2000). Real competitive 
advantage is starting to come from the supply chain as a unit rather than from its 
individual components. As Christopher and Juttner (2000) have commented, "Supply 
chains compete, not companies". 
In this context, outsourcing has gained wide acceptance as a business strategy 
(Mullin, 1996). Although some executives still use outsourcing primarily to offload 
non-core activities and reduce costs, others use it to gain access to competitive skills, 
improve service levels and increase their ability to respond to changing business needs. 
Thus, outsourcing is evolving from simply being a way of cutting costs to a delicate 
strategy of alliances and joint-ventures with providers to enhance performance. 
Outsourcing is now starting to evolve into a form of `vertical quasi-integration' of the 
supplier. In such reality the cultural differences between client and supplier are 
minimised, and are based on cooperative working procedures defined through advanced 
forms of client-supplier relationships. Outsourcing enables the adjustment of firms' 
boundaries according to the needs resulting from their surrounding environment 
(Mahnke, 2001). 
1.1. Focus of the research 
Outsourcing has been thoroughly researched during recent years, and two themes of 
outsourcing research have been the subject of particular interest among researchers, 
namely the reasons for and benefits of outsourcing decisions, and the decision as to 
whether or not to outsource (the make or buy decision). Other themes, such as the 
selection of a partner for the outsourcing relationship and the elaboration of the contract 
have also received attention from the research community (either directly or indirectly, 
through studies in parallel areas as normal buyer-supplier relationships and alliances). 
However,, what happens once the outsourcing contract is signed has been neglected by 
5 
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researchers., This neglected part has the potential to dictate the success or failure of 
outsourcing, even when a good outsourcing base has been created. 
The author's research is focused on 'the exploration of the management of 
outsourcing during the on-going phase of the process. The lack of sufficient theoretical 
understanding surrounding the on-going management of outsourcing highlights the need 
for the development of a better understanding of its mechanisms, thus this research 
investigates the way companies manage on-going outsourcing and the problems that 
they have. It attempts to structure and describe the outsourcing management process 
and understand and explain some of its problems. The research therefore aims to 
generate new knowledge and an initial theory that can contribute to future theory 
development and refinement. 
1.2. Research design 
Outsourcing management is undertaken by people, involved in groups and bounded 
by the context they live in. The actions of those people - which guide the outsourcing 
management - are directed by how they think, feel and behave, both as individuals and 
groups. This assumption that social reality is produced and reproduced by social actors 
leads the research to a constructivist approach. 
The research was divided in two sequential parts with complementary objectives. 
The first part - the exploratory phase - was used to develop the initial knowledge about 
the outsourcing process. The second part of the research - the reinforcement phase - 
considered whether the knowledge collected and structured in the exploratory phase was 
real and supported by the people involved in the outsourcing where that phase took 
place. The reinforcement phase also aimed to see whether the knowledge collected and 
structured in the exploratory phase was useful and appropriate to describe what 
happened in two other different outsourcings. 
The methodological approach taken in this research is further developed in the 
`Research design' chapter of this thesis. The thesis structure is shown in Figure 1. 
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Chapter I 
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Chapter 2 To describe the context fier the research and the 
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Chapter 3 Research 
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presentation of the Introduction to the outsourcing presented. 
p 
management model findings 
Chapter 6 To present the suggested model to describe the 
Outsourcing management outsourcing management process. 
process model 
Chapter 7 l'o present and describe the gaps and problems in the 
Outsourcing management model: outsourcing management. 
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Model describing the 
outsourcing 
management process 
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Chapter 8 
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To summarise the approach taken and the overall research and Conclusion 
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Chapter 9 To present the information necessary to enablel References List of references readers to track the referenced works. 
Figure 1- Thesis structure 
1.3. Overview of the chapter 
The chapter provides the background and context to this work in outsourcing. The 
focus of the thesis is on the way companies manage on-going outsourcing during its on- 
going phase and the problems that they have. The chapter ends with an overview of the 
Chapter I- Introduction 
structure of the thesis (Figure 1), helping the reader to understand better the logic and 
sequence of the document. 
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2. Review of the literature 
Outsourcing is one of the most prevalent trends in today's business environment, yet 
outsourcing management has not received a great deal of interest from academics. This 
chapter gives a brief overview of outsourcing to provide the context of the research. 
The aims and objectives of the research are presented, as well as its contribution to the 
existent body of literature. 
2.1. Presentation of the literature review 
This literature review aims to clearly define and bound the subject under study, 
placing the present work in the context of its contribution to knowledge. /As no 
investigation focusing on the current research topic was found in the literaturit is not 
possible to present existing models concerning the way clients manage on-going 
outsourcings and on the problems they have., 
This literature review starts by highlighting the lack of consolidation in the language 
used to refer to outsourcing concepts. It discusses contradictory definitions for 
outsourcing existent in the literature, and suggests a definition, which is then followed 
in this thesis. The literature review follows by debating the risks and benefits of 
outsourcing and defining the outsourcing phase under study in this thesis: being the 
`Managing relationship' phase, which corresponds to the on-going management of 
outsourcings. Then outsourcings are distinguished, according to their characteristics 
and types of activities. The outsourcings under investigation in the thesis are then 
identified: strategic outsourcing of services. Finally the aims and objectives of the 
research are presented, jointly with its contribution to knowledge. 
2.2. Definition of outsourcing 
Many of the terms characteristic of outsourcing are used in the literature with 
different meanings. This may lead to confusion. An example of this is the term 
`outsourcer'. 40utsourcer' can be refer either to the client organisation (e. g. Meer- 
Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000) or to the supplier organisation (e. g. Linder et al, 2002). 
There is a need to standardise the language of outsourcing, and the literature, too, seems 
not to be consolidated. This may be justified by its relative newness. 
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In this work the term `outsourcer' is used to refer to the customerlbuying 
organisation; the company which is outsourcing an activity. In the thesis the term 
`client' is used to refer to the `outsourcer'. The expression `outsourcing management' 
also refers to the client's processes and practices of managing an outsourcing and their 
suppliers. Another example of the lack of rigour within the language of the outsourcing 
literature is the term `outsourcing' itself. 
In spite of being one of the most prevalent trends in today's business environment 
(Bragg, 1998; Greco, 1997), the definition of outsourcing is not clear in the literature. 
Some authors simply define outsourcing as the procurement of products or services 
from sources that are external to the organisation (e. g. Lankford and Parsa, 1999). They 
see outsourcing as the process of looking for expertise to handle certain activities 
outside the existing firm. 
This definition of outsourcing is so broad that it can include almost all kinds of goods 
and services that an organisation buys from an outside firm. Gilley and Rasheed (2000) 
contend that outsourcing cannot be defined simply as a procurement activity. Seen in 
this way its true strategic nature of rejecting the internalisation of an activity would be 
completely hidden. Outsourcing can be a highly strategic decision that has the potential 
to cause ripple effects throughout the entire organisation. 
Some authors have a more restricted definition of outsourcing. They argue that it is a 
form of external provision for the delivery of goods or services that had been previously 
offered in-house (Lonsdale and Cox, 1998). For them outsourcing is the act of 
transferring some of the organisation's recurring internal activities and decision rights to 
outside suppliers, as set out in a contract (Greaver, 1999). Hence, this externalisation 
view states that outsourcing is the process of transferring the responsibility for a specific 
business function from an employee group to a non-employee group (Zhu et al, 2001). 
What if an organisation needs to incorporate a new process and wants it to be 
supplied by an external supplier? Can't that be outsourcing? To respond to this kind of 
situation Gilley and Rasheed (2000) present a more structured and complete view of 
outsourcing. This view can be seen as the convergence of the two already presented. 
They state that outsourcing may arise in two ways. Firstly, it may appear by the 
substitution of internal activities by external purchases. In such cases outsourcing can 
be viewed as a discontinuation of internal production and the beginning of procurement 
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from outside suppliers. However, Gilley and Rasheed argue that outsourcing doesn't 
need to be limited to those activities that are shifted from within the enterprise to 
external suppliers. It may arise when a firm purchases goods or services from outside 
organisations even though it could produce them internally, even when those goods or 
services have not been completed in-house in the past. This abstention-based 
outsourcing, just like the substitution-based outsourcing (externalisation philosophy), 
reflects a decision to reject internalisation. They say that an organisation having no 
choice but to acquire a particular good or service from an external source (because of a 
lack of capital or expertise, for example) is not outsourcing, because the internalisation 
of the activity in question is not an option. Hence, outsourcing involves the decision of 
not performing the activity `in-house'. 
Although some researchers treat outsourcing and contracting out as one and the same 
thing (Lonsdale and Cox, 1998), others radically distinguish them. They contend that 
outsourcing is not a synonym for contracting out (e. g. Embleton and Wright, 1998), and 
affirm that contracting out refers to work assigned to an outside supplier on a job-by job 
basis, usually involving a cost-plus arrangement. Outsourcing, on the other hand, 
entails a long term relationship between supplier and beneficiary with a high degree of 
risk-sharing. 
The key to the definition of outsourcing is the concept of transfer of control (Bendor- 
Samuel, 2000). Outsourcing differentiates from business relationships (normally with a 
short term horizon, even though that can be renewed over time) in which the client 
retains control of the process and tells the supplier how to do the work. In outsourcing 
the supplier has control over the activity and its management. So, it is expected that the 
supplier's know-how is used more effectively and that the internal coordination of the 
activity is easier. 
Following the previous argumentations, the definition of outsourcing used in this 
work is: 
Outsourcing is the continuous procurement of products or services from sources 
external to the organisation for a defined period of time, when the internalisation of the 
activity in question is an option and its control and decision rights are transferred to the 
supplier. 
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2.3. Benefits and risks of outsourcing 
Outsourcing enables companies to use external suppliers' economies of scale, 
investments, innovations and specialised professional capabilities that the buyer would 
have difficulty in affording otherwise. This way, clients have more resources to focus 
on their own core competences, while increasing flexibility and reducing overheads. 
The benefits of outsourcing are appellative, but are constrained by its risks which 
cannot be underestimated. Outsourcing can lead to the loss of critical skills, loss of 
control over the outsourced function and the introduction of new and unanticipated 
costs. But, although the literature warns of the serious danger of outsourcing risks, 
Gilley and Rasheed (2000) concluded that the dangers associated with outsourcing may 
not be as large as they appear. Nevertheless, they conclude their argument by 
highlighting that the dangers of outsourcing are long term and may not have been 
adequately captured by their study. 
In the literature many surveys point to the reasons to outsource and the risks of 
outsourcing (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2002b; Bailey et al, 2002; Claver et al, 2002; 
Elmuti and Kathawala, 2000; Fan, 2000; Hurley and Schaumann, 1997). The 
populations surveyed as well as the survey period vary. The rankings of the reasons to 
outsource and of the risks of outsourcing are dependent on the specific situation and 
hierarchical position of the populations used in the survey, thus the ordering of each 
work cannot be compared since they represent different situations. 
Some of the most important potential benefits of outsourcing - directly related to the 
reasons for outsourcing - and risks available in the literature are presented below 
(Figure 2) divided into types. 
Some studies state that senior management is increasingly recognising that the 
disadvantages of outsourcing outweigh the advantages (e. g. Kliem, 1999). So, the 
rampant growth of outsourcing does not necessary imply satisfied customers 
(Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2000) and several studies show that a considerable 
percentage of outsourcings are not achieving the expected results (e. g. Willcocks and 
Lacity, 1999; Mullin, 1996; Lacity et al, 1995), in some cases even leading to the in- 
sourcing of the activity (Greco, 1997). 
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Type of Benefits 
benefits/risks Risks 
Q nnDydcivm Enhance effectiveness by focusing on coreReduced company's control over the 
competences (e. g. Kakabadse and outsourced activity (e. g. Kakabadse and 
Kakabadse, 2002b) Kakabadse, 2000) or supplier (e. g. 
Increase flexibility to meet current volatileQuinn and Hilmer, 1994) 
business conditions (e. g. Hurley and Loss of skills and memory inside the 
Schaumann, 1997) client organisation (e. g. Jennings, 2002) 
Transform the organisation (e. g. Business volumes (or business 
Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2000) conditions) on which the outsourcing 
contract was based may decline (or 
change), rendering the outsourcing 
inadequate to the situation (e. g. Rothery 
and Robertson, 1995) 
hrgnn tdsiven Improve operating performance (e. g. Monitoring and managing the 
Embleton and Wright, 1998) performance of the providers is a crucial 
Acquire new ideas, expertise, skills and but difficult task, which if wrongly done 
technologies that otherwise would not be can seriously jeopardise the outsourcing 
available inside the company (e. g. (e. g. Reilly and Tamkin, 1996) 
Lankford and Parsa, 1999) Weakened innovative capacity (e. g. 
Improve credibility and image by Reilly and Tarnkin, 1996) 
associating with superior providers (e. g. 
Greaver, 1999) 
Fimrr alaixlcx Reduce costs through provider's superior Cost surprises (hidden costs and costs 
fei performance and lower cost structure (e. g. savings not as high as expected) (e. g. 
Bailey et al, 2002) Barthelemy, 2001) 
Turn fixed costs into variable costs and Redefinition of organisation's 
generate cash by transferring assets to the boundaries and consequent structural 
provider (e. g. Kakabadse and Kakabadse, adjustments of human resources incur 
2000) social and new financial costs (transition 
Reduce investments in assets and free up costs) (e. g. Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 
some resources for other purposes (e. g. 2000) 
Blumberg, 1998) 
Revawdriýn Accelerate expansion by using provider's Leak of information and know-how for 
developed capacity, processes and systemsthe concurrence (e. g. Barthelemy and 
(e. g. Greaver, 1999) Geyer, 2001) 
Gain market access and business Outsourcing functions that have 
opportunities through the provider's customer contact may alienate customers 
network (e. g. Vanson, 2001) (e. g. Blumberg, 1998) 
Figure 2- Potential benefits and risks of outsourcing 
In contrast to the more negative trends reported, Kakabadse's survey (Kakabadse and 
Kakabadse, 2002a) reports positive experiences of outsourcing. Fifty eight per cent of 
the respondents (over seven hundred from Europe and North America, mainly senior 
managers from board level or from the executive committee) indicated satisfaction with 
their outsourcing arrangements, over 36 per cent indicated mixed feelings as to what 
they had gained from outsourcing, and fewer than 6 per cent reported dissatisfaction 
with their outsourcing experience. Although there is no clear consensus about the 
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impact of outsourcing on firm-level performance (Mason et al, 2002; ten Raa and 
Wolff, 2001; De Groot, 2001; Jumah and Wood, 2000; Gilley and Rasheed, 2000), the 
arguments surrounding its positive impact in the functional areas in which it occurs 
seem to be consensual (Gilley et al, 2004; Jones et al, 2003; Heshmati, 2003; Gilley and 
Rasheed, 2000; Fixler and Siegel, 1999). 
This apparent contradiction between those who affirm that many outsourcing 
contracts are not being successful and studies which indicate satisfaction with 
outsourcing can be partly explained by Elmuti and Kathawala's (2000) survey. This 
concludes that while organisations are not getting the projected or the promised order of 
magnitude of improvements from outsourcing, they are achieving significant 
improvements in their activities. Companies are expecting bigger improvements in 
their activities than those actually achieved, but the improvements achieved are still 
significant. Such a conclusion seems to be supported by the affirmation of Kakabadse 
and Kakabadse (2000), who say that nearly 70 per cent of companies who have 
undergone outsourcing state that they are "unhappy with one or more aspects of their 
suppliers". 
2.4. Process of outsourcing 
The outsourcing literature provides some consensus about the way to divide the 
process of outsourcing into phases. Even though the proposals for structuring the 
outsourcing process in phases are not exactly the same (e. g. Momme and Hvolby, 2002; 
Zhu et al, 2001; Greaver, 1999), they have similar bases as the identification of the 
cyclical nature of the outsourcing process. 
This work uses Momme and Hvolby's (2002) framework (Figure 3) to structure the 
outsourcing process. This complete framework divides the outsourcing process in six 
phases. Additionally, it identifies their built-in activities, performance measures and 
expected outputs. 
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Figure 3- Outsourcing process (Momme and Hvolby, 2002) 
Each of the identified phases, and the corresponding literature, is briefly presented in 
the following sections. 
2.4.1. Competence analysis 
The first step when thinking about outsourcing is the choice of what to outsource. 
This decision is highly related to a company's strategy. Although the activities which 
are candidates for outsourcing may be chosen according to the manager's experience, 
some research presents structured tools which corporations can employ to choose 
outsourcing candidates (e. g. Drejer and Sorensen, 2002; Insinga and Werle, 2000). 
After the choice of the candidate activities, organisations can use various tools to 
assist the decision of whether or not to outsource a specific chosen activity (Humphreys 
et al, 2002; Platts et al, 2002; Tayles and Drury, 2001; Mclvor, 2000; Spina et al, 2000; 
Coman and Ronen, 2000; Cdnez et al, 2000). This decision, commonly called the 
`make or buy' decision, always has to be moderated by the specific context situation 
and environment (Wilson and Zhang, 2002; Ghausi, 2002; Nellore and Soderquist, 
2000; Arnold, 2000; Dekkers, 2000; Fill and Visser, 2000; Londsdale, 1999; Jennings, 
1997; Gavin and Matherly, 1997). Some research also suggests that for the 
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maximisation of companies' effectiveness, the aim should be the achievement of an 
optimum point between integration and outsourcing (e. g. Grossman and Helpman, 
2002). 
The `make or buy' decision is the most commonly studied of the outsourcing phases. 
Even though conservative literature states that only non-core activities should be 
outsourced (e. g. Mullin, 1996), a new breath of literature argues for the outsourcing of 
activities related to companies' core competences (e. g. Heikkila and Cordon, 2002; 
Baden-Fuller et al, 2000). 
At the end of this phase the client company should have a good level of knowledge 
of its competitiveness, a strategic direction which is well defined, a candidate activity to 
outsource, and the decision of whether or not it should be outsourced. 
2.4.2. Assessment and approval 
Research focusing on the choice of supplier for outsourcing is not abundant (e. g. 
Choy et al, 2003; Choy et al, 2002; Choy and Lee, 2002), although research focusing on 
the choice of suppliers in general is rich. It is expected that many of the techniques 
suggested for the choice of general suppliers can also be used to choose an outsourcing 
supplier. These techniques range from tools based on performance measurement (e. g. 
Lau et al, 2001) to methods related to operational research (e. g. Talluri and Narasimhan, 
2004; Talluri, 2002). Park and Krishnan (2001) examined the supplier selection 
practices among small business in the mid-West United States, to decide which were the 
most significant models for predicting the supplier selection practices in small firms. 
Customers select suppliers based on the relative importance of different attributes such 
as quality, price, flexibility and delivered performance (Verma and Pullman, 1998), but 
the purchasing relationship between companies is also important (Humphreys et al, 
1998). 
At the end of this outsourcing phase the client company should have chosen a 
supplier based on the proposals. The decision is normally based on risk, performance 
(related both to output and costs) and relational issues. 
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2.4.3. Contract negotiation 
Once the supplier has been chosen, the following step is to choose the best 
outsourcing configuration (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2000; Insinga and Werle, 2000; 
Suarez-Villa, 1998; Currie and Willcocks, 1998) and to negotiate the contract 
accordingly. The literature on contracts is wide. Some authors focus on how to 
negotiate a contract (e. g. Sankaran et al, 2002), while others discuss the constituents 
(e. g. Sadler, 2002; Logan, 2000) and consequences (e. g. Harris et al, 1998) of contracts. 
There is even research recognizing variations of contract type according to geographic 
location (Ryan, 1999). 
Some new and more informal types of contracts are appearing in the market, and the 
role of both formal and informal contracts is analysed in the literature (Frankel et al, 
1996). Some researchers suggest that formal and informal contracts are 
complementary (e. g. Poppo and Zenger, 2002) and that long term contracts are not 
always the best solution (e. g. Cohen and Agrawal, 1999). 
The literature realises that contracts based on incentive/disincentive contracting are 
becoming common (e. g. Bubshait, 2003; Berends, 2000). These contracts normally 
take the form of service level agreements (SLA) or of performance contracts (Mullin, 
2002; Lehr and McKnight, 2002; Gilleard and Kam-shim, 2001; Davies and Chan, 
2001; Bissel et al, 2000; Larson, 1998; Robison, 1998; Parish, 1997; Hiles, 1994; Pratt, 
1994). The literature also presents several means of avoiding common pitfalls 
associated with this kind of contract (e. g. Beten and Kant, 1999), as well as 
technological methods to support their use (e. g. Chan and Chung, 2002; Bhoj et al, 
2001). 
The signed contract defines the rules for the relationship and is very important for 
both the quality of the relationship and for the outputs of the outsourcing. 
2.4.4. Project execution and transfer 
This phase corresponds to the transfer of control of the outsourced activity from the 
client to the supplier. Outsourcing introduces a new relationship and a different culture 
into an organisation. Strategic steps need to be taken at the beginning of the 
relationship to properly manage the agreement and the change of control in the 
outsourced activity. For its success, both parties have to define their expectations and 
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work together to handle the problems in a manner that keeps the relationship following 
its original objectives (SourceNet Solutions, 2003). Companies may struggle in the 
`project execution and transfer' phase. This difficulty has many sources, for example 
the differences between company cultures, or the lack of attention paid to the soft sides 
- human concerns - of the process (Lynch, 2000a). 
Although the transition from internal to external (supplier) service has proven to be a 
complex and demanding process, literature guiding this outsourcing phase is practically 
nonexistent. There are some `loose' paragraphs in the literature referring to the 
transition from client to supplier, but no work focusing on the process of the 
outsourcing transition phase was found. It is believed that the change management 
literature can help in the transition process. 
At the end of this phase the supplier should understand the outsourced activity and be 
able to control its process. The supplier should also be already integrated into the 
client's company, and both companies should have adapted to each other. 
2.4.5. Managing relationship 
In the `managing relationship' phase the outsourcing is operating in full. The 
supplier controls the process and has the main responsible for the outsourcing. 
Although Momme and Hvolby (2002) have called this phase `Managing 
Relationship', it is much more than the relationship that is being managed. I Us the 
results, the processes, the supplier and the relationship of the outsourcing activity. So, 
from hereafter, this phase of the outsourcing overall process will be called the on-going 
phase or the on-going management of the outsourcing. 
The prime risk in outsourcing is non-performance. If the supplier does not deliver 
the goods or services according to the requirements of the contract, the client 
organisation could suffer a loss. Outsourcing has been perceived to be risky because 
control of the outsourced activity process is given to the supplier. Although there is risk 
associated with any activity, the subjective `distance' that contracting places between 
the client and supplier creates a heightened perception of risk (Domberger, 1998). 
Outsourcing management and monitoring is used to control this risk. It has four main 
objectives: to ensure that the supplier's work is faithful to the contract and the client's 
wants, to identify the extent of variation in quality and its relationship to cost factors, to 
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determine whether the clients (both the ones from within the client company and the 
client company's own clients) are satisfied with the service, and to determine the most 
cost-effective approach to ensure that efficiency and innovation gains from outsourcing 
are not eroded (Dean and Kiu, 2002). Outsourcing management and monitoring is 
essential to the success of outsourcing. Its philosophy is to monitor the outsourcing, 
and when an irregularity is discovered to deal with it preventatively. This way 
problems are prevented or corrected at an early stage, conflicts are avoided and the 
objectives of the outsourcing are more likely to be met (Tuten and Urban, 2001). 
Notwithstanding this importance of outsourcing management, managers tend not to 
reflect much about how they actually manage, and should manage their outsourcing 
relations (Kern and Willcocks, 2000). `The 2003 Outsourcing World Summit' seems to 
support this affirmation. /It concluded that less than half of the outsourcing companies 
have specific programmes in place to develop relationship management capabilities for 
outsourcing (Corbett, 2003) f As an observation on the lack of reflection about the best 
way to manage the outsourcing, there are clients that still neither archive performance- 
related data using formal recording systems nor report contractors' performances 
through proper channels (Ng et al, 2002). Such practices are likely to compromise the 
quality of an outsourcing management, and consequently the achievement of the 
outsourcing objectives. 
During this phase the client tries to guide the performance and supplier in such a way 
that the contract is respected and the objectives are achieved. 
Practitioners' neglect of the best way to manage outsourcing is mirrored by the 
academic community. Nevertheless, being the longer phase and the phase in which the 
outsourcing objectives are or are not met, guides about how to manage an outsourcing 
during its on-going phase and studies focusing on the pitfalls that occur during it (and 
which can jeopardise its success) are rare in the literature. Even though some works 
refer to problems which may occur in on-going outsourcing management, they tend to 
refer to them simply as part of a broader argument (e. g. Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 
2000). So problems are simply identified, spread and lost in the outsourcing literature. 
The literature which does analyse the problems in outsourcing management is more 
normally directed towards practitioners (Lynch, 2000a; Bendor-Samuel, 2000) and does 
so simply to immediately `sell' a solution for the problems. Academic studies focusing 
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on outsourcing management and its problems are missing. The present research focuses 
on this on-going phase of the outsourcing process, where the on-going outsourcing 
management takes place. 
IOutsourcing 
Choice of Contract 
decision supplier negotiation 
" Transfer of Contract 
activity to termination 
supplier 
Figure 4- Outsourcing phase focused by the research 
2.4.6. Contract termination 
At the end of an outsourcing contract the client has three options: to renegotiate the 
contract with the same supplier, to change suppliers, or to in-source the activity again 
(or a combination of the three). The two first options highlight the cyclical nature of 
outsourcing, while the last one corresponds with its end. 
No literature focusing specifically on the end of an outsourcing activity was 
identified, but some pieces of research focusing on business relationships in general are 
useful. Halinen and Tahtinen (2002) present a work about the ending of business 
relationships; what it is, why it happens, and how an extant relationship dissolves. 
2.5. Types of outsourcings 
The present work focuses on strategic outsourcings of services. Strategic 
outsourcings are outsourcings which are aligned with the client organisation's long-term 
strategies, where results which are either positive or negative will be important for it 
and which may emerge over several years (Greaver, 1999). 
Some authors suggest that a buying organisation has an overall management style 
that affects all their relationships (and, consequently it is not possible to manage 
absolute variety of types of relationships) (e. g. Donaldson and OToole, 2000). 
Nevertheless, the general view in the literature is that organisations cannot manage with 
only one design for all relationships, and need to manage a portfolio of relationships 
(e. g. Gadde and Snehota, 2000; Bensaou, 1999; Spekman et al, 1999). The same 
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happens with outsourcing. The characteristics of the outsourcing and the risks and 
benefits associated with its failure or success drive the type of needed management. 
There must be a concern covering issues of value in outsourcing management (Dean 
and Kiu, 2002). Developing close links and a good outsourcing management system 
with suppliers is resource-intensive (needs assessment, coordination, adaptation and 
interaction costs), so it can be only justified when the costs of extended involvement in 
outsourcing management are less than its benefits. Although outsourcings can be 
analysed according to the nature of the activity (IT, contract manufacturing, catering, 
etc. ) (e. g. Rothery and Robertson, 1995), an analysis according to their characteristics 
(e. g. importance for the client organisation) could be more effective when dealing with 
on-going management. 
The next section distinguishes two types of outsourcing; traditional and 
transformational outsourcings. The last, due to its characteristics, is closely related to 
strategic outsourcing. 
2.5.1. Traditional vs transformational outsourcing 
Conventional wisdom suggests that organisations should only outsource commodity 
activities (e. g. Mullin, 1996), recently it has been argued that under, certain conditions, 
more strategic activities can also be outsourced, as long as the outsourcing remains 
flexible and the client strategically controls (e. g. Heikkila and Cordon, 2002). 
Nowadays outsourcing is no longer limited to the simple reengineering of support 
systems to offload companies from non-core activities, reducing costs and improving 
strategic focus. It is already used to achieve rapid and sustainable improvement in the 
performances of companies at the enterprise level through access to competitive skills 
and improved ability to respond to changing business needs (Linder, 2004; Linder et al, 
2002). 
According to Mazzawi (2002), there are two main types of outsourcing: traditional 
and transformational. 
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Strategic drivers 
Characteristics 
r firne 
Classical outsourcing paradigm New outsourcing paradigm 
Reduction or control of operating costs. To grow and stay competitive (e. g. lower 
cost and improve service). 
Canplautuy Increased availability of capital funds. 
drner. Cash infusion. 
Specialisation. 
Access to expert skills (lack of internal 
resources). 
Problematic functions. 
Dcbatefoas Whether to outsource? 
Wh tisbc Non-core functions - parts, facilities and 
____ __ 
components. 
Dcsii ht adcn Strategic vs commodity approach. 
Effj ypirs In a single function. 
Global competition. 
Focus on core competencies - redirecting 
internal skills/ capabilities and resources to 
high value-added areas. 
Improved business focus. 
Move to flatter organisations/ downsizing. 
Search for greater flexibility. 
Cumulative production experience. 
(Re) invention of value to the customer. 
Advances in IT. 
Shared risk. 
What to outsource? 
Business processes - intellectual based 
systems (e. g. customer response handling, 
management). 
Value creation approach. 
In a whole process (e. g. greater 
shareholder value across the enterprise). 
R furä d Reduction of costs. Reduction of costs. 
thof Lack of expertise. Economic downturn. 
Q Global competition, mergers and 
acquisitions. 
Specialisation. 
Reducing size of the enterprise (including 
government). 
Figure 5- Strategic drivers: comparison between classical and new outsourcing paradigms (Kakabadse 
and Kakabadse, 2000) 
Traditional outsourcing focuses on avoiding doing in-house what others can do more 
efficiently and effectively. It embraces non-core services and adds value by giving 
access to best practice and economies of scale in non-complex and non-core areas. A 
shift from fixed to variable costs and access to new technology is achieved, but 
normally there is no significant business change. With this type of outsourcing 
performance improvements are operational or tactical rather than strategic. The 
objective is to do the same thing better, faster and cheaper. Thus, the added value it can 
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bring to an organisation is limited. Traditional outsourcing is no longer a competitive 
differentiator (Mazzawi, 2002). 
Market 
Characteristics Classical outsourcing paradigm 
Q! 9 uric Large corporations. 
New outsourcing paradigm 
Large-scale businesses. 
Medium and small businesses. 
Government. 
Outsourcing vendors themselves (e. g. EDS). 
M* r it' aac Manufacturing. 
secbr 
Gßowdim ixt Predominantly USA, UK and 
Australia. 
Services and manufacturing. 
Global and sectoral (e. g. retail, financial 
services). 
Figure 6- Market: comparison between classical and new outsourcing paradigms (Kakabadse and 
Kakabadse, 2000) 
Previously, conventional wisdom held that all problems should be fixed in-house and 
that only well-run operations should be outsourced (e. g. Forst, 1999). The logic was 
based on the difficulties that third parties could have in understanding and fixing 
problems. But, with new different needs and the broader capabilities of suppliers, 
situations and practices have changed. Suppliers have now considerable experience in 
improving operational performance and clients are anxious to access that experience to 
fix some of their problems faster and more effectively. As a result, traditional 
outsourcing has evolved to become more business focused and problem solving, with a 
focus on achieving all the benefits of traditional outsourcing, plus adding value through 
its strategic base. This is known as transformational outsourcing (Mazzawi, 2002). 
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Configuration 
Characteristics Classical outsourcing paradigm 
Efl ctsof u `Hollow organisation' (i. e. turning 
onorzmk6onalhm organisation into an empty box). 
New outsourcing paradigm 
`Virtual organisation' interconnected 
relationships. 
OQ Takeover of existing assets and 
human resources. Large up-front 
payments from the outsourcing 
suppliers to clients for the clients' IT 
assets, followed by performance 
improvement and cost reduction in 
the clients' IT operations. 
Oonalfomt Vertical integration. 
Diversified corporation. 
Suppliers install and run new systems. Unit 
cost reduction portion of operational savings 
goes into R&D and systems innovation, 
savings and profits shared with vendors (e. g. 
Swiss Bank/Perot Systems). 
Networked organisation (e. g. virtual 
organisation, Shamrock). 
Specialised corporation. 
Figure 7- Configuration: comparison between classical and new outsourcing paradigms (Kakabadse and 
Kakabadse, 2000) 
While traditional outsourcing focuses on efficiency, transformational outsourcing 
focuses on effectiveness. Transformational outsourcing focuses on core activities and 
business issues, using outsourcing as an important element of the wider strategy rather 
than an isolated entity. It is a tool to adapt enterprises to respond to market volatility 
and the pace and nature of the change. Transformational outsourcing combines 
consulting, technology and outsourcing, stimulating and facilitating business change. It 
helps to establish the capacity and capability to respond rapidly and effectively to the 
range of unpredictable events that occur in the actual business environment, or to 
improve the effectiveness of more strategic functions. Transformational outsourcing 
has the potential to enable an enterprise to achieve rapid and sustained benefit from a 
new market opportunity, or to improve the effectiveness of a function nearer to its core 
competences. Hence, transformational outsourcing is about helping to create a new 
strategic business model and a new management approach (Mazzawi, 2002). 
Transformational outsourcing tends to exploit intellectually-based systems (knowledge 
capacities) enabling higher value, more flexible and more integrated systems, improving 
a company's capacity to remain current and to innovate by interacting with `best in 
world' knowledge sources (Quinn, 1999). While traditional outsourcing is directed at 
support functions, transformational outsourcing is close to a company's strategic issues. 
Some authors even suggest the outsourcing of activities essential to a company's future 
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direction, such as innovation (e. g. Quinn, 2000). As can be seen from its 
characteristics, transformational outsourcing is closely related to strategic outsourcing. 
Performance management 
Characteristics Classical outsourcing paradigm 
gzjý ý foal Vertical integration. 
Mt fna Managing integration. 
Ccmiu* fim Control activities associated with 
inscr market-exchange relationship. 
New outsourcing paradigm 
External contracting of key activities. 
Managing portfolio of relationships. 
Complex co-ordination task. 
, Id k Monitoring performance (e. g. 
procurement and contract 
management). 
b5 Limited, with specification for 
possible additional services based 
on agreed schedule of rates. 
Catmt Contract specifies detailed 
performance provisions, including 
monitoring, penalties and 
guarantees. 
. Iz Individuals within single 
organisation (i. e. individual 
specialists). 
R of Primarily to re-negotiate terms of 
contract and/or change supplier. 
Coriatchim t Detailed, formal (legally binding) 
and highly specific. 
Dim cesck Mechanisms stated in contract 
document including the provision 
for specific arbitration. 
SLrOmdpan1itarr Effective choice of the supplier. 
Carmwoortzact Mega-large contract. 
Managing relationship and/or `virtual 
corporation'. 
Flexibility based on rapid and full sharing of 
information. Adjustments in scale or scope are 
negotiated on this basis. 
Control through co-operation, monitoring, 
sharing of benefits and risks. 
Entire organisation, contracting on particular 
set of activities (e. g. core competencies, 
organisational capabilities). 
Primarily to reposition and reinvigorate the 
relationship with the supplier (e. g. Kodak). 
Agreement between parties spells out general 
purpose and objectives of the relationships. 
Documentation usually parsimonious and not 
formal. 
Expectation is that potential disputes are 
resolved before they reach adversarial level. 
Emphasis on risk management and conflict 
resolution. No formal mechanisms specified 
although all legal processes can be utilised. 
Preparation and the commitment to manage 
outsourcing. 
Medium size deal (with discrete deliverables). 
S= 
Figure 8- Performance management: comparison between classical and new outsourcing paradigms 
(Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2000) 
Traditional and transformational outsourcings fall respectively into Kakabadse and 
Kakabadse's (2000) classical and new outsourcing paradigms. Representing different 
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paradigms, these outsourcings target different strategic drivers (Figure 5) and different 
markets (Figure 6). Hence, they have different configurations (Figure 7), different 
performance management (Figure 8) and different supplier interfaces (Figure 9), 
resulting in different levels of value, and consequently of outsourcing satisfaction 
(Figure 10). 
Supplier interface 
Characteristics Classical outsourcing paradigm New outsourcing paradigm 
R lief choice: Single supplier offering one-stop- Multiple suppliers or `best-in-breed' approach, 
shop or one-size-fits-all model, where different suppliers are selected for each 
where the entire IT operation is area of specialisation. Expected to provide 
handed over to one big supplier. seamless service (e. g. Halliburton Co., Kodak). 
Pro ürspacia Primarily technology and business Industry-sector driven (e. g. shared service 
driven. centres in oil industry). 
Nun±erofoa s Contracts for each individual 
supplier. 
Contract for individual consortia of suppliers 
(e. g. Pinnacle Alliance). 
Caiaknl Purchaser/supplier. 
ie 
Increasingly joint venture (e. g. shared risk, 
equity stakes, consortia, and spin-offs). 
Coca irtioa Variable, depending on activity, Variable but generally longer, often 10-15 
generally between three and seven years. 
years. 
Figure 9- Supplier interface: comparison between classical and new outsourcing paradigms (Kakabadse 
and Kakabadse, 2000) 
Although outsourcing practices differ slightly with the geographical localisation, its 
overall picture and evolution is similar (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2002b). 
Outsourcing satisfaction/dissatisfaction 
Characteristics Classical outsourcing paradigm New outsourcing paradigm 
Sa_tiM 70 per cent unhappy with 70 per cent unhappy with one or more aspects 
outsourcing outcomes. of their suppliers. 
Makrn isfar Incorrect and rigid specifications, Contract not adequately written, under- 
nwith loss of control, failure of estimation of the time and the skills needed for 
oýsoý service/goods delivery, high costs, managing contracts, lack of clarity of 
inadequate quality, uncooperative ownership, competitive advantage in the market 
vendor, and unrealistic no longer exists. 
expectations. 
Figure 10 - Outsourcing satisfaction/dissatisfaction: comparison between classical and new outsourcing 
paradigms (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2000) 
) 
k 
3 r 
) 
A 
I 
26 
1 
Chapter 2- Review of the literature 
2.5.2. Manufacturing vs service outsourcings 
The present work focuses on outsourcings of services. 
Service purchasing and quality in individual customer services (e. g. retail banking, 
credit cards) is very different from purchasing and quality of goods (Zeithaml et al, 
1990). Services are basically intangible; they are experiences rather than objects. 
Airline transportation and aerobic exercises cannot be measured, tested and verified in 
advance of sale to assure quality. The criteria customers use to evaluate them may be 
complex and difficult to capture precisely. Services are heterogeneous; their 
performance often varies from producer to producer, from customer to customer, and 
from day to day. Production and consumption of many services are inseparable. 
Quality in services often occurs during service delivery. Service quality is more 
difficult for customers to evaluate than goods quality. Therefore, the criteria that 
customers use to evaluate service quality may be more difficult for the marketer to 
comprehend. Moreover, customers=do not evaluate service quality solely on the 
outcome of a service (e. g. how a customer's hair looks after a haircut); they also 
consider the process of service delivery (e. g. how involved, responsive and friendly the 
hair stylist is during the haircut). The only criteria that count in evaluating service 
quality are defined by customers. Only customers judge quality; all other judgements 
are essentially irrelevant. Specifically, service-quality perceptions stem from how well 
a provider performs vis-ä-vis the customer's expectations about how the provider 
should perform (Zeithaml et al, 1990). 
In industrial relations the purchasing of services is also more complex than the 
purchasing of products. Fitzsimmons and colleagues (1998) re-state that services are 
less tangible, making the evaluation of the supplier difficult to measure and the 
specification of the service delivered less precise/ The same authors say that it is 
difficult to judge whether the services being delivered are meeting expectations because 
they are not subject to close scrutiny. There is no incoming inspection of deliveries as 
is the case of material goods. Manufacturing (products) outsourcing and service 
outsourcing differences are summarised in Figure 11. 
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Factor Manufacturing Service 
Defridmof Precise. Represented by engineering Usually imprecise. Broad definitions with Fý drawings and standards, many exceptions. 
Qpky- Emphasis on objective and measurable Some objective and many subjective and 
criteria, perception-based criteria. 
Poilsofoortam Few. Communication usually Many. The service provider often interacts 
channelled by a few people, such as directly with end users as well as the 
purchasing or the project manager. programme managers. 
Eh§jd2gMjtiM Separation is normal from host Separation is difficult as most services 
lr9fnnand company. This allows the use of any must be provided on the host company's 
aii r&IIhs contractors - even international - to site and cannot be inventoried or stored. 
control costs, etc. 
PST of Dependent on the accuracy of forecasts Dependent on both internal priorities and 
dmm± for final customer demand. external demand, both of which are 
dynamic. 
Wctcorntn1ty Work content is a direct function of the Work content is situation specific, so needs 
dLtnn* number of units consumed, so costs are to be monitored and accounted for. 
easy to determine. 
&a of Information can be shared with Contract workers may be exposed to 
dae: contractors on a need-to-know basis. confidential information during the 
delivery of their services (hallway 
conversations, access to restricted areas). 
P , kmr sohrtiat Formal procedures with clear Difficult to create a process because 
responsibilities can be easily specified. problems often occur due to interpersonal 
issues or vague, ill-defined expectations; 
problem resolution requires greater 
flexibility. 
TczsitimbL"cC With planning, it is usually possible to Transition is more visible. requires more 
mtacm change contractors with no noticeable communication to minimize problems; 
effect on supply; inventory can be disruption is often unavoidable because 
maintained during change. services cannot be stored and new contract 
workers are introduced to the site. 
Figure 11= Differences between outsourcing of manufacturing and services (Allen and Chandrashckar, 
2000) 
2.6. Research aim, objectives and novelty 
2.6.1. Research aim 
The overall aim of the research is to provide exploratory, structured knowledge about 
how clients manage strategic outsourcings of services in real world settings during their 
on-going phase, and about the problems that exist in such management. 
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Strategic outsourcings of services 
Outsourcing 
decision 
Contract 
termination 
Figure 12 - Focus of the research: clients' on-going management of strategic outsourcing of services 
2.6.2. Research objectives and deliverables 
The outsourcing management process has been neglected in the literature, and there 
is very little previous research on the management of an outsourcing. Thus, there is a 
significant gap in the literature around the management of outsourcing and a need to 
identify specific areas for further research. 
This exploratory research focuses around the following research questions and their 
Choice of Contract 
supplier negotiation 
Transfer of 
activity to 
sunnlier 
respective objectives: 
Research 
questions 
Objectives Deliverables 
ýýuºý thc! i nx To provide exploratory knowledge about the A model describing the 
camr, af clients' process of managing on-going strategic process of how clients manage 
ýicsdriýttrim- outsourcing of services. This can be used as a on-going strategic outsourcing 
starting point for further research about of services. 
outsourcing on-going management. 
To describe and structure clients' management Insight and structure to 
process of on-going strategic outsourcings. understand how clients 
manage their on-going 
strategic outsourcing of 
services. 
Rho nnv To understand and explain problems (causes and Identification, structuring and 
ai i rcftm'm- consequences) which occur in strategic explanation of problems that 
_of outsourcing of services on-going management occur 
in strategic outsourcing 
s! -st carnrcf and which may reduce the outsourcing's of services on-going 
____ 
e effectiveness. management. 
Insight into problems that 
occur in strategic outsourcing 
of services on-going 
management. 
Figure 13 - Research questions and research's objectives 
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2.6.3. Novelty of the research 
Previous outsourcing research has tended to focus on general issues related to the 
success and planning of outsourcing (e. g. make or buy decision), leaving operational 
issues of real world outsourcings aside. This exploratory research therefore investigates 
what happens in real world strategic outsourcings of services during their on-going 
phase. 
The research therefore contributes new knowledge by: 
" Describing and modelling in an exploratory way the process by which clients 
manage their on-going strategic outsourcings of services; 
o Identifying three management levels in such a management process, ' with 
different objectives and characteristics; 
o Structuring such management process into ten activities and exploring their 
characteristics; 
o Recognising the constant learning and adaptation mechanism existent in 
strategic outsourcing of services on-going management; 
o Recognising clients' continuous and active monitoring and guidance over an 
outsourced activity and corresponding supplier; 
" Identifying and exploring problems that occur during the on-going 
management of strategic outsourcing of services, which might have an impact 
on its effectiveness; 
o Identifying nine management gaps and twenty-four problems, and 
distinguishing and exploring their causes and consequences in a 
constructivist way; 
o Recognising that problems in the on-going management of strategic 
outsourcing of services can be originated by ineffectiveness in previous 
phases of the outsourcing overall process; 
o Concluding that both outsourcing parties sometimes adopt opportunistic 
behaviours which can jeopardise the objectives of outsourcing; 
o Identifying misalignments between aspects of the on-going management 
process activities which are, to a certain extent, a consequence of 
outsourcing on-going management problems; 
o Concluding that many of the identified problems are related; 
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9 Identifying the need for further research related to on-going outsourcing 
management. 
2.7. Overview of the chapter 
This chapter has provided an overview of outsourcing and defined the subject under 
investigation. A wide literature review concerning outsourcing, as well as similar 
relationships (e. g. partnerships, normal client-supplier relations) was undertaken to 
organise the background to the outsourcing research. The chapter demonstrated that the 
outsourcing literature is still not consolidated. The main concepts used in the thesis 
were defined, the general process of outsourcing was presented, and the phase under 
focus in this thesis identified: being the on-going outsourcing management phase 
(which is consistent with Momme and Hvolby's `Managing relationship' phase). 
Outsourcings were distinguished according to their characteristics as well as type of 
outsourced activity. The type of outsourcing on which this research focuses was 
identified as strategic outsourcing of services. Finally the researcher presented the aims 
and objectives of the study, as well as how it makes a novel contribution to the existent 
body of literature. 
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3. Research Design 
Research design is an integrated statement of and justification for the more technical 
decisions involved in planning a research project (Blaikie, 2000). It is the "logical plan 
for getting from here to there, where here may be defined as the initial set of questions 
to be answered, and there is some set of conclusions (answers) about these questions" 
(Yin, 2003). A research design "is much more than a work plan. The main purpose of 
the design is to help to avoid the situation in which the evidence does not address the 
initial research question. In this sense a research design deals with a logical problem 
and not a logistic problem" (Yin, 2003). The purpose of this chapter is to show the 
reader that the selected research design was appropriate to the aims and constraints of 
the research. The chapter aspires to outline, discuss and validate the chosen research 
design employed in this research. First, the research topic, research questions and 
objectives are restated. Second, the researcher's expectations for the study are 
presented. Then, the research strategy and tactics are introduced. Next, the methods 
used in the research will be introduced, jointly with explanation of how the collected 
data was analysed. The chapter concludes with a discussion about the quality of the 
research. 
3.1. Research problem 
The statement of the research topic both sets the research on a specific path and 
defines the area to be explored. Notwithstanding that the research topic has already 
been presented in the literature review, its formal statement follows. 
The topic itself provides very little direction for the design of the project. Research 
questions are fundamental to give the research a clear focus and direction, connecting 
what is going to be researched with how it is going to be researched (Blaikie, 2000). 
The research questions behind the research are presented, as well as a discussion about 
the type of research and its objectives. 
3.1.1. Research topic and research questions 
The new breadth of outsourcing (e. g. transformational and strategic) and the 
outsourcing of services require an even more rigorous management, due to their 
importance and delicateness. This research explores clients' on-going management of 
strategic outsourcing of services. It attempts to structure and describe such a 
management process and explain and understand some of its problems. 
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Strategic outsourcings of services 
Outsourcing 
decision 
Contract 
termination 
Transfer of 
activity to 
sunnlier 
Figure 14 - Focus of the research: clients' on-going management of strategic outsourcing of services 
The research is based in two research questions: 
How do clients manage strategic outsourcing of services during their on-going 
phase? 
What problems may affect the clients' on-going management of strategic 
outsourcing of services? 
3.1.2. Type of research 
Neuman (1997), based on Freeman and Rossi (1984), suggests an ideal typical 
contrast between basic and applied social research (Figure 15). Basic research is 
concerned with producing knowledge for understanding, and applied research is 
concerned with producing knowledge for action. 
Basic Applied 
Research is intrinsically satisfying and judgements Research is part of a job and is judged by sponsors 
are made by other sociologists. outside the discipline of sociology. 
Research problems and subjects are selected with a Research problems are narrowly constrained by 
great deal of freedom. the demands of employers and sponsors. 
Research is judged by absolute norms of scientific The rigour and standards of scholarship depend on 
rigour, and the highest standards of scholarship are the uses of results. Research can be 'quick and 
sought. dirty' or may match high scientific standards. 
The primary concern is with the internal logic and The primary concern is with the ability to 
rigour of the research design. generalise findings to areas of interest to sponsors. 
The driving goal is to contribute to basic, The driving goal is to have practical payoffs or 
theoretical knowledge. uses for results. 
Success comes when results appear in a scholarly Success comes when results are used by sponsors 
journal and have an impact on others in the in decision making. 
scientific community. 
Figure ]5 -Basic and applied social research (Neuman, 1997) 
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Notwithstanding this ideal dichotomy, Blaikie (2000) states that research is often a 
mixture of basic and applied. This research about clients' on-going management of 
strategic outsourcing of services is mainly basic, but has also the intention of helping to 
solve a practical problem and assisting practitioners in their jobs. 
3.1.3. Research objectives 
Research objectives are concerned with the type of knowledge to be produced. 
Research objectives include exploration, description, explanation, understanding, 
prediction, change, evaluation and impact assessment. Basic research focuses on the 
first five objectives, but particularly on description, explanation and understanding; 
while applied research may include some of these `basic objectives', it is particularly 
concerned with change, evaluation and impact assessment (Blaikie, 2000). 
This research has the objective of exploring, describing, explaining and 
understanding. The way in which the research aims to address each of these research 
objectives is now presented: 
Exploration: Very little is known about how clients' manage on-going strategic 
outsourcing of services. So, this research is exploratory and is used to develop an initial 
description and understanding bout theprocess an its problem . 
Description: This research seeks to present an accurate, albeit initial account of the 
structure of the clients' on-going management process of strategic outsourcing of 
services. Thus, it is also descriptive. Blaikie (2000) states that in practice the boundary 
between exploratory and descriptive research is blurred, but that descriptive research is 
more rigorous and is usually narrower in its focus. 
Explanation: This research seeks to account for patterns in the clients' on-going 
management process of strategic outsourcing of services. It attempts to make 
intelligible the structure of such a management process and that of some of its identified 
problems. Thus, this research is also explanatory; it gives an account of why the 
relationship between its components is as it is, as well as why some of the problems in 
the process may occur. 
Understanding: Blaikie (2000) notes that "the difference between explanation and 
understanding is a matter of how intelligibility is achieved; it is the difference between 
causal explanation and reason explanation. Explanations identify causes of events or 
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regularities, the factors or mechanisms that produce them, and understanding is 
provided by the reasons or accounts social actors give for their actions. The latter is 
also associated with the meaning of an event or activity in a particular social context, 
either that given by social actors or the meaning that researchers derive from social 
actors' accounts. Explanations are produced by researchers who look at the 
phenomenon from the `outside', while understanding is based on an `inside' view in 
which researchers grasp the subjective consciousness, the interpretations, of social 
actors involved in the conduct (... ) Whereas explanation is concerned with abstract 
patterns of relationships in deductive arguments or causal sequences, understanding is 
concerned with the reasons social actors give for their actions. The focus is not so much 
on the explanations that the researcher constructs but on the explanations social actors 
can offer and which can be used by the social researcher to construct a social scientific 
account of their activity. " This research focuses on some of the problems that occur in 
the on-going management of strategic outsourcing of services. It does it in two different 
ways: structuring the identified problems that occur in such a management and 
suggesting explanations for some of them; using managers' opinions and beliefs to 
justify some of those problems. 
Therefore it can be concluded that the research does not aim to produce generalisable 
results, but to develop an exploratory understanding that can be readily absorbed and 
taken up by academics and practitioners. Academics may use it to improve the 
presented on-going management of strategic outsourcing model or as a base for further 
research, while practitioners may use it to better understand their outsourcings and 
improve their practices accordingly. 
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3.2. What the study is designed to achieve 
The study will... The study will not... 
Explore and enhance understanding about the 
clients' on-going management of strategic 
outsourcing of services 
Produce facts or objective truths 
Provide insights that are expected to have value in Establish the relevance of existing theory 
the clients' on-going management of strategic 
outsourcing of services 
Have a holistic and abstract view of how clients 
manage on-going strategic outsourcing of services 
Describe exactly the practices of the case studies 
Have an exploratory focus on the elements and 
problems of the on-going management of those 
outsourcings that were most salient to the 
researcher and the ones involved in the study 
Focus on the emerging understanding and 
tendencies concerning the identified problems 
Give an overall, exploratory view about the on- 
going management of strategic outsourcing of 
services' process, gaps and problems 
Identify gaps and problems in the on-going 
management of strategic outsourcing of services 
Be generalisable to all strategic outsourcing of 
services 
Use population variables to compare differing 
perspectives 
Study the problems in depth 
Find a solution to the gaps and problems 
Be a relevant and meaningful starting point to the Provide all the answers 
exploration of on-going management of strategic 
outsourcings of services 
3.3. Research strategy 
On-going management of strategic outsourcing of services is undertaken by people, 
involved in groups and bounded by the context they live in. Those people's actions, 
which guide the outsourcing on-going management, are directed by how they think, feel 
and behave both as individuals and groups. Therefore, the approaches and methods of 
the social sciences need to be employed in the attempt to absorb and interpret the 
relationships between the companies involved in the outsourcing and the way in which 
these are perceived and operated by the people involved. This chapter shows how the 
research problem defined the strategic approach (logic of enquiry) to this study. 
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3.3.1. Philosophy of the research 
From a philosophical point of view, ontology is `the science or study of being'. 
However, ontology is normally used in a more specific sense: "ontological assumptions 
are concerned with what we believe constitutes social reality" (Blaikie, 2000). 
Approaches to social enquiry can be divided into two main groups in terms of their 
ontological assumptions; they are either positivist or constructivist. 
f"Positivism, 
critical 
rationalism and [structural version of (Blaikie, 2000)] realism all assume that social 
reality exists independently of the observer and the activities of social science, that this 
reality is ordered and that these uniformities can be observed and explained. However, 
they differ in their view of the elements that constitute social reality, particularly the 
explanatory elements, and on whether this reality also exists independently of social 
actors. (... ) The other major approaches, interpretivism, critical theory, structuration 
theory and feminism, are all fully or partly constructivist in their ontological 
assumptions, and [constructivist version of] realism also includes some elements of it. 
A constructivist ontology entails the assumption that social reality is produced and 
reproduced by social actors; it is a preinterpreted, intersubjective world of cultural 
objects, meanings and social institutions. A consequence of this position is that in any 
social situation there may be multiple realities" (Blaikie, 1993). Thus, there is a 
fundamental choice to be made by the social researcher between very different 
ontological positions: positivist versus constructivist. The main differences are 
presented in Figure 16. Easterby-Smith and colleagues (2002) argue that an 
understanding of philosophical issues is useful in research because it can support the 
creation of an adequate research design. 
The author's research took a constructivist position; it is assumed that the reality is 
determined by people rather than by objective and external factors. Hence not only 
were facts gathered (for example contracts) but the different constructions and meanings 
that people create from their experiences were also absorbed. The focus of the study 
was not only about what was happening in the outsourcing, but also on what the people 
involved were thinking and feeling. These thoughts and feelings were found to affect 
people's behaviour towards the outsourcing, and consequently affect the outsourcing 
itself. The research looked for general structures and problems in the outsourcing 
management as well as attempting to understand and explain companies' and 
.I 
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employees' motivations, experiences and actions which affected those factors. In this 
way, stakeholders' perspectives and interests were analysed, as well as the complexity 
of the outsourcing. 
Issue Positivist Constructivist 
Iaeofreairty Single Multiple 
Swir, Theory Observation 
Technical language Lay language 
Outside Inside 
R_kdtU_nde 1: 1 correspondence with reality Constitution of social activity 
aa mzls Irrelevant Fundamental 
Corrigible Authentic 
Trans-situational Situational 
Socsil mg= xxuis Generalisable across social Specific in time and space 
contexts 
Resgd_ _e Subject-to-object Subject-to-subject 
Detached Involved 
Outside expert Reflective partner 
c' hi + Absolutist Relativist 
Static Dynamic 
MM ä'c h Correspondence Consensus 
Political Pragmatic 
Ainofres=rh Explain Understand 
Evaluate Change 
Figure 16 - Main differences between realist and constructivist approaches to social enquiry (Blaikie, 
1993) 
3.3.2. Research tactic 
3.3.2.1. Research approach 
Case studies were chosen to undertake the present research. This decision followed 
Yin's (2003) guidelines, as is explained below: 
Type of research question - this investigation's "what" question is exploratory, so 
case studies, as well as other tactics (survey, experiment, history ... ) are appropriate. 
The "how" question of the research, in addition to being exploratory, deals with 
operational links and so needs to be traced over time. Hence it favours the use of case 
studies, experiments or histories. 
-k 
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Extent of control over behavioural events - in the investigation the researcher did not 
have control or power of manipulation over relevant behaviours, thus experiments were 
not appropriate to the situation in hand. The researcher had absolutely no control over 
the research context. In a real world situation it is almost impossible to establish direct 
causal links between events and their impact on the outsourcing; the closest the 
researcher can aim is to establish correlations, and therefore potential relationships 
between events and their impacts (and then support for these relationships may be 
sought). Case studies and histories remain possibilities. 
Degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events - as the 
outsourcings were functioning at the same time as the researcher was undertaking the 
study, the full range of evidence available (documents, interviews and observations), the 
flexibility and the depth of understanding that the situation permitted were able to be 
used in this investigation. Consequently case studies were chosen in preference over 
histories. In this way contextual conditions which were believed to be pertinent to the 
study of the outsourcing - in fact the outsourcing is not readily distinguishable from its 
context - could also be considered. 
The case study tactic focuses on understanding the dynamics present within single 
settings (Eisenhardt, 1989), even though each case can be analysed and compared with 
others. 
3.3.2.2. Sampling decisions 
The cases undertook had as unit of analysis the clients' process of on-going 
management of strategic outsourcing of services and its problems. All the case studies 
were conducted within the outsourcing of maintenance and were undertaken in the 
Portuguese pulp for paper industry. 
The overall aim of the research is to provide exploratory, initial structured 
knowledge about how clients manage strategic outsourcings of services in real world 
settings during their on-going phase, and about the problems that exist in such 
management. The resources and time available for the research were limited and its 
nature needed a deep analysis. So, the researcher had to compromise between depth and 
breadth; and he chose depth. Therefore the study focuses deeply upon just a sector of 
the population. 
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The researcher is Portuguese and elected to work with Portuguese companies, to 
benefit from sharing the same language and values with the people involved in the 
outsourcings, while also facilitating the interface, the relationship and the 
communication. 
The researcher sought important on-going strategic outsourcings that were operating 
in Portugal. He discovered that the Portuguese pulp for paper industry tended to 
outsource all their maintenance function, including management and coordination of the 
maintenance activities; and that these were among the largest outsourcings operating in 
Portugal. 
Industrial maintenance is crucial in such a continuous production industry, since it is 
strongly related to the primary process of such companies. Uptime, capacity and 
precision of equipment are extremely important for their business model; and the impact 
of maintenance on the quality of the final product is crucial. The aim of maintenance is 
to support and maintain efficient production, thus it needs to be integrated into the main 
business processes of the pulp for paper companies. Given that industrial, maintenance 
is a service essential for the client's success, it is judged to have high strategic 
importance, and therefore qualifies as a case of a strategic outsourcing of services. 
While based in a specific context, the research is expected to be of value to on-going 
management of strategic outsourcings of services in general. Although focused on 
outsourcing of the maintenance function in the pulp for paper industry, and specifically 
within Portuguese companies, it is expected that the insights and conclusions emerging 
from the research have value to a much wider variety of outsourced activities and 
industries. The cases did not exhibit extreme or unusual contexts or behaviours (when 
compared to the broader literature on outsourcing); the analysis also drew upon the 
limited extant literature and the wider international and cross-sectoral experience of 
some of the interviewees to provide limited support for the findings outside of the 
specific context of Portuguese pulp for paper companies. 
3.3.3. Division of the research 
To reach its objectives, the research activity was divided into two sequential parts 
with complementary objectives: the exploratory and the reinforcement phases. Each is 
briefly presented following. 
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3.3.3.1. Exploratory phase 
The on-going management of outsourcing of services is an area that has not received 
much attention in the literature., 
The exploratory phase of the research was used to develop the initial knowledge 
about the clients' on-going management of strategic outsourcing of services 
(exploratory research objective). The data collection stage was long and used a wide 
range of techniques to enable the absorption of a variety of different aspects. In this 
first phase, only data from the client side was collected, enabling a closer relationship to 
be developed with it. Such closeness was expected to bring benefits for the 
investigation. The research pursued the conceptual structure of the clients' process of 
on-going management of strategic outsourcing of services, and the identification and 
understanding of some of the problems that exist in such a management. 
Following the data collection, the researcher constructed a conceptual model which 
described the clients' process of on-going management of strategic outsourcing of 
services descrition research objective) and identified some of the problems that were 
arising in the studied on-going outsourcing, locating them in the steps of the model and 
presenting their rationale. To do this, the study used not only the opinions and beliefs 
put forward by staff within the client companies (understanding research objective), but 
also used the researcher's critical mind to suggest constructions and mechanisms 
(explanation research objective). The long data collection phase, the closeness to the 
outsourcing managers and the variety of methods used enabled a deep understanding to 
be developed about the actual outsourcing, which facilitated this investigation and 
reflection. 
Thus, at the end of the exploratory phase the researcher had an initial outsourcing 
management process model (model of the clients' on-going management of strategic 
outsourcing of services, in which its components are identified, structured and 
described). This model was also populated with some of the problems that were 
identified within each step of the strategic outsourcing of services on-going 
management; the rationale behind them was also presented. This group of problems 
and correspondent rationales is called outsourcing management problems. These two 
components (outsourcing management process model and the outsourcing management 
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problems) constitute the outsourcing management model proposed by the exploratory 
pha; c. 
Outsourcing management model 
( )ut. Our. in' [I Outsourcing management 
process model problems 
Figure 17 - Constitution of the outsourcing management model 
The proposed model was then taken to the next phase of the research: the 
reinforcement phase. 
3.3.3.2. Reinforcement phase 
I. nlikc the first phase of the investigation, which aimed at a deep understanding of 
the reality of clients' strategic outsourcing of services on-going management, the 
reinftrcement phase had two main objectives. Firstly, to see whether the model 
constructed based on a deep knowledge of one situation (the outsourcing management 
model resultant from the exploratory phase) was recognised as real and supported by the 
people involved in that actual situation; and to see whether the model was also useful 
and appropriate to describe what happened in other two different situations. 
Thus, if the model was reinforced by the data collected in the reinforcement phase, 
the model's appropriateness to describe the clients' on-going management studied in the 
exploratory phase would be strengthened, as would be the confidence for its use to 
describe other outsourcings. 
The data corresponding to the reinforcement phase was collected from the same 
initial outsourcing and from two other outsourcings. In this phase data was collected 
from both parties of the outsourcing. Due to the objectives of this phase, and the 
limited resources available, the data collection techniques used were more direct, and 
much quicker. 
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3.4. Exploratory phase 
In the exploratory phase a case study was used to build theory in an inductive 
fashion. Eisenhardt (1989) structures the steps necessary for using a case study to build 
theory. After identifying the research questions which guided and focused the study, 
the outsourcing literature was reviewed. -/It was observed that no current theory 
addressed the research questions), Thus, the investigation started with no theory under 
consideration and no hypotheses (or propositions) to test. Eisenhardt (1989) considers 
this to be desirable for this type of research. The aim is to remain unbiased from 
previous research and not to limit the possible findings right from the beginning. The 
investigation then continued on to the selection of the cases. 
3.4.1. Objective 
The objective of this phase of the investigation and case study was to develop the 
initial knowledge about the clients' on-going management of strategic outsourcing of 
services. So, the data collection process was long and involved a wide range of 
techniques. The aim was to enable the absorption of a variety of aspects of the actual 
situation, in order to comprehend the complexities of outsourcing. This was the only 
way that permitted the researcher to understand the construction that insiders build 
about the outsourcing, and at the same time, develop a critical view about it, suggesting 
alternative or further explanations about the same situation. The focus of the 
exploratory phase was on meaning, understanding and depth. The objective was the 
creation of knowledge and construction of a conceptual outsourcing management 
model. The resulting model was intended to be tested during the reinforcement phase of 
the research. 
3.4.2. Type of case study 
A single case study approach was chosen to conduct the exploratory phase of the 
research. As Blaikie (2000) suggests, case studies are expensive to conduct, so 
multiple-case studies should not be undertaken lightly. Moreover, Yin (2003) 
recognises that "the conduct of a multiple-case study can require extensive resources 
and time beyond the means of a single student or independent research investigator".. 
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3.4.2.1. Limitations of the type of case study 
Despite opting for a single case study in the exploratory phase, the researcher was 
aware of its main limitations: 
Uniqueness of the case -a case may have very special (and possibly unique) 
characteristics. It may be dangerous to extrapolate the findings from a randomly chosen 
single case study to other situations as they may have very different characteristics; 
Limited data - single case studies limit the researcher's ability to gain a wider and 
more representative range of data; 
No possibility of cross-case analysis (direct replication. contrasting situations. simple 
comparison. etc. ) - single case studies limit the researcher's power of analysis. The 
absence of cross-analysis may discourage investigators from using structured data 
analysis and hence limit them from going beyond initial impressions. As a consequence 
analytical conclusions created by single case studies may not be considered as powerful 
as those originated by multiple case-studies; 
Inability to reach theoretical saturation - in the use of case studies to build theory, 
researchers should ideally stop adding cases when theoretical saturation is reached 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Theoretical saturation is simply the point at which incremental 
learning is minimal because the researchers are observing phenomena already seen 
before. In single case studies it is not possible to achieve theoretical saturation since the 
data available is restricted by the case. The only closure that can be obtained in single 
case studies is analysis closure. Analysis closure corresponds to the point at which the 
researcher should stop iterating between theory and data because the incremental 
improvement to the theory is minimal. Thus, it is possible to achieve within-case 
analysis closure in single case studies. 
3.4.2.2. Techniques used to minimise the limitations 
In this investigation robustness was also a requirement. The single case study's 
limitations were minimised by: 
Use of a representative case (Yin, 2003) - in this study the population and the sector 
under study were well defined and the case selected was typical of that sector. So the 
lessons learned from this representative case are expected to be informative about what 
happens in other outsourcings of the population. 
46 
Chapter 3- Research design 
Overlap of local data analysis with data collection - enabled the researcher to have a 
flexible data collection process, being free to explore emerging themes or to collect 
extra data if found necessary for a better comprehension of the situation. 
Opportunistic data collection - enabled the researcher to take advantage of special 
opportunities for data collection and to explore emerging themes. The investigator tried 
to understand the case in as much depth as possible, attempting to collect all significant 
data about aspects considered important to the study and research questions. 
Data collected referring to other cases - the researcher had the opportunity to collect 
some data referring to other cases through conversations with practitioners and based on 
their past experiences. This data and understanding was useful to better comprehend an 
outsourcing situation and to develop the necessary critical perspective to construct the 
outsourcing management model. The fact that the data collected was not specifically 
related to the chosen case was not a negative point since the model does not aim to 
describe the specific outsourcing, but to be an initial conceptual outsourcing 
management model to represent general practices of the client's on-going management 
of strategic outsourcings of services. 
Great reflection after data collection and local analysis - after the data collection and 
local analysis, the results were the focus of considered thought and reflection by the 
researcher. Varied interpretations were tried and various points of view attempted. The 
researcher had the task of structuring the data analysis to keep the final interpretation as 
independent as possible from the initial one, and from the interpretations and 
understandings transmitted by the practitioners. Furthermore, since the outsourcing 
literature did not focus on the studied problems, inspiration for analysing and 
structuring the data was sought elsewhere (in literature felt to be parallel to the 
outsourcing situation under study, such as that of personal consumer services, 
partnerships, alliances, normal client-supplier relationships etc. ). 
Comparison with the literature - after data analysis, a preliminary model of 
outsourcing management was constructed, based solely on the data collected. Then, the 
preliminary model was compared with the available literature (both academic and 
practitioner). Naturally some of this literature did not refer to the population and sector 
under study, but had the potential to highlight some of the problems characteristic of 
general outsourcing management. Even though no similar construct to this study exists 
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in the literature, some of the outsourcing problems included in the suggested model 
were sporadically referred to in the literature. Thus, supporting and contradicting 
literature within similar fields of research were used to complete the model. Some of 
these issues were included in the model with the corresponding reference, and aimed 
either to support the model or to suggest an alternative, increasing the external validity 
of the research. 
Further research - the exploratory study created an output - the outsourcing 
management model - which would be further used in the reinforcement phase. The aim 
of this multiple-case study phase was to support the exploratory model's 
appropriateness to describe what happened. Its structure was completely different and 
was adapted to its own objectives. The reinforcement study reduced some limitations of 
the single case-study and contributed to the validity and quality of the overall study. 
The reinforcement phase was expected to support or criticise the suggested exploratory 
model, so increasing the robustness of the study. 
3.4.3. Case selection 
Being a single-case study phase, the case selection for the exploratory phase of the 
research was of special importance. 
3.4.3.1. Criteria for case selection 
Representative case (Yin, 2003) - the selected case had to be a typical case of 
outsourcing of the maintenance function within companies of the Portuguese pulp for 
paper industry. 
Wide access to data - the selected case had to enable the researcher to have extensive 
access to people at different levels who were involved in the outsourcing and were 
willing to give insights about its management and problems, to documents defining the 
outsourcing rules (e. g. contracts), and to the observation of the outsourcing management 
practices themselves. 
Stable outsourcing on-going management - the selected case had to be active for 
long enough to have developed clear outsourcing management procedures. 
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3.4.3.2. How the chosen case satisfied the criteria for case selection 
Representative case - the chosen case was representative since it corresponded to an 
outsourcing with the same basic principles as the other outsourcings within the studied 
sector of the population. - 
Wide access to data - the researcher had the sponsorship and support of the most 
senior managers of the group (specifically of the President and of one of the members of 
the administration board) which owns the studied company. Moreover, the researcher 
developed a good professional relationship with the two maintenance directors of the 
case study. Furthermore the researcher was located in an office in the maintenance 
managers' area, so encouraging informal contacts. 
Stable outsourcing management - the selected outsourcing had been running for 
more than two years when the research begun, so outsourcing management procedures 
were already well defined. At the time the client had two maintenance directors 
because one was about to retire and was passing the job on to his successor. The new 
director came from another large Portuguese pulp and paper company in which the 
maintenance was also outsourced, and so brought further insights to the research. 
3.4.4. Data sources 
In the exploratory phase of the research all the data was collected from the client's 
side. In this way the researcher would be seen as `one of the client's' and consequently 
the client's managers would be much more willing to share their views about the 
outsourcing. This tactic was successful in making data available in greater quantity, 
quality and depth. For example, the researcher often had the experience of one of the 
client's managers knocking on his door to `accuse' the supplier of something or to vent 
their feelings about aspects related to the outsourcing. This data gave further insight 
about the outsourcing management process, revealed some of its problems, or shed light 
on new issues. It is believed that if the researcher had also had proximity to the 
supplier, this spontaneous and revealing type of data would not have been available 
because the client's managers would view the researcher with more reservations. 
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3.4.5. Data type 
Qualitative data was more suitable for the research objectives than quantitative data. 
This phase of the investigation had an explorative objective. The intention was to look 
for depth and richness of meaning, which might well be specific to the context. The 
overall aim was to develop a new and empirically grounded understanding about the 
clients' process of managing on-going strategic outsourcing of services and its 
problems. Quantitative research normally tries to keep the researcher completely 
detached from the people being studied, uses preconceived notions of which concepts 
are relevant and how they are defined, and is highly structured. Qualitative research 
normally requires the involvement of the researcher in the social world under 
investigation, may have no theory in mind when entering the field and lets it be 
constructed by the concepts that emerge in the field, and is highly flexible, enabling the 
researcher to take advantage of exploration opportunities that arise during the inquiry 
(Blaikie, 2000). Moreover, qualitative data is said to focus on naturally occurring, 
ordinary events in natural settings, so that researchers can have a strong handle on what 
`real life' is like; confidence in qualitative data is boosted through local groundness 
because the fact that the data is collected in close proximity to the studied specific 
situation while the researcher is involved in its context may permit deeper 
understanding. Qualitative data is rich and holistic, having a strong potential for 
revealing complexity, and the continuity of data collection during the period makes 
qualitative research powerful for studying a process, since it gives more than simple 
`snapshots' of the process in specific moments (so the objective can go further than 
what and how many, to respond to how and why). The extra flexibility of qualitative 
research provides further opportunities to better understand the process under study; 
with its emphasis on people's lived experience, qualitative research has the potential to 
connect the meanings that people place on what happens around them with their social 
world (Miles and Huberman, 1994). So, favouring contextualisation, complexity and 
exploration, qualitative research seemed to be the most appropriate approach to 
answering the research problem and satisfying the objectives of this phase. 
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3.4.6. Researcher's role 
The researcher entered the company as an academic to create a performance 
management system to help with the management of the outsourcing. He was 
welcomed into the maintenance managers' area. This proximity with the people 
involved in the outsourcing was ideal to collect data since due to the philosophy of the 
investigation and objective of the exploratory phase the researcher wanted to feel the 
studied outsourcing from the inside. Such a role enabled the researcher to have a great 
deal of depth since it allowed him to get very close to the outsourcing and develop an 
understanding about the management processes and attitudes behind it. 
The researcher immersed himself in the outsourcing, allowing himself to experience 
that setting as much as possible, almost in the same way as any other organisational 
member, so he was well integrated into the client firm. He had access to what was 
actually happening; to what managers and directors actually did and thought (informal 
organisation), as opposed to what they might claim they do, and what official sanctions 
impel them to do (the formal organisation) (Gill and Johnson, 2002). Through this 
direct experience of the outsourcing the researcher was able to construct knowledge not 
only based on what managers communicated to him - which would make him 
dependent upon their honesty and their abilities to symbolise their experience (Gill and 
Johnson, 2002) - but also on what he saw and his own experiences. Naturally these last 
aspects remain part of the data collected and also influenced the local analysis and data 
collection. 
Notwithstanding the proximity, the researcher always kept to his commitment of 
being a researcher. During the data collection the researcher had the difficulty of trying 
not to internalise the client's culture because this would make it difficult to take a 
dispassionate view of events. So, even in the field the researcher internalised for 
himself his role as researcher and maintained an analytic detachment. After the data 
collection stage the researcher retreated from the company to analyse all the data 
collected, including the first analyses. The researcher detached himself a little more 
from the day-to-day functioning of the case with the intention of diminishing bias and 
enabling the more systematic final analyses to be as rigorous as possible. Nevertheless 
the intimate knowledge of managers' frames of reference was very important for 
interpreting and analysing the data, and for avoiding misunderstandings. 
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3.4.7. Data collection 
The objective of this phase of the investigation was to develop the initial knowledge 
about the clients' process of managing on-going strategic outsourcing of services and its 
problems. So, the data collected needed to be wide and deep in order to absorb the rich 
nature of the reality of the outsourcing. 
Timing: The researcher collected data from the outsourcing during a three month 
period on-site, where all the outsourcing activity was developed. Then he went back to 
England to analyse the data and construct the suggested outsourcing management 
model. 
Data collection techniques: 
Interviews: Interviews were an essential source of the case study evidence and also 
directed the researcher to other sources of evidence. The researcher kept in mind the 
fact that interviews are simply verbal reports and as such are subject to bias, poor recall 
and poor and inaccurate articulation (Yin, 2003). Unstructured interviews (Robson, 
2002) were the main type of interviews undertaken. These unstructured interviews 
normally took the form of simple conversations between the researcher and the 
managers. The researcher developed a relationship with many managers which 
facilitated more open discussions and explorations of issues that perhaps they would not 
discuss in front of others. Thus, the researcher tried to satisfy the needs of the inquiry 
while having `friendly' and open conversations. In terms of ethics, there was no 
problem since the managers understood that the researcher was in the company not only 
to develop a performance management system, but also to study that specific 
outsourcing and its management. The interviews were not recorded because a recording 
device would take the natural freedom and spirit out of the conversations. Furthermore, 
the researcher did once, at the beginning of the research, ask for authorisation to record 
a more formal interview (which was more suited to being recorded than the informal 
conversations) -a focus group with the two directors of maintenance. The response 
was that they did not mind, but then they told the story of a person who had serious 
problems in the company due to a recorded meeting. This story, and the way and 
circumstances in which it was told were interpreted by the researcher as `If you want a 
rich and open conversation, please do not record it'. As the richness and openness of 
the conversation were essential to the researcher's aim, he did not try to record any 
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interviews from then on. The findings from all the interviews were registered as field 
notes. These constituted palpable data which was used in later analyses. 
Observations: The investigator observed directly the client's entire outsourcing 
management mechanism in a casual way. He tried to record what was going on 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) through on-going field notes (Lofland and Lofland, 1995). The 
researcher needed a certain selective process which bounded the data according to the 
initial research questions in order to prevent problems of data overload (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). The on-going field notes normally involve a concurrent analysis of 
the raw data - the observation. As happens with the interviews, this overlapping 
analysis enabled interactive research. So, as data was collected, key topics and aspects 
were identified, guiding the remaining data collection. With this flexible practice the 
research gained the advantage of being able to explore and clarify new insights that 
continuously emerged. 
Documentation: Documents - e. g. contracts and supplier's reports - provided other 
specific details to corroborate information received from other sources. Furthermore 
documents were also useful to understand better the actual situation, and sometimes to 
draw inferences about explanations of behaviours or problems. Nevertheless, these 
inferences were treated only as clues and needed to be confirmed by other sources. 
3.4.8. Data analysis 
The objective of this phase of the investigation was to develop the initial knowledge 
about the clients' process of managing on-going strategic outsourcing of services and its 
problems. The data had to be organised and the researcher had to make sense of it in 
such a way that it was adequate to reflect the rich nature of the outsourcing situation. 
The resulting exploratory outsourcing management model was composed of two 
components: the outsourcing management process model and the outsourcing 
management problems (including the identification of the problems that occur within 
each component of the outsourcing management process model, and their rationale). 
The data was analysed separately according to the topic to which it related; the 
outsourcing management process model, or outsourcing management problems. 
The main procedures of the data analysis for the exploratory phase are presented 
next. These procedures constituted a developmental, rather than a linear process. 
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3.4.8.1. Outsourcing management process model 
Initial interpretation: While still on-site the researcher started to develop an initial 
understanding about the outsourcing management process. With this understanding, 
doubts and questions frequently arose, so the researcher attempted to collect data which 
filled the identified gaps. Data collection and analysis while on-site was an iterative 
process. At the end of this process the researcher had recorded and made an initial 
interpretation of the main activities of the outsourcing management process. 
Categorisation: After leaving the site the researcher started to group the activities in a 
logical and chronological sequence, through an iterative process. This iteration process 
between the previously recorded data and the grouping ended when there was no 
incremental improvement. The aim of this process was to categorise the activities, and 
the end result was a raw categorisation of activities according to their logical order in 
the outsourcing management process, followed by a broad chronological sequence of 
those groups of activities. 
Conceptualisation: The researcher then made an abstraction of the chronological 
sequence. The ultimate objective was to achieve a descriptive and conceptual display 
which ordered the main components of the outsourcing management process according 
to logic and sequence, correspondent to the descriptive research objective. Thus, the 
historical chronological flow was preserved, enabling a clear view of what led to what 
and when, as suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994). 
./ 
The outsourcing literature does not focus on the issue under investigation, so this 
step of the analysis was done without supporting literature Nevertheless the researcher 
tried to find inspiration elsewhere, in other types of literature. A fundamental source of 
inspiration for this stage of the research was Parasuraman's team work (Parasuraman et 
al, 1994b; Parasuraman et al, 1994a; Berry et al, 1994; Zeithaml et al, 1990; Berry et al, 
1990; Parasuraman et al, 1988; Parasuraman et al, 1985) about service quality in 
individual customer services (e. g. retail banking, credit cards). They (Parasuraman et 
al, 1985) suggest a service quality model (Figure 19) which was the main inspiration for 
the development of the proposed outsourcing management process model. This service 
quality model was a good starting point for the outsourcing management process model, 
but was far from sufficient to representing that particular situation. These two situations 
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- service to individual customers and outsourcing of services - are different (e. g. 
different activities, different client-supplier relationship, different power balances). 
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Figure 19 Parasuraman's team's (1985) "Sen-ice quality model" 
I he categorisation achieved in the previous step of the analysis was the origin of the 
concept of the outsourcing management process, based on a chronological sequence. So 
once again based on the cycle of tentative, revisiting the data, reflection and 
refinement a conceptualisation of the outsourcing management process was 
undertaken. 
Figure 20 - An earls version of the conceptualization of the outsourcing management process model 
(included as Appendix A) 
Chapter 3 Research desi 
The end result of this process was the suggested exploratory outsourcing 
management process model which describes its components and positions them 
according to their chronological order in the outsourcing management process. 
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Figure 21 - Outsourcing management process model suggested at the end of the exploratory phase 
3.4.8.2. Outsourcing management problems 
Initial interpretation: This initial analysis of the data was done Mhile still on site. 
Data collection and initial analysis while on site was an iterative process, as the data 
was collected the field notes were recorded, then analysed, and the remaining doubts 
and questions were identified to guide further data collection, which then modified or 
built on prior identified problems and aspects. This data collection and analysis period 
finished when no new problems arose and the researcher's doubts about those already 
identified had been clarified. At the end of this process the researcher had identified the 
main problems that existed within on-going outsourcing management. This 
identification was based both on direct recognitions by the managers linked to the 
understanding research objective - and in detection by the researcher through 
observation and reflection - linked to the explanation research objective. 
Categorisation: While in the field, the researcher did not distinguish bad management 
practices and their consequences. All were considered simply as problems: the former 
were problems because they created inconvenience for the outsourcing, while the latter 
were those inconveniences themselves. After reflection the researcher comprehended 
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this distinction. Then, using brainstorming and planning software he distinguished all 
the identified 'problems' into the two categories of causes and consequences. The end 
result was a categorisation of the initial 'problems' into causes and consequences. In 
reality a problem as treated in this thesis is a conjunction of a cause and a consequence. 
Initial conceptualisation: This phase of analysis was undertaken after the 
construction of the base structure of the outsourcing management process model. So, 
the researcher again inspired by Parasuraman's team's (1985) research (Figure 22) - 
identilied some gaps in the outsourcing management process. 
%l'hese 
gaps corresponded 
both to had practices in the outsourcing management and to trenches between different 
performances levels. Unlike the Parasuraman team, which treated all the gaps as equal, 
the researcher divided the gaps into two types: management gaps and performance gaps., 
The former are linked with problems and bad practices in the on-going outsourcing 
management, and the latter are linked with differences in performance of the service 
(e. g. the client expected a certain level of performance but received another level). 
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Figure 22 - Parasuraman's team's (1985) service quality model and its gaps 
The next step was to distribute the identified causes of problems to the identified 
management gaps. Figure 23 illustrates the result of such process. 
Figure 23 - Mind map do: unIeiu : urresp, )naent to an L: arl\ distribution of the muses of problems by the 
management gaps (see Appendix B for full scale version) 
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At the end of this phase of the analysis the researcher had defined the outsourcing 
management process model with identified management and performance gaps. These 
management gaps were filled with the identified causes of problems which occurred in 
the corresponding management activity, and which contributed to the existence of the 
gaps. 
Development of connections: In this step of the analysis the researcher connected the 
already distributed causes of problems with the previously identified consequences. 
Some of the causes of problems could not be connected with previously identified 
consequences and vice-versa. These were analysed further and the consequences or 
causes of the corresponding problems were gathered from the available data. 
The end result was a connection between causes and consequences of the problems. 
These dyads were also already distributed through the management gaps identified in 
the outsourcing management process model. 
Final conceptualisation: At this step of the analysis the researcher revised the 
connected causes of problems and consequences. Many of the dyads were somehow 
related or dependent, so there was a reorganisation of the dyads. This involved many 
merges. The objective was to have as far as possible independent dyads, even though 
some related dyads remain independent because certain aspects about them could be lost 
if merged. This reduced the total number of dyads and increased the simplicity of the 
model without losing content. 
At the end of this step of the exploratory phase's data analysis the problems which 
caused the management gaps had been identified and explained by the data collected. 
Comparison with literature: In this final step of the analysis, the outsourcing 
management model was compared with the available literature (both in outsourcing and 
related areas). The objective was to compare the findings with the literature to find 
support or contradict them. The literature was important because it enabled the 
inclusion of other aspects important to the situation in the constructed model. The 
supporting literature was important to confirm that aspects identified in the study 
occurred in other outsourcings or in other situations parallel to outsourcing. In this way 
the study gained strength, supporting the model's possible appropriateness to other 
outsourcings, and thus attributing to it a higher conceptual level. Conflicting literature - 
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w1 hen found' as also analysed. This was also important because it increased 
confidence in the findings, as well as obliging researchers to argue their views more 
vehemently (Eisenhardt, 1989). So, the outsourcing management problems previously 
identified ere confronted, completed and supported by the available literature. 
The end result was the exploratory outsourcing management problems, which, 
jointly %%ith the outsourcing management process model, formed the complete 
explorator% outsourcing management model (Figure 24). This model was going to be 
the toCUS oI further analysis in the reinforcement phase of the investigation. 
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Figure 24 - Outsourcing management model that resulted from the exploratory phase 
3.5. Reinforcement phase 
I cn though the exploratory phase used a representative and revelatory case - in 
itself an acceptable rationale for undertaking an investigation based on a single-case 
study (Yin, 2003) it was decided to add another phase to the investigation with the 
objective of reinforcing and increasing the robustness of the findings of the exploratory 
phase. This phase is also based on a case study rationale, but with different 
characteristics from that of the exploratory phase. 
' Due to the nature of the statement, finding literature which stated that a specific problem did not occur 
Has not common. 
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3.5.1. Objective 
The reinforcement phase had the objective of confirming that the outsourcing 
management model resultant from the exploratory phase was appropriate to the case in 
which it was developed. Moreover, its appropriateness to two other outsourcings of the 
same sector of the population was investigated. The study did not aim to prove the 
model, but to show its appropriateness to some on-going outsourcing management 
situations and to enrich the model through providing important detail. Since the 
objective was to support the model, data collection during the reinforcement phase was 
direct and structured. Expansion of the initial and suggested model was not an 
objective. 
3.5.2. Type of case study 
A case study with these objectives does not need to go deep in the field. So the 
resources needed for each case are much more limited than those needed for the single- 
case study of the exploratory phase. The reinforcement phase used a multiple-case 
study to take advantage of a bigger number of cases, covering a wider range of 
situations. 
3.5.3. Case selection 
The sampling of cases from the chosen population relied on theoretical sampling (i. e. 
cases are chosen for theoretical, not statistical reasons) (Eisenhardt, 1989). "The mode 
of generalization is `analytic generalization', in which a previously developed theory is 
used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of the case study. If two 
or more cases are shown to support the same theory, replication may be claimed" (Yin, 
2003). The sampling technique aimed at focusing efforts on "theoretical useful cases" 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). In this situation the cases were expected to replicate the findings 
and support the outsourcing management model. This corresponds to Yin's (2003) 
`literal replication' objective, through which the cases are selected in such a manner that 
similar results are expected 
The purpose of this phase of the research was to support the exploratory outsourcing 
management model. For that three typical cases were selected. It is very difficult to 
show that a specific case is typical. Blaikie (2000) presents Mitchell's (1983) argument 
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against trying to find typical cases: "There is absolutely no advantage in going to a great 
deal of trouble to find a `typical' case: concern with this issue reflects a confusion of 
enumerative and analytic modes of induction. For general purposes any set of events 
will serve the purpose of the analyst if the theoretical base is sufficiently well developed 
to enable the analyst to identify within these events the operation of the general 
principles incorporated in the theory". Blaikie then concludes that Mitchell's argument 
defends the view that researchers should not be concerned with the issue of 
representativeness and generalisation in the narrow sense, but, rather, with 
appropriateness. Following this, Blaikie (2000) presents Bassey's work which, in the 
context of educational research, states that "an important criterion for judging the merit 
of case study is the extent to which the details are sufficient and appropriate for a 
teacher working in a similar situation to relate his decision making to that described in 
the case study. The relatability [directly related to appropriateness] of a ca ds more 
important than_its-generalisability" asse 1981). Following these arguments, even 
though using what are considered to be `typical' cases, the researcher of the present 
investigation prefers not to think about generalisation in this research. Instead, and in 
the line with Bassey's inquiry, he prefers to speak about appropriateness and value of 
the research's findings to other cases. A philosophical discussion related to this issue 
can be seen further in the chapter, in the section which discusses the internal validity of 
the study. 
One of the three cases chosen is same as in the exploratory phase. This had the 
objective of confirming that the exploratory outsourcing management model is 
considered appropriate to describe what happens in that outsourcing by the persons 
involved in it, thus increasing the construct validity. Since the research approach is 
completely different from that of the exploratory phase, the case studied in the 
exploratory phase is treated and considered itself as a normal and independent case in 
this phase of the research. 
3.5.4. Data sources 
In the reinforcement phase of the research the data was collected both from the client 
and supplier sides of the outsourcings. In the exploratory phase the researcher just 
collected data from client's side; personnel perceptions, opinions, behaviours towards 
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the outsourcing and documents. It was decided that this reinforcement phase would 
confirm those views and the model constructed from them, and also give the supplier's 
view of the constructed exploratory outsourcing management model. This was 
expected to confirm and make the outsourcing management model more robust. 
3.5.5. Data type 
Qualitative data was also more suited than quantitative data for the research 
objectives of the reinforcement phase. Once again the contextualisation of the problem 
was important and qualitative research gave extra flexibility to the researcher to 
investigate how well the outsourcing management model fitted the studied cases. 
3.5.6. The role of the researcher 
In the reinforcement phase the researcher's objective is to find support for the 
constructed outsourcing management model, which was a much more structured 
activity, and did not require as much involvement as the exploratory phase. The 
researcher needed only to be sensitive to managers' views about the model, retaining the 
integrity of the managers' opinions and accounts either in favour of or against the 
various aspects of the model. The researcher only had contact with the outsourcing 
during the interviews, as a visitor. 
3.5.7. Data collection 
The objective of this phase of the investigation was to find support (or not) to the 
exploratory outsourcing management model. So, the data collection was direct and 
structured and did not intend to expand the model. 
Data collection techniques: 
Interviews: The reinforcement phase was based on interviews with a defined 
sequenced structure. This type of semi-structured interview was considered to be the 
one most suited to the objectives of the reinforcement phase, since this phase focused on 
testing the model (Wengraf, 2001). The reinforcement phase started with the model 
suggested by the exploratory study which defined the `collectable facts' that should be 
collected or generated. This corresponds to Wengrafs (2001) "anti-common-sense 
hypothetico-deductivist semi structured interview model". From the prior suggested 
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outsourcing management model - which at the beginning of the reinforcement phase is 
considered_to_be. _a-hypothetical model - 
"the researcher generates a particular 
hypothesis [or roposition] whose truth_or falsity 
, 
could be -`tested' 
by a particular 
selection of `hypothesis-relevant facts'. The hypothesis-relevant facts are then 
collected, and the hypothesis [or proposition] is either supported by the evidence of 
those facts or it is refuted by them". The interviews followed a well defined protocol 
(example in Appendix C) where each question corresponded to a component of the 
model. The use of semi-structured interview protocols ensured that the same topics 
were covered in all interviews while giving a certain space for the interviewees to 
explain their views about the studied relations and problems. 
It was not an objective of this phase to expand the model, so no extra relations or 
problems were being looked for - just support or otherwise of the initial suggested 
model. Thus the flexibility of discussion in the interview was limited at times by the 
researcher, to prevent deviations from the subject being analysed. 
During the interviews the researcher was careful about the way he asked the 
questions (e. g. body language, tone of voice). The objective was to avoid leading and 
biased questions which could contaminate the response. As Wengraf (2001) says, most 
informants feel somewhat vulnerable in `opening up' to an interviewer. "If you let them 
know in any way that you have a preferred response to one of your questions, they are 
more likely to tailor their responses to what you seem to be hoping for. A few will go 
the other way, and be determined to give you what you seem to be hoping not to hear". 
Either way the answer is contaminated. "Much of this [questioning contamination] is 
`read' by them from your tone of voice and general body behaviour". 
Wengraf (2001) also highlights the contamination that the type of questions 
themselves may bring. So, to diminish the possible leading and bias, Wengraf advises 
interviewers to indicate to the interviewees how wide the range of possible and 
legitimate answers is and to indicate why all of them might be reasonable, and so 
welcomed by researcher. He also presents--other-tactics such-as_. asking indirect 
questions or asking questions biased in the direction opposite to the expected response 
as a way to enhancing-the chances of the hypothesis to be falsified (Wengraf, 2001). 
These three tactics were adopted in the research interviews. Furthermore, the researcher 
also asked the interviewees to give examples of situations that had occurred in the 
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specific outsourcing which supported the propositions. This was used as a tactic to 
verify the existence of those problems and to give empirical illustrations of them. If 
there was no situation in that specific case history, examples of situations from the 
interviewee's previous experience, or situations that the interviewee knew about were 
asked for. As an example the protocol for the interviews concerning the outsourcing 
management problems is included as Appendix C. 
Because the interviews were much more focused, and because no sensitive 
information was going to be exchanged, the researcher asked if he could record them. 
This time he had a positive answer from almost all the interviewees and recorded them 
in a digital format. When the interviewees preferred the interview not to be recorded 
the researcher took notes. 
Ten interviews (some divided in parts, separated by less than a week) were carried 
out with the responsible for the outsourcing of both parties. Six of these interviews 
focused on the outsourcing management process model while the other four focused on 
the outsourcing management problems. These interviews were in Portuguese or in 
English, depending on the interviewees' nationality. 
The six interviews concerning the outsourcing management process model were 
undertaken with three senior managers from the client company, and three from the 
supplier. The researcher interviewed one representative from each side of the dyad of 
each of the three studied outsourcings. Interviews were undertaken with both sides of 
the yad in order to get a fegLfQZthe differences CW=nshe-ways. in-which_the client 
and supplier saw the client's management and management _pems, -=sulting 
in a 
wider understan dng, and one_ which was probably closer to the reality. The four 
interviews focusing on outsourcing management problems were with two senior 
managers from the client company (alr9a 
management process model) and two from the suppliers (one already interviewed 
concerning the utso-vr=g_. management... process model and the other the 
administrator to whom the other two suppliemanagers interviewed r to). The 
change of interviewees was due to the fact that the opportunity arose to interview the 
supplier's administrator responsible for the supplier's maintenance section in Portugal - 
and thus someone who had a wide experience in maintenance outsourcings across 
several industries - instead of the two site managers who reported to him and who were 
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interviewed in the previous interviews. One of the client executives previously 
interviewed was not available at the time of the reinforcement phase due to 
incompatibility of schedules, and the data collected from the other two client executives 
was so rich (the interviews took around five hours each) that it was decided that there 
was no need to undertake that interview later. Moreover, during the interviews 
concerning the outsourcing management process model some problems had already 
been spontaneously commented on by the interviewees. 
The senior managers2 were chosen because they were considered to be the people 
who had a better overall view, and greater detachment and criticality over the 
outsourcing. Nevertheless, the researcher realises that they may not want to recognise 
some practices within their outsourcings (or even in others), and that consequently they 
may not be entirely sincere, or they may omit some factors. For example, the suppliers' 
managers could not speak frankly about the client's management problems if the 
supplier was gaining an advantage from them. The researcher also realised that the 
suppliers' representatives tended to be more careful in the information they gave, and 
some tended to avoid giving concrete examples related to the outsourcing under study. 
The semi-structured interviews related to the outsourcing management process 
model lasted from one to four hours (the normal was around two hours), while those 
referring to the outsourcing management problems lasted from two to five hours (the 
average was three and a half hours). 
3.5.8. Data analysis 
The objective of this phase of the investigation was to support (or not) the 
exploratory outsourcing management model. Expansion of the model was not an 
objective. So, the data analysis was direct and structured. The analysis was based on 
the comparison of the collected data with the exploratory outsourcing management 
model, on the comparison between cases, and on the comparison between clients' and 
suppliers' perceptions about the same situation. 
The analysis of the interviews was based on a gradual support for the model during 
the interviews and tabulation of evidences after the interviews. This analysis was greatly 
2 The client's maintenance or mill directors who regulated the outsourcing at the high level; the supplier's highest manager in-local and an administrator of one of the supplier companies. 
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facilitated by the structure that the interviews' protocols gave to the interviews. The 
strategy chosen to develop the interview was to gradually go through the all components 
of the model, following the interview protocol. The objective was to find evidence that 
reinforced or contradicted each element of the model with intermediate questions. 
Thus, the initial within-case analysis would take place during the interview jointly with 
the interviewee. Later, the researcher re-played the interviews and divided them in 
several parts, according to the component of the model under consideration. The notes 
taken during the un-recorded interviews were used in a similar way. This enabled a 
deeper and more rigorous analysis of the data, because when analysing each component 
of the model the researcher could be focused on the selected data and therefore was 
more able to analyse the extent to which the individual components of the model were 
supported by the interview. See Figure 25 as an example of how the interviews were 
broken down and brought together under the particular elements of the model. 
Whenever possible the researcher also inserted detail from the interviews to the 
outsourcing management model. A cross-case analysis comparing the results obtained 
from the different interviews was also undertaken. Finally conclusions were drawn 
from the analysis and the final outsourcing management model presented. As all the 
components of the exploratory outsourcing management model were supported, the 
final outsourcing management model is equal to the exploratory one, but enriched with 
detail. The final outsourcing management model is presented in the `Outsourcing 
management model' part of the thesis. 
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3.6. Research quality 
ahilitý to shoe that the methods used were reliable and that the 
conclusions are valid is crucial to a social inquiry (Silverman, 2000). Yin (2003) 
identifies four concerns that are relevant to establish the quality of empirical social 
research: construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability. Each of 
these tests was undertaken for the present research and commented on accordingly in 
the follo%%ing section. 
3.6.1. Construct validity 
3.6.1.1. General concerns 
Construct \ alidit\ is described as the degree of certainty one has that the 
phenomenon has been appropriately measured and studied. It is especially problematic 
in case study research. Many criticise case studies arguing that a case study investigator 
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fails to develop a sufficiently operational set of measures and that `subjective' 
judgements are used to collect data (Yin, 2003). 
3.6.1.2. Specific case 
This general concern tends to be more pronounced in qualitative studies. 
Quantitative studies are normally seen as more direct and objective while qualitative 
studies tend to be seen as more dependent on the researcher, and thus not so objective. 
Silverman (2000) states that there are many observational studies where the reader has 
to depend on the researcher's depiction of what was going on. Furthermore, Blaikie 
(2000), referring to qualitative methods, states that "a test of whether the social actor's 
meanings have been `discovered' can only be based on whether the researcher has 
developed the capacity to interact successfully in a particular social context. To achieve 
this, it is necessary for the researcher to become as subjective as possible rather than to 
try to adopt some kind of objective stance, at least at the data collection stage". The 
advantage of flexibility that qualitative studies have over quantitative studies is highly 
connected with the possible `subjective' judgements made to decide which data to 
collect. These `subjective' judgements are the drivers for opportunistic data collection 
which focuses on emergent issues or clarifies further certain doubts. Such opportunistic 
data collections normally represent new important and clarifying data. 
To diminish the criticism about construct _ validity, 
the study used the 
countermeasures presented below. 
3.6.1.3. Countermeasures 
Multiple sources of evidence: the use of more than one source of data enables the 
development of converging lines of inquiry. This correspond. ln_ihe-triangulation of 
data sources, which aims at collecting information from multiple sources to corroborate 
the sam L. or_phenomenon (Yin, 2003). So, data triangulation can address the 
problems related to construct validity, since the multiple sources of evidence provide 
multiple measures of the same phenomenon. In this research triangulation was also 
used to expand the understanding over the outsourcing on-going management due to the 
variety of data which offered different perspectives. Additionally, the multi-method 
approach used was also a strategy "to attack a research problem with an arsenal of 
methods that have non-overlapping weaknesses in addition to their complementary 
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strength" (Brewer and Hunter, 1989). Thus a more complete view was achieved 
through the concurrent use of multi-methods. Finally, the existence of some non- 
convergent data was also used, in a provocative way, to produce new interpretations and 
conclusions (Blaikie, 2000). 
Maintain a chain of evidence: allowed a reader to follow the derivation of evidence, 
enabling him to trace the steps in either direction (from initial research questions to 
conclusions or the other way around), and therefore giving him more confidence in the 
construct validity (Yin, 2003). So, to achieve this objective, many quotes and 
illustrations from the case study evidence are directly introduced in the thesis. 
Model was reviewed by key informants: if the findings of a study are supported by 
the informants, then it will give strength to the cases. The informants and participants 
may still disagree with the investigator's conclusions and interpretations, but they 
should not disagree over the actual facts of the case. Possible corrections that are made 
about the facts of the case enhance the accuracy of the case study, diminishing the 
likelihood of falsely reporting an event. Thus the construct validity of the study is 
increased (Yin, 2003). In the present investigation, the first case study of the 
reinforcement phase was conducted in the same outsourcing as the exploratory case 
study, enabling the confirmation of the exploratory evidences to happen. 
3.6.2. Internal validity 
3.6.2.1. General concerns 
Internal validity concerns the establishment of a causal relationship, whereby certain 
conditions are shown to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious 
relationships. It is essential in experimental and quasi-experimental research, but 
inapplicable to descriptive or exploratory studies (whether the studies are case studies, 
surveys or experiments) since they are not concerned with making causal claims. In 
relation to case studies, it is only a concern for causal (or explanatory) case studies. For 
example, a research design has failed to deal with some threat to internal validity when 
a researcher tries to determine if an event x led to an event y and incorrectly concludes 
that there is a causal relationship between them, without knowing that some third factor 
-z- may actually have caused y (Yin, 2003). 
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3.6.2.2. Specific case 
This general concern seems to be derived from positivist ontology. The present 
research is based on constructivist ontology and the explanation of the research 
objective is dealt with within a realist epistemology. This is an epistemology of laws as 
expressing tendencies of things, as opposed to the conjunctions of events advocated by 
positivism (Blaikie, 1993). Realism rejects "Positivism's pattern model of explanation, 
i. e. that explanation can be achieved by establishing regularities, or constant 
conjunctions, within phenomena or between events. (... ) [Realism argues] that 
establishing such regularities is only the beginning of the process. What is then 
required is to locate the structure or mechanism that has produced the pattern or 
relationship. These structures and mechanisms are nothing more than the tendencies or 
powers of things to act in a particular way. The capacity of a thing to exercise its 
powers, or the likelihood that it will, depends on whether or not the circumstances are 
favourable. This view of causation allows for the possibility that competing or 
cancelling mechanisms may be operating when no event or change is observed, i. e. lack 
of movement may be due to opposing forces at work" (Blaikie, 2000). So, all the 
presented explanations are based in tendencies of connections and causality because the 
context may affect the mechanism. Due to the complexity and lack of control over the 
environment - unlike what happens in experimental research, which gives significant 
attention to internal validity - this research cannot guarantee that x leads to Y. The 
maximum it can say is that there is a tendency of x to lead to y. But some contextual 
forces can break that tendency. 
Nevertheless, the research also used some techniques which are normally related to 
the increase of internal validity. These techniques are presented below. 
3.6.2.3. Countermeasures 
Logic models and explanation building: in the exploratory study the outsourcing 
management process model was a conceptual model describing its main components 
and their relationships. The explanatory part of the exploratory study suggested some 
outsourcing management problems, as well as their logic (cause-effect) mechanisms. 
These mechanisms (explanation building) were constructed by an iterative process 
based on the following cycle: initial proposition, new comparison with data, reflection, 
refinement of the proposition, and so on (Yin, 2003). This practice was much helped by 
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the researcher's analytic insight about the outsourcing gained during his long immersion 
in the field. At the end of the exploratory phase the researcher had a suggested 
outsourcing management model which was going to be the target of further studies to 
increase its robustness during the reinforcement phase. 
Pattern matching logic: after the exploratory study the researcher had an outsourcing 
management model which contained suggested explanations for certain problems. Such 
explanations were the focus of further analysis in the reinforcement phase. This phase 
was based on the comparison of the suggested explanations with the empirically-based 
reactions to this patterns made and discussed by the interviewees. As the data collected 
in the interviews supported the outsourcing management model, the reinforcement 
phase helped to increase the study's `internal validity'. 
3.6.3. External validity 
3.6.3.1. General concerns 
External validity concerns the extent of confidence one has that the findings can be 
generalised beyond the immediate case. It has been a major barrier in doing case 
studies, since critics classically state that single cases offer a poor basis for generalising. , 
However, such critics are implicitly contrasting the situation to survey research, in 
which a sample readily generalises to a larger universe. This analogy is incorrect when 
dealing with case studies. Survey research relies on statistical generalisation, while case 
studies rely on analytical generalisation. In analytical generalisation, the investigator is 
striving to generalise a particular set of results to some broader theory, but the 
generalisation is not automatic (Yin, 2003). 
3.6.3.2. Specific case 
This research aims to develop an understanding that can be readily understood and 
taken up by academics and practitioners. Appropriateness is the aim, as discussed in the 
case selection of the reinforcement phase. It is expected that the findings of this study 
may not describe exactly all the other situations, but at least the details are sufficient and 
appropriate for a manager of an outsourcing of the same population to relate his case to 
that presented in this study. 
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Although generalisation is not an objective, the research used some techniques which 
are normally connected with that aim. They were used in this research with the aim of 
constructing a more solid study, and are now presented. 
3.6.3.3. Countermeasures 
Exploratory phase: 
Use of a representative and revelatory case study: These arc by themselves 
acceptable rationales to do an investigation just based in a single-case study (Yin, 
2003). What was done in this study - and is pointed by Yin (2003) as a technique that 
supports the use of case studies to generalisations - was to create a theory from the 
study. This theory had the form of the outsourcing management model. 
Comparison with literature: Furthermore the findings were then supported by 
existing literature covering other parts of the population under study and similar 
situations. This supports the argument that the findings are not specific to the sector of 
the population under study, increasing the findings' external validity. 
Reinforcement phase: 
The theory which resulted from the exploratory phase - outsourcing management 
model - looked for support in the reinforcement phase: First the exploratory theory was 
tested by another type of investigation in the same place in which it was based. The 
confirmation of the findings gave support that the theory was correct to that case - also 
increasing the study's construct validity (Yin, 2003). Then this first reinforcement case 
was replicated in two other cases which belonged to the sector of the population under 
study, giving support to the outsourcing management model. This support increased the 
external validity of the study (Yin, 2003) to the sector under study, indicating that the 
outsourcing management model was appropriate and had value to other situations. 
Thus, there is confidence that the understanding that comes from the study can be used 
and taken up by academics and practitioners in that sector. Nevertheless, the research is 
expected to be of value to on-going management of strategic outsourcings of services in 
general. Although focused on outsourcing of the maintenance function in the pulp for 
paper industry, and specifically within Portuguese companies, it is expected that the 
insights and conclusions emerging from the research have value to a much wider variety 
of outsourced activities and industries. The cases did not exhibit extreme or unusual 
contexts or behaviours (when compared to the broader literature on outsourcing); the 
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analysis also drew upon the limited extant literature and the wider-international_and 
cross-sectoral experience of some of the interviewees to provide limitcd_support-for-the 
findings outside of the specific context of Portuguese pulp for paper companies. The 
present research is expected to be a relevant and meaningful starting point to the 
exploration of on-going management of strategic outsourcings of services. 
3.6.4. Reliability - 
3.6.4.1. General concerns 
Reliability concerns the researcher's conviction that the research and its findings are 
repeatable. The emphasis is on doing the same case over again, not on replicating the 
results of one case by doing another case study. The goal of reliability is to minimise the 
errors and biases in a study (Yin, 2003). 
3.6.4.2. Specific case 
One prerequisite for enabling another investigator to repeat an earlier case study is to 
document the procedures followed in the earlier case. In the exploratory phase it was 
almost impossible to make a detailed study plan beforehand since it would limit greatly 
the flexibility and opportunism of data collected. The researcher entered the field 
without theories or hypothesis to validate, thus the research procedures had to be highly 
adapted to what he found and to the individual circumstances, which were very difficult 
to predict. It would be difficult for another researcher (or even the same researcher) to 
be able to repeat exactly the same exploratory study. The study was highly dependent 
on the dynamics that existed between the researcher and the managers, and was also 
conditioned by the context of the investigation and the outsourcing, which is always 
changing. "The character of qualitative data makes corroboration and replication more 
difficult, some would say impossible" (Blaikie, 2000). Due to the nature of the data 
collection techniques in the exploratory phase - which had to be adapted to the context 
and conditions of the study - it was difficult to separate the data/evidence from the 
interpretation made by the researcher. Due to the research constraints the data recording 
techniques described what the researcher saw and listened to, jointly with his 
interpretations. As Silverman (2001) noted, there are some studies where the reader has 
to depend on the researcher's depiction of what was going on. This way the data cannot 
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be the subject of separate, secondary analysis (Blaikie, 2000), independent of the 
original investigator's work. 
The reinforcement phase was structured (seeing that the interaction between the 
researcher and the outsourcing is much more superficial), thus it would be far easier for 
another researcher to do the same case study again. The reinforcement phase had an 
initial study plan which was strictly followed. It had conditions for a much better 
reporting system since the data was collected and recorded in a much more direct way. 
Some techniques were used to diminish the possible criticisms about reliability of the 
present study. 
3.6.4.3. Countermeasures 
Use of a case study protocol: The researcher started the exploratory phase with a 
broad initial protocol. Despite the protocol and some details that were added during the 
investigation, and as already justified, it would be difficult for another researcher (or 
even the same researcher) to be able to repeat exactly the same study. The 
reinforcement phase (multiple-case study) was much more structured and planned, thus 
the use of a protocol was much simpler and more usable. Thus the protocol used was 
much more complete and structured, making all the steps as operational as possible to 
clearly guide the development of the cases. Yin (2003) suggests that having a case 
study protocol is desirable under all circumstances, but it is essential in multiple-case 
studies. This is probably due to the replication intention; all the cases must be treated in 
exactly the same way to be compared with a degree of certainty. The interview protocol 
referring to the outsourcing management problems is included in Appendix C. 
Case study database: due to the conditions of the exploratory study the research can 
be criticised for the absence of raw data, with no in-built interpretations. This is a 
problem that often occurs in qualitative data (Silverman, 2001; Blaikie, 2000). The 
researcher was not able to resolve it because he had very limited control over the 
conditions and rules within which he operated. Thus, he had to choose between having 
recorded raw data (for example recorded interviews) or having better and deeper data. 
The researcher chose to go for better and deeper data, as this was found to be the only 
possible way to gain a good understanding about the outsourcing. So, for example, 
instead of recording the interviews -a practice which would limit the freedom with 
which the interviewees could speak, as was previously concluded - the researcher 
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decided to listen and then make field notes accordingly. In this way the interviewees 
were more comfortable and sincere, transmitting a better knowledge of what was 
actually going on in the real outsourcing. This better knowledge supported the 
construction of the outsourcing management model. 
After the construction of the model, the reinforcement study already had different 
characteristics which enabled the development of a formal, presentable database. This 
way other investigators can review the evidence directly and need not be limited to the 
written case study report. In such reports the data tends to be presented already pre- 
interpreted (as happened in the exploratory study). This thesis seeks to present some 
raw data (in form of quotes) for the reader to be able to draw independent conclusions 
about the study (Yin, 2003). But even that `raw' data can be criticised for being pre- 
processed to a certain extent: not only is the data presented out of context - which 
presupposes a decision of what was important to show as an example - but it is also 
translated data, since some of the interviews were conducted in Portuguese (Wengraf, 
2001). 
3.7. Overview of the chapter 
This chapter has discussed the choices made by the researcher at the strategic, 
tactical and operational levels of the research. The end result was a clear description of 
the overall research design which was planned to achieve the research objectives. The 
quality of the investigation was also discussed in terms of construct validity, internal 
validity, external validity and reliability. 
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4. Presentation of the case studies 
This chapter gives an outline description about each case study analysed. The 
descriptions base themselves mainly in the presentation of the client, of the supplier and 
of the scope of the contract. 
4.1. Exploratory phase 
4.1.1. Main characteristics of the single case study 
4.1.1.1. Client 
The mill in which the exploratory study took place - ABCA3 - belongs to ABC 
Group. The ABC Group is one of the five largest European producers of uncoated 
woodfree paper. The ABC Group has a productive capacity that exceeds 1 million 
tonnes of paper and 1.2 million tonnes of pulp, with 138 thousand hectares of forest and 
an annual turnover of over 1000 million euros. One of the Group's present priorities is 
its strategy of integration (from forest plantation to commercialisation of own brand 
paper), which is part of its continued drive towards consistent growth and greater 
presence in international markets. 
The Group's production structure is based at three mills: ABCA, ABCF and ABCS. 
The ABC Group has been formed from two companies with different histories. ABCP 
(the owner of the ABCA and ABCS mills) bought ABCSO (the owner of the ABCF 
mill) in 2001. The operations of ABCA, ABCS and ABCF mills are independent; they 
are treated in this study for simplicity of language as three different companies of the 
same group. 
ABCP began operations at ABCA mill in 1953 and it was the first mill to produce 
pulp and paper from eucalyptus at an international level, in 1957. ABCA mill is set in 
the heart of the largest area of eucalyptus forest in the country, which is said to have 
special characteristics for this industry. The proximity of this raw material is a key 
3 The client's and the supplier's company names are disguised. This disguise is used only in the chapter 
presenting the case studies, since the other chapters avoid the use of the company names by just referring 
to the "client" and the "supplier". 
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advantage that this unit has exploited to be more competitive and to increase the value 
of its products. Furthermore, an innovative attitude has been a constant feature at this 
industrial unit, which has capitalised on the know-how accumulated over decades. This 
mill produces 260 thousand tonnes/year of pulp normally suited for special applications 
- it has a well-established position at an international level 
in market segments with its 
pulp for `decor' papers, its coated papers and high quality `tissue' papers - and 
investigations about the viability of its extension are being undertaken. Historically 
ABCA grew to 1000 direct employees but at the moment, due to advances in 
technology and due to outsourcings and sub-contracting, it employs around 300 people. 
4.1.1.2. Supplier 
The objective of the outsourcing was to have a consortium of the client and of 
another firm delivering the maintenance in a partnership spirit. Even though that 
consortium existed formally, it was far from working in practice. What existed was that 
an external firm (which is from now considered to be the supplier in this outsourcing) 
managed the maintenance and commanded an operational workforce (that partly 
belonged to the client), while having its performances being evaluated and controlled by 
a team of the client, which was also part of the consortium. 
The supplier company - XYZ - is an international company with a very good 
reputation around the market through over 100 years of history. It presents itself as the 
worldwide leader in power and automation technologies and in engineering and 
management of full service maintenance contracts. The supplier company provides 
customers with a wide variety of services and operates in around 100 countries, 
employing around 105,000 people. 
In the outsourcing case study, the supplier was responsible for the maintenance 
function of the client company. For that it had a management team on-site which 
guided former employees of the client, who continued to perform maintenance services 
for the client company, and were still employees of ABCA, but were now under orders 
of the supplier firm. 
4.1.1.3. Main rationale for the outsourcing 
" Decrease maintenance costs per tonne of produced pulp; 
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9 Increase productivity (improving the availability of the mill through 
higher 
maintenance effectiveness); 
" Improve the maintenance practices through a specialised supplier, 
" Bring new know-how from the supplier to the client company; 
" Substitute client workers who were leaving (ABCA was reducing the number 
of own employees); 
" Raise the flexibility over the management of the workforce. 
4.1.1.4. Contract signed 
September 2000, but in February 2002 there was an increase of its scope. 
4.1.1.5. Contract duration 
3 years. 
4.1.1.6. Scope of contract 
Areas covered by the contract: 
" Wood reception and preparation; 
" Energy and recuperation; 
" Pulp production; 
" The maintenance (preventive and corrective) of the previous sectors, including 
all the works needed up to level 4 of AFNOR NF X 60-010. 
Equipment included in the contract: 
" Electrical equipment; 
" Mechanical equipment; 
" Electronic and instrumentation equipment; 
" Structures and buildings; 
" Fluid systems; 
" Other equipment considered by the supplier to be necessary for the successful 
functioning of the mill. 
For strategic reasons (keeping internal knowledge in the firm so as to have 
immediate control of the maintenance of the mill again; in this way the client is safe 
from surprises and retains negotiation power) the client company continued to staff the 
maintenance engineering function - responsible for analysing process equipment, 
supporting capital investments and planning the annual shutdown - using its own staff, 
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and had another outsourcing contract related to the workshops, which include the 
facilities inside the mill and also some special workshops outside. The client also 
maintained the spare parts stores. 
4.2. Reinforcement phase 
4.2.1. Main characteristics of Case A 
Case study A was undertaken in the same mill as the exploratory single case study, 
but two years later. 
Many structural and organisational changes were put in place in the outsourcing by 
the new maintenance director during those two years. The biggest change was that the 
client turned the client's evaluation team in the consortium into an operational 
maintenance work-group to work jointly with the supplier (the old relationship manager 
is integrated into that team, as well as many of the client's old maintenance 
management team members). This work-group and the supplier now constitute a single 
team that works together in the operational issues towards the same objectives. The 
partnership (as the client and supplier called it, but, as already seen in this thesis, is 
perhaps better denominated by the term alliance) spirit was starting to appear and the 
consortium team was starting to work as a homogeneous team. Even though this was an 
objective from the beginning of the outsourcing, these structural and organisational 
modifications enabled it to start to work. In fact these modifications implemented by 
the client's new maintenance director, with the help of a new site manager from the 
supplier, were felt to improve the performance and cooperative spirit of the outsourcing. 
Now the client's management of the outsourcing was undertaken directly by the 
maintenance director, and the client began to consider extending the contract with the 
same supplier. 
4.2.2. Main characteristics of Case B 
4.2.2.1. Client 
The mill in which case study B took place - ABCF - is one of the most efficient pulp 
and paper production units in Europe. It also belongs to the ABC Group as ABCP 
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bought ABCSO (which owned ABCF) in 2001, forming the group. The acquisition and 
integration of ABCSO by ABCP was very political and carefully done. The buyer did 
not make an aggressive move and is integrating ABCSO slowly. Thus, in ABCF there 
is still a little independence from the group. 
ABCF was inaugurated in 1984 and is considered a benchmark for the European fine 
uncoated paper industry. This unit, with 850 highly educated and specialised 
employees, has its pulp production partially integrated with the uncoated printing and 
writing paper production. It guarantees an annual volume of production and processing 
of fine uncoated papers of around 750 thousand tonnes, and represents the biggest mill 
site in Europe for uncoated woodfree paper. Almost all the paper produced is 
transformed internally into sheets for the graphics industry (large format) and into 
sheets for office use (A4 and A3). The present portfolio comprises almost 7000 
different product items as the result of the combination of different grades, weights, 
brightness, packing specifications and consignees, etc. 
4.2.2.2. Supplier 
The organisation is similar to that of Case A (and the exploratory case): a consortium 
between the client and an external company. The situation of the consortium seemed to 
be similar to what was happening in Case A during the exploratory phase of this 
investigation; even though the consortium between the client and the supplier existed 
formally, it seemed not to work in practice as an alliance for a long time, and it was 
only at the last part of the outsourcing that a cooperative spirit started to become 
apparent within the outsourcing. 
The supplier company of Case B is the same as that of the exploratory single case 
study, even though the management structures in the two cases are independent. 
4.2.2.3. Alain rationale for the outsourcing 
" Leave internal resources to be entirely dedicated to the core business; 
" Create conditions which, in the long term, will enable suppliers to reduce 
specific costs of the maintenance and reduce downtimes due to higher 
effectiveness of the maintenance (the client feels that at the moment no 
supplier can provide the service better and cheaper than previously, when the 
service was performed in-house). 
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4.2.2.4. Contract signed 
February 2002. 
4.2.2.5. Contract duration 
3 years. 
4.2.2.6. Scope of contract 
Areas covered by the contract: 
" Wood reception and preparation; 
" Energy and recuperation of the pulp mill; 
Pulp production; 
" The maintenance (preventive and corrective) of the previous sectors, including 
all the works needed to level 4 of AFNOR NF X 60-010. 
Equipment covered by the contract: 
" Electrical equipment; 
" Mechanical equipment; 
" Electronic and instrumentation equipment; 
" Structures and buildings; 
" Fluid systems; 
" Other equipment considered by the supplier to be necessary for the successful 
functioning of the mill. 
For strategic reasons the client company continued to staff the engineering function - 
responsible for analysing process equipment, supporting capital investments and 
planning the annual shutdown -itself, and had another outsourcing contract related to 
the workshops, which include the facilities inside the mill and also some special shops 
outside. The client also managed the spare parts stores. 
4.2.3. Main characteristics of Case C 
4.2.3.1. Client 
The mill in which Case study C took place - ABCS - also belongs to the ABC 
Group. It includes two industrial units that work in an integrated way. The mill 
produces bleached eucalyptus pulp and sends almost 40% of its production to the 
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printing and writing paper mill. These plants have capacities of 500 thousand 
tonnes/year and 275 thousand tonnes/year respectively, employing 800 workers. 
The foremost competitive advantages of the pulp mill are an excellent energy 
performance and its eco-efficiency. In fact ABCS is self-sufficient in energy production 
and by means of burning biomass from useless parts of raw material - mainly the 
eucalyptus globules from Portuguese forests - generates an excess that is sold to the 
national grid. 
The paper produced is transformed in cut-size formats (near 50%), folio-sizes (30%) 
and reels (20%), destined for the domestic and European office paper market, offset, 
pre-print and envelopes. 
4.2.3.2. Supplier 
In this case the maintenance service was also formerly delivered by a consortium. 
This time the consortium - made up of around 150 people - was formed by the client 
and three other companies. Among other areas of expertise related to maintenance, one 
of the companies involved was a well-known worldwide producer of machinery for the 
pulp and paper industry; much of the main production equipment of the ABCS mill was 
made by this firm. Thus this firm had considerable knowledge about process design, 
engineering, equipment design and manufacturing of the equipment used. Another of 
the three firms was also a global firm with a solid reputation in a wide variety of 
businesses (from consumer products - such as mobile phones or televisions - to 
services to industry passing by technology development). Its pulp and paper section has 
solutions and services for entire plants and individual products, with a portfolio that is 
said to cover every aspect of a plant's lifecycle - from automation, drive engineering 
and energy, to infrastructure, communication, and enterprise resource planning (ERP). 
The third external enterprise involved in the consortium is a Portuguese company which 
specialises in general industrial maintenance and mechanic works. The client was not 
integrated as deeply as the three other companies in the consortium. Thus the working 
group constituted by the three external companies is here considered to be the supplier. 
4.2.3.3. Main rationale for the outsourcing: 
" Financial: increase the availability of the mill and reduce specific maintenance 
costs; 
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" Maintenance practices: improve the maintenance practices with a specialised 
supplier with experience from a wide number of other situations in several 
industries (when the activity is done in-house there is a tendency to crystallise 
the knowledge and have a slower rate of improvement in practices); 
" Human resources: suppliers have more flexibility when dealing with 
employees, since the client is a previously public company and the employees 
have some privileges which are difficult to stop; 
9 Control: the control of a service in outsourcing is much easier because the 
exigency with a supplier can be much higher and more rigid than the exigency 
with colleagues inside the same organisation. 
4.2.3.4. Contract signed 
This contract was the result of several contracts. The outsourcing started in 1992 in 
the wood yard. At the time the contract was very superficial since part of the 
management of the activity was still undertaken by the client. In 1994 the management 
of the wood yard was completely given to the supplier. In 1999 the supplier started to 
be responsible for part of the mill's maintenance and was also included in the contract, 
and from then on the contract gradually started to incorporate more elements. 
4.2.3.5. Contract duration 
In the actual main configuration: 5 years (finishes at the end of January 2005), but in 
the middle there was an increase of its scope. 
4.2.3.6. Scope of contract 
All the equipment of the wood yard, power section of the pulp mill and the fibreline. 
4.3. Overview of the chapter 
This chapter has presented the major characteristics of the outsourcings, including a 
brief description of the client companies, the supplier companies and the scope of the 
contracts. The client firms all belong to the same pulp and paper group, but have 
generally independent management of the outsourcing. The supplier firm is the same in 
Case A and in Case B, but the outsourcings management are independent. 
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5. Introduction to the outsourcing management model 
The aim of the chapter is to review the problem under analysis, explain the approach 
taken by the research, and describe the structure of presentation of the findings. 
5.1. Research problem 
This research explores clients' on-going management of strategic outsourcing of 
services. It attempts to structure and describe such a management process and explain 
and understand some of its problems. 
Strategic outsourcings of services 
Outsourcing 
decision 
Contract 
termination 
Transfer of 
activity to 
sunolier 
Figure 26 - Focus of the research: clients' on-going management of strategic outsourcing of services 
The research is based in two research questions: 
How do clients manage strategic outsourcing of services during their on-going 
phase? 
What problems may affect the on-going management of strategic outsourcing of 
services? 
5.2. Research approach 
A two phase sequential research approach was undertaken to answer these questions. 
First, an exploratory phase was used to develop initial knowledge about the clients' 
on-going management of strategic outsourcing of services. The details of this phase of 
the research were presented in the `Research design' chapter, and its main 
characteristics are reviewed in Figure 27. 
Choice of Contract 
supplier negotiation 
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Part 1: Exploratory phase 
construction of a initial outsourcing management model 
Starting point: Defined focus 
No theory under consideration 
No hypothesis to test 
Tactic: Inductive single case study 
Operations 
Data collection: 3 months on-site 
Focusing client side only 
Data collection methods: Interviews 
Observation 
Documentation analysis 
Data analysis: Initial interpretation concurrent with data 
collection 
Categoniation (grouping acts% itmes ) 
Conceptual nat ion 
Comparison. %ith literature 
Output: Initial outsourcing management model 
Figure 27 - Main characteristics of the explorator% phase of the research 
This exploratory phase of the research developed an initial outsourcing management 
model in an inductive way. This model structured the observed clients' process of on- 
going management of strategic outsourcing of services and identified some of its 
problems, locating them in the steps of the model where they tended to occur and 
developing their rationale. These are the two different components of the outsourcing 
management model: the outsourcing management process model and the outsourcing 
management problems. 
Figure 28 - Example of the :..:.: :.:. Jtscus ed in the 
'Research design chapter (included as Appendix B) 
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Figure 29 Initial outsourcing management model 
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I his outsourcing management model was taken to the second phase of the research. 
This reinforcement phase aimed to confirm that the constructs included in the 
exploratory outsourcing management model were appropriate to describe the situation 
under study, and to enrich the model through providing important detail. This phase of 
the research had the objective of strengthening the findings of the exploratory phase, 
increasing the robustness of the research; not of developing further the model as for 
example through the identification of new problems. 
The details of this phase of the research were presented in the 'Research design' 
chapter, and its main characteristics are reviewed in Figure 30. 
Suppliers 'er, ice and 
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Figur 
Part 2: Reinforcement phase 
)! I ; c' %I, i: crturLc tIIC ,I the exploratorti 
ind: n ý wd to ennch the outsourcing management model 
Starting point: Exploratory findings 
Tactic: Three deducti,. e case study 
Operations 
Data collection: Focusing both sides of the dyad 
Data collection methods: Semi-structured inter is ' 
Data analysis: Tabulation of e. idences 
Comparasion with cxplorator) findings 
Output: Final outsourcing management model 
e 30 Main characteristics of the reinforcement ohase of the rm. arch 
The end result of the reinforcement phase of the research aas the final outsourcing 
management model. All the components of the initial outsourcing management model 
were supported during the reinforcement phase, so the final outsourcing management 
model is equal to the initial one, with additional detail in the descriptions and content, 
since the initial outsourcing management model Has enriched during the reinforcement 
phase. 
The ultimate output of the present research is the final outsourcing management 
model, which is presented in this part of the thesis. 
5.3. Structure of the presentation of the findings 
The linal outsourcing management model is presented in the next two chapters. 
The presentation within the thesis does not follow the timeline of its construction; 
instead it will follow the logic of the model, presenting each of its components. First 
the outsourcing management process model is presented in Chapter 6, and then the 
outsourcing management problems are presented in Chapter 7. 
Outsourcing management model 
Outsourcing management process mode Outwuft nj ii, xiijef? c" ý problem. 
Chapter 6C fin - 
Figure 31 - Structure of the presentation of the outsourcing nnnagcmcnt model 
Chapter 5- Introduction to the outsourcing management model 
5.4. Small note concerned with language 
Today the general literature is saturated with works referring to `best practice'. 
Thus, pro-active and positive language tends to be used. The author believes that before 
offering advice and `best practice' for avoiding or solving problems in the management 
of outsourcing, it is important first to identify and understand them thoroughly. Hence, 
in this work what is studied are current practices and problems. The language and 
emphasis is more descriptive (less pro-active) and is often negative (referring to 
practices that result in problems). This does not mean that the practices of the case- 
studies were bad - two of the outsourcings studied, after some troubled times, were 
achieving a very good performance at the time of the reinforcement study interviews. 
5.5. Overview of the chapter 
This chapter has reviewed the problem under analysis and the approach taken by the 
research. It has explained the way how the findings are presented in the thesis. This is 
expected to help the reader understand better the content of the next chapters. 
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6. Outsourcing management process model 
I .S (%Jt1/ 
1,1 J)/ )/)st'S !i olit t'pli i% mod '. 
1 o/ 1/It' nleC'%h llisn] o/ on-go//g Outsourcing 
nrallagenrent which was svnthesi: ecl from the data collected. Due to there being more 
than once dimension in the on-going outsourcing management situation, the model 
suggests the dillererrtiution of three management levels. It structures the clients' on- 
going outsourcing management process. describes its components (steps and context) 
and their chronological influence. Moreover, it uncovers three broad aspects: 
distinguishing of outsourcing on-going management levels and exploration of their 
relationships, the constant learning and adaptation mechanism inherent to outsourcing 
on-going nnallagement, and the need for clients to continue to monitor and guide the 
outsourced uc tiwtt.. even after it has been outsourcecl. The model is presented at the 
beginning o/ the chapter and is used to structure its presentation. Quotes collected 
during the reinforcement phase of the research are used to enrich the model with 
illustrative detail. 
6.1. Outsourcing management levels 
U«---oiu i»aua''e, ucnt 01, outsourc1n" is a complex process which takes place at 
different decision le%els ýNithin a firm and is influenced by diverse aspects. The process 
of on-going outsourcing management as divided in three main levels (Figure 32). 
k: nýirunment: Manr. rmrnt W iiJ 
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out_,. iurctng 
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Figure 32 -t eý c1. of the outsourcing on-going management process 
In normal daily operations, outsourcing management does not go further than the 
'operations' level. Suppliers provide the service which is evaluated by the client. Then 
the client gives feedback to the supplier according to the evaluation and in certain 
situations tries to help the supplier to improve the performance of the service. When 
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one of the parties decides to change something in the outsourcing (either due to self- 
interest or to a better understanding of the situation), the outsourcing management teams 
from both sides take actions at the `negotiations' level (e. g. to establish the other party's 
openness to negotiate the change). In less frequent cases in which the philosophy of the 
outsourcing needs to change (e. g. due to a change in its context) the management teams 
take action at the `environment' level (e. g. defining a new strategy for the outsourcing). 
The three management levels are interactive. Understandings or decisions within one 
management level can lead to actions in the others. The frequency of management 
activity increases from the higher to the lower management level. 
6.2. Description of the outsourcing management process 
Figure 33 presents the model which emerged from the investigation and which 
focuses on the way how clients manage on-going strategic outsourcing of services. It 
has been divided into ten activities over three different management levels. 
Management levels are shaded in Figure 33 and are `environment', `negotiations' and 
`operations'. The model structures clients' on-going outsourcing management 
processes, and describes their main activities and links. Notwithstanding the focusing 
on clients' management, the model includes activities that correspond to general aspects 
of the market or to issues related to the supplier. They are included because aspects of 
the market and activities of the supplier directly influence a client's on-going 
outsourcing management. Each activity of the management levels is presented in a 
separate section below. Each activity is described and discussed; the relationship of that 
activity with the other activities of the model is also explored, and its importance 
explained. 
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Figure 33 Outsourcing management process model 
6.2.1. 'En%ironment' level 
I he 'eng ºronment' le\ el (represented as dark grey in Figure 32 and Figure 33) relates 
to the macro factors which drive the outsourcing management philosophy and set the 
back 
, round 
for their development. This deals with both the context of the outsourcing 
and each party's strategies for the outsourcing. 
6.2.1.1. Outsourcing context 
Outsourcings de\ elop in the context of specific rules, characteristics and constraints 
constituted by factors both internal and external to the outsourcing relationship and the 
parties ins ol\ ed. 
Managers look beyond their own organisation for information, ideas and support. A 
single company does not have the resources to perform all the experiments on its own; 
therefore they try to learn about each others' attempts, results and reflections. 
"During this outsourcing we had several companies that came here to know more about the 
outsourcing, because they do not want to make the same mistakes and have the same 
Chapter 6- Outsourcing management process model 
problems that others had. When the first ones get involved in something [strategic 
outsourcings is a new practice and the studied cases were among the first large ones in 
Portugal] they face the unknown. Then the others already know how to avoid problems. As 
we were the first outsourcing a full-service, what we did influences others outsourcing 
companies and their management practices. Even we are influenced. " (Client executive) 
Actually the contextual elements of the market background (e. g. actual demand and 
legislation), market culture (e. g. rooted assumptions and shared experiences) and 
characteristics of the parties involved in the outsourcing (e. g. actual financial situation, 
working practices and past experience) condition outsourcing management and 
progress. 
"Maintenance is related to some kind of investments. You cannot just maintain; you have 
also to invest to be able to preserve or improve the availability [the main performance 
indicator of this outsourcing]. The financial situation in this mill has not been the best, so 
there has been a little lack of investment. (... ) [The philosophy) has been trying to keep the 
equipment running and that had an impact [on performance]. (... ) In the last year they [the 
client] have helped us [the supplier] especially in the wood yard. 'There they have listened 
to us and there they have done what we asked for [investment]. That has given them results 
today. In the rest of the mill it still needs more investment. " (Supplier executive) 
So management of the outsourcing is adapted to the actual business environment and 
context to maximise the chances of success. 
6.2.1.2. Outsourcing strategy 
Outsourcing strategy encompasses the plan that the outsourcing is expected to follow 
in order to achieve its objectives. Clients are responsible for establishing outsourcing 
strategy and obiectives. while suppliers are responsible for the activity's tactical and 
operational issues. 
"The client has a strategy for the outsourcing. They have declared %hat they would like to 
have from us. They want to have this special knowledge, they expect us to develop a 
maintenance concept that gives them both higher availability and lower costs. " (Supplier 
executive) 
Even though outsourcing strategies are not often changed, there are occasions on 
which they have to be adapted. Outsourcing strategies are dependent on issues related to 
the context of the company and the outsourcing. Laws, constraints, past experiences or 
market conditions may limit or enhance the success rate of certain outsourcing 
strategies. Changes in the context, as well as the evolution of the outsourcing itself, can 
lead to the need to make adaptations to the outsourcing strategy. A client is likely to 
change the outsourcing strategy when it realises that the actual strategy is not being 
successful or could be improved. 
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"In the beginning we defined a strategy that is simple. They have to establish preventive 
maintenance - when I say preventive it is preventive and predictive and that had to be a 
priority... We also established that then [when the preventive plans and their practices were 
in place] they should focus on failure analysis and lastly the planning. In practice we 
changed it because of the outsourcing development. The planning is being focused on now 
and failure analysis will be dealt with later. We established this as the plan to reach lower 
costs. " (Client executive) 
Although rarer, outsourcing strategies can even be adapted to react to conditions 
created during negotiations. If the client understands that there are conditions to achieve 
a better deal, it may take advantage of such a negotiation opportunity and decide to 
change the outsourcing strategy appropriately. Whenever outsourcings' strategies 
change, their practices have to be adjusted accordingly. Outsourcing strategies are 
fundamental to help the accomplishment of the outsourcing objectives, and ultimately 
the client's business objectives. 
6.2.1.3. Supplier strategies and desires 
The supplier's strategy encompasses the plan that the supplier follows to achieve its 
own objectives for the outsourcing. These objectives may vary greatly and can include 
achieving client satisfaction, raising its own reputation in the market, and having high 
profits, among others. Like clients, suppliers also enter the outsourcing and every 
negotiation with their own desires. They reveal what suppliers would like to get and 
give in the outsourcing, reflecting the benefits they would like to achieve from it. 
Supplier strategies and desires are also dependent on the context - both external (e. g. 
concurrency in the market) and internal factors (e. g. supplier capacity, expertise and 
actual financial situation). Moreover they may change with the evolution of the 
outsourcing context, opportunities that appear during negotiations, and the improved 
understanding about the outsourcing or client's views that suppliers gain with time. 
"When you start an outsourcing in a company you have a strategy: this is the way I am 
going to work Then you start to work with the client and you see that the strategy may be 
not the most adequate one. So you may have to change it a little to get, for example, closer 
to the client. After a chile you even may get a better understanding about what the client 
really wants; that means that you have to change the strategy a little again. " (Supplier 
executive) 
The supplier's desires and strategy for the outsourcing drives its behaviour in the 
outsourcing. The supplier knows that it has to follow and accomplish the outsourcing 
strategy and objectives defined by the client, but how and to what degree it will try to 
achieve them is dependent on the supplier's own strategy for the outsourcing. So the 
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supplier's desires and strategy for the outsourcing influence the evolution of the 
outsourcing, and thus the type of posture and management needed by the client. 
6.2.2. `Negotiations' level 
The `negotiations' level (represented in light grey in Figure 32 and Figure 33) relates 
to the evolution from what the client wants out of the outsourcing when entering 
negotiations to what is agreed, i. e. it represents adjustments of each party's desires to 
the expectations they have from the outsourcing after the agreement. It deals with the 
client's desires, the client's posture in the outsourcing, and with the negotiations 
between the parties. 
6.2.2.1. Client strategies and desires 
After the specification of a new outsourcing strategy the client translates it into 
operational targets. Jointly with other aspects that the client would like to receive from 
the outsourcing (e. g. related to financial, performance, behavioural or temporal aspects), 
these targets represent the desires that the client takes into negotiations. The client also 
defines for itself the posture it will adopt in the relationship and during the negotiations. 
This client's strategy refers to the way the client faces the outsourcing management and 
the supplier. It encompasses the behaviour and the spirit with which the client rules its 
own existence in the relationship; for example being a proactive or a passive client; 
being a motivator (when the results are good recognising those accomplishments but 
always motivating and challenging the supplier to achieve better results) or a hard-nosed 
client (always saying that the results are not good enough and demanding more, putting 
on negative pressure). 
"They [the client] were not happy with the cost per tonne we had. (... ) The client told us 
that they were not happy and they have been very active to try to decrease the cost by 
supporting us to decrease the man-power, by supporting us to borrow people between 
areas... " (Supplier executive) 
Clients' desires can change during the outsourcing, even when the strategy does not. 
When the context changes or the client analyses the outsourcing, the client may decide 
to adapt the outsourcing slightly. This way it is likely to have new desires and try to 
enter into new negotiations. The client's posture in the relationship may also be 
modified during the outsourcing due to changes in the outsourcing context, changes in 
desired performances, episodes that happened in the outsourcing or supplier evaluation. 
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For example the client may want to change its position from passive to active in 
supplier development because the supplier is not achieving the expected performance; 
or conversely, the client may want to pass from an active to a passive position in the 
outsourcing because its performance is already satisfactory and the client needs to focus 
resources and efforts in other areas. These modifications may happen any time during 
the outsourcing and may not need negotiations. 
"First we were just waiting for the activity to be delivered. (... ) The supplier was 
performing badly and losing money. (... ) We had to learn from that. So, from then on we 
got involved much more in the outsourcing and started to do the management jointly [with 
the supplier]. From there on they did not lose money and the performances increased. " 
(Client executive) 
Both the client's strategy and desires also depend greatly on the outsourcing context. 
For example, when defining the performance it desires the supplier to achieve in the 
outsourcing, a client normally bases this on its own past experience - but this is also 
sensitive to information in respect of performance achieved elsewhere, to the 
information that the supplier sends to the market and to the supplier's reputation; also 
with more experience the client increases its ability to recognise the best way to 
approach certain type of suppliers and its own supplier to achieve the expected 
objectives. 
if I know that certain performances are being achieved elsewhere, or that other companies 
are being successful at managing the outsourcing in another way, obviously we will adapt 
or at least try to bring for us the benefits that such management or experience brought to 
others. " (Client executive) 
The desires that the client takes into the negotiations will drive what is agreed and 
thus greatly influence the future performance of the outsourcing. The client's strategy is 
also crucial in the outsourcing management because it defines how much effort the 
client puts into the outsourcing and what type of conditions are offered to the supplier to 
perform its work. 
"I do whatever I can to influence the supplier to reach my objectives. If for me it is crucial 
that to have lower costs my supplier needs to have some profit, then I orient myself in a 
way that enables it to have profit... then I reach my objectives. (... ) I follow my objectives, 
but if to reach them I need to do something to influence the achievement of supplier's 
objectives... I have been doing it, and I believe we should continue to do it... but not 
without having my objective in mind" (Client executive) 
The definition of `client strategy and desires' and `supplier strategy and desires' are 
parallel activities, but one is considered to belong to the `negotiations' management 
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level, while the other belongs to the `environment' management level. This apparent 
contradiction is explained by the fact that the outsourcing management process focused 
upon in this thesis refers to the client's management, and consequently `client strategy 
and desires' is interior to the client organisation, while `supplier strategy and desires' is 
exterior and belongs to its business environment. 
6.2.2.2. Agreements 
Sometimes there are negotiations during the outsourcing. These negotiations are not 
the initial outsourcing contract negotiations, but negotiations that occur during on-going 
outsourcings. Such intermediate agreements may be used by either party to change or 
improve aspects that were identified as being prejudicial or opportunistic for the 
outsourcing. When parties have specific desires they may also try to re-enter 
negotiations. These negotiations during the outsourcing may have different degrees of 
seriousness. While the majority just involve clarifications and adjustments in the 
outsourcing, others are serious and may seem close to re-negotiation of the contract - 
though this is very unusual. Client and supplier start negotiations with desires for the 
outsourcing. Even when small clarifications are the only content being dealt with, each 
party's desires are normally different or are not entirely compatible and have to be 
negotiated. This process needs flexibility and trade-offs in each party's desires (e. g. 
between performance and prices) for an agreement to be reached. The negotiations 
finish when clear rules and specifications are agreed. 
"An outsourcing contract has to be always open to alterations and improvements because 
outsourcing is a partnership between two companies. But this is a written partnership with 
certain objectives and intentions. In its daily life what happens is different and if there is no 
capacity for permanent adaptation it will not work. (... ) So, it is desirable that both parties 
have negotiation capacity during the outsourcing to improve the aspects that are found to be 
`less well'. " (Client executive) 
To avoid future confusion one of the parties may create a formal document in which 
its understanding of the agreement is objectively and clearly defined. The formalised 
document defines in detail the aspects agreed during negotiations. This content can 
include: what the parties should deliver or make available, what the parties will not 
deliver or make available, what the parties can do, what the parties cannot do, what are 
the priorities, what is the level of performance expected and how it will be measured, 
what are the rewards or punishments corresponding to the achievement of target 
performances, among other issues. If the other party does not agree with the proposals 
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described in the formal document both parties will go back to negotiations until all the 
misunderstandings are clarified. These formal documents are attached to the initial 
contract. A formal and structured service specifications document was also observed 
being used as a means to reinforce the communication between the client and the 
supplier. If the communication between the parties is not effective, then there is the risk 
that the supplier will not know what it is supposed to deliver and that it will give 
priority to issues that are not important to the client while neglecting aspects that the 
client considers essential. So, the formal and structured service expectations document 
is part of the effort that parties make to enhance the supplier's understanding about 
client wants and expectations from the outsourcing. 
'There were some doubts about some work which because it was expensive the supplier 
defended that it was a major repair and thus we should pay for it. I said 'I will not pay. This 
is not a major repair [which would not be included in the contract] and I will not pay. ' We 
went to the process [the agreements folders that are attached to the initial contract] and 
there it was stated that we [supplier and client most senior outsourcing managers] jointly 
agreed that it was work included in the outsourcing and thus the supplier's responsibility. 
And there was my signature and the supplier's site manager's signature. (... ) Nevertheless 
at the time we discussed and negotiated the issue and reached an understanding. (... ) Thus 
the agreements have to be transparent and clear to help us understand and remember better 
what was agreed. " (Client executive) 
The negotiations in the middle of the outsourcing are important for its adaptation to 
the changing environment or to its own evolution. An outsourcing just governed by the 
rules defined in the original contract would fail to adapt to the new circumstances and 
consequently would jeopardise its success. 
"Both in terms of operations and management, corrections and adjustments which benefit 
both parties should be done [through negotiations]. " (Client executive) 
The use of a formal document stating the agreements made in the intermediate 
negotiations is also seen to be important, because it enables the identification of unclear 
points and its immediate clarification, avoiding disputes further in the relationship. 
Furthermore, the formal and structured agreement is also a tool used to support the 
clarity of the communication between parties during negotiations. 
"One issue that is discussed a lot is what is included in the scope. There have been some 
letters between us, clarifying what the client and supplier understood from the agreements. 
We try to clarify things by this mailing. (... ) When you have these negotiations sometimes 
we do not go to the detail and when we start to do the work, you realise that parties have different understandings. As a client you would like to have everything, as a supplier you just give what you think you agreed to. That has needed clarifications from the two sides 
and now we use this process [the letters] to have a better common understanding of what is included or not. " (Supplier executive) 
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6.2.3. `Operations' level 
The `operations' level (represented in white in Figure 32 and Figure 33) relates to the 
everyday interactions between client and supplier. It deals with the supplier's 
understanding about what to deliver, the service delivery, the measurement of the 
service performance and its perception by the client, the results of the contractual 
reward system and the evaluation and feedback that the client gives to the supplier. 
6.2.3.1. Supplier's understanding 
The supplier understands the characteristics and performance of the service it has to 
deliver. The supplier's understanding has two different dimensions. In the first 
dimension the supplier understands what the client says it wants, as agreed to during 
negotiations. This corresponds to the discussions and information exchange that took 
place in negotiations, during which the supplier understands what was agreed and 
absorbs what the client wants from the outsourcing. This initial understanding is then 
refined through the formalisation of the agreement. Furthermore, during all their 
interactions, parties exchange information which is useful for the alignment of the 
supplier's understanding with the client's actual expectations. In the second dimension 
of the supplier's understanding, the supplier senses the client's reaction, and uses this to 
make a judgement concerning the way the client perceives the quality of the service and 
its overall satisfaction. This understanding is achieved through the feedback that the 
client gives to the supplier and through the interpretation of the client's behaviour, "Past 
performance conditions future behaviour" (Domberger, 1998). This understanding of 
the client's perception and satisfaction with the service helps the supplier to better 
understand the client's real expectations, priorities and the levels of performance which 
are sufficient to achieve its satisfaction. The quality of the supplier's understanding is 
fundamental for outsourcing success, since it is a driver of the supplier's behaviour and 
operating methods. Nevertheless, the supplier's actions and performance may be 
moderated by its own interests and strategy for the outsourcing. 
"What the client wants from the outsourcing is understood and clarified during 
negotiations. (... ) If I see that the client is not happy I will try to find out v6 by. Then we 
have the opportunity to change our way of working. " (Supplier executive) 
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6.2.3.2. Service delivered 
The continuing adaptation of the supplier's understanding is seen as important to the 
revision of the supplier's delivery plans. In these plans the supplier's management 
defines internal service specifications to their own operators based on its understanding 
about what the client wants. Once the internal quality specifications are defined, the 
operational part of the supplier organisation tries to meet the specifications defined by 
its own management. 
'They [the supplier] many times know what we desire and want, but are conditioned by 
financial and economic reasons related to the contract and therefore cannot always deliver 
erbat we want. " (Client executive) 
The internal service specifications are also observed to be indirectly dependent on 
the supplier's actual situation and its strategy towards the outsourcing. If the supplier is 
in a difficult financial situation it may define lower specifications as a way to save 
money. In addition internal specifications may be influenced by contractual reward 
systems - suppliers are often motivated by bonus payments to make an extra effort 
toward achieving certain performances and to give priority to certain issues. The way in 
which the supplier's management notices the client's perception about the delivered 
service can also influence the internal service specifications - e. g. if the supplier's 
management feels that the client is satisfied with the actual performance, it is unlikely to 
raise the internal specifications; but if it feels that the client is dissatisfied then it may 
choose to raise them. 
"While they [the supplier] were in financial difficulties it was very difficult for them to 
understand that the mill could not be under-maintained, and that there were certain 
activities that need to continue to be done independently of costing money. (... ) On the 
other hand we feel today that being helpful to them making some money in the outsourcing 
it is much easier to demand from them aspects that are almost out of the contract. (... ) 
Clearly, we feel that they are willing to satisfy as far as possible everything that we define 
as a necessity and that are inside the scope of the contract. Visibly, when they are reaching 
their objectives they try to follow the agreements, their obligations and our desires. " (Client 
executive) 
Sometimes the client organisation takes action and interferes directly in the service 
delivery. This may happen for example when the client sees that the supplier is not able 
to achieve the expected performances alone and thus decides to take supplier 
development actions. When the supplier feels that the client does not perceive or use the 
service as it should, then it communicates with the client in an attempt to enhance its 
understanding of the service. Suppliers also address clients with many other objectives, 
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e. g. clarifying doubts, justifying poor performance and asking for modifications to the 
client's normal practices to improve the performance of the outsourced activity. Some 
suppliers regularly produce reports about the performance and achievements of the 
outsourcing. All this feedback from the supplier can help the client to better understand 
the outsourcing, its own process, and find bottlenecks and problems. 
"Nowadays in practice we observe that we still do some operational management (... ) [we] 
support our supplier in the operations management, in the parts that they do not dominate 
and that are from our 'metier' [expertise specific to the pulp and paper industry]. When 
they deliver less well some of these practices [specific to the pulp and paper industry) in 
which we have several years of experience, we support them to try to pass our experience 
and knowledge to them. " (Client executive) 
The delivery of the service is the core of the outsourcing. Therefore it is not a great 
surprise to find that its results directly affect the management of and behaviours in the 
outsourcing. 
6.2.3.3. Measured and perceived service 
The characteristics and outputs of the service are measured in accordance with the 
defined contract and agreements. Parallel to this the client perceives the service delivery 
and results. Normally there is a difference between the service that the supplier delivers 
and the service that the client perceives. The client perceives the service in a complex 
way, affected by many intangibles. The `perceived service' is exactly the way the client 
`feels' the service. This involves not only the service itself and its outputs, but also 
diverse intangible factors - e. g. factors related to how the service was delivered, the 
relationship between the two companies, the environmental conditions, the achievement 
of the expectations, the reputation of the supplier, the word of mouth through the 
industry, the promises made by the supplier, among others. 
"Many times the quantitative evaluation may even be good (... ) (but clients are still 
dissatisfied because] the client feels that they [the supplier] do not approach some issues in 
a technical way; they behave opportunistically; they are not good professionals... " (Client 
executive) 
Factors such as service measurement and supplier evaluation appear to help reduce 
the gap between the service that the client perceives and the service actually delivered. 
Although the client immediately perceives the service in a certain way, later it may 
analyse objective data and information which will refine its perception of the service. 
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Nevertheless the intangibles related to the way the service is perceived are important for 
the client to better understand what is happening in the outsourcing. 
if the client feels that the service is very bad, for him to change his mind means that the 
supplier has to more or less show him the opposite [in the following service delivery]. (... ) 
Many times the first impression it [the client] gets is not right because many times the 
service is evaluated just for one occasion, and one occasion can be bad. But then they 
deliver five times a good service; that mean that those five cover the first one; that means 
that the client changes its mind. " (Supplier executive) 
6.2.3.4. Contractual reward system 
In the contract negotiations at the beginning of the outsourcing, both parties agree 
service levels through which the supplier receives rewards or punishments against 
defined performances. The data collected in the measurement of the outputs of the 
outsourcing is used to calculate those rewards or punishments. Clients use reward 
systems to stimulate the supplier to work in the most important areas and to achieve 
good performances in them. Indirectly clients use reward systems to orientate the 
supplier's service delivery, motivating the supplier to follow its outsourcing strategy 
and achieve the outsourcing objectives. 
"Equipment availability is the main driver of the reward system. (... ) If we have bad 
availability in a certain area [of the mill], for sure we focus on that area to try to solve the 
problem. (... ) As we have done for example in the wood yard: the performance was very 
bad one year ago and today is excellent. (... ) Today we are much more focused on the pulp 
drying machine [which did not have a good availability]. (... ) So that [the reward system] 
can move your efforts. " (Supplier executive) 
6.2.3.5. Supplier evaluation, feedback and actions 
After analysing the results, performance and progress of the outsourcing, the client 
can make an overall evaluation of the outsourcing and the supplier. This evaluation is 
partly done by comparison of the measured service with the formal and structured 
specifications. Such evaluation also embraces aspects such as the achieved performance 
and their trends, the supplier's behaviour and problems that occurred in the outsourcing. 
Even though the evaluation is mainly based on objective data (measurement of 
outsourcing's process and outputs), it also has an intangible part. Intangible factors 
perceived by the client are important for an on-going and complete supplier evaluation - 
e. g. variations in the supplier's motivation, professionalism, working methods, 
behaviour towards the outsourcing, among others. The constraints communicated by the 
supplier as affecting its activity influence this overall evaluation. 
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"If I would see indications that the client is seeing things and that they are going to 
approach us to question them... I would like to push my organisation to be proactive 
instead of reactive. I would like to go to the customer before he sees anything. because that 
avoids a lot of problems and less confusion. If you are proactive and you go and say that 
you have a justification... because sometimes maintenance is right and has reasons to do 
some things that in the client's eyes are not the most clever things... So, if you go 
beforehand and you say that tomorrow we are going to do this thing because of this thing, 
the client will not raise the issue: not before, not during and not after. So you avoid all the 
unnecessary communication by being proactive. Of course sometimes there are cases in 
which we urgently need to act and do certain things, but even then I try not to pick up the 
mobile phone - because that is the normal technique - and instead 
I try contacting them 
saying that this is the actual situation, this is what I am going to do and this is % hat will 
happen... (... ) Normally client's satisfaction is guaranteed. " (Supplier executive) 
The evaluation was then seen to be communicated to the supplier through a detailed 
report. In this report the client makes a critical and proactive analysis about the 
supplier's performance, identifying aspects in which the supplier achieved good 
performance, aspects in which the supplier performed poorly, problems that occurred, 
issues that it does not want to see again, issues that it wants to see improved, and 
identification of priorities. The supplier may give a response to the evaluation - e. g. to 
justify some of the non-achievements. The evaluation is used by the client as a way to 
maintain control over the outsourcing, to motivate the supplier and to guide its 
performance towards the client's objectives. Jointly with the report the client has 
meetings with the supplier in which the report is presented, analysed and discussed/Mc 
objective of this feedback is to communicate the actual performances to the supplier, to 
explain how the client perceives the service and to help the supplier to understand the 
most effective way to achieve the client's objectives. 'The 
feedback that the client gives 
to the supplier is not limited to the report and joint discussions. During all the contact 
between the parties, informal sharing of information and opinions takes place. The 
client tells the supplier what it thinks, giving new information and opinions to the 
supplier, and vice-versa. 
"Daily we have meetings; monthly we make the balance of the month and of the KPIs. 
Monthly we make an evaluation of the contract, daily we work the contract. " (Client 
executive) 
When the client concludes from the supplier evaluation that the supplier is not able to 
achieve the expected performances by itself, then it determines whether or not it should 
help the supplier or undertake supplier development actions. 
"[When they were having bad performances] we told them that they had to change their 
organisation and prioritise the preventive maintenance to diminish the number of 
breakdowns we were having and therefore the number of non-programmed stops. we 
ºo6 
Chapter 6- Outsourcing management process model 
demanded, but still did another thing. We put at the head of the preventive maintenance two 
of our men. (... ) (Additionally] we contracted a 'coacher' [a retired maintenance director 
from another mill of the group] that worked as a consultant to help them to improve their 
performances. " (Client executive) 
The supplier development decision is dependent, among other factors, on how the 
client has evaluated the supplier's strategy, efforts and commitment to the relationship 
(Krause, 1999). The decision to conduct supplier development is also connected to the 
client's strategy towards the outsourcing. If the client wants to have excellent 
performance in the outsourced service then it is likely to plan supplier development 
initiatives, but if it does not consider the outsourced service performance a priority it is 
less likely to embark upon supplier development and will just pressure the supplier to 
achieve better performances. Supplier development is facilitated by the client's 
expertise in the outsourced activity. The experience enables the client to see the 
supplier's strengths and weaknesses, and then help the supplier to overcome the 
weaknesses that it cannot overcome by itself. If the client does not have enough 
expertise to undertake supplier development, but nevertheless wants the supplier to be 
developed, then it may seek such expertise elsewhere. 
The `contractual reward system' and the `supplier evaluation, feedback and actions' 
can be seen as two quite distinct levels of motivation, monitoring and management in 
the outsourcing process: a contractual (and financial) level in which the reward system 
defines bonus or penalties according to the achieved performances and the rigid rules 
defined in the contract; and a separate feedback (and emotional) level where the client 
regularly evaluates the performance of the outsourcing, giving feedback to the supplier 
about its wants, needs, suggestions, opinions and wishes. The evaluation and feedback 
actions included in this activity are crucial to the evolution of the outsourcing, since 
they transmit to the supplier the aspects that are performing well and those needing 
improvement. This orientates the supplier's efforts towards the most important aspects 
for the client. Moreover the supplier development actions are also fundamental to 
enabling the supplier to improve its performances beyond certain levels. 
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6.3. Discussion 
The chapter has structured the clients' on-going management process of strategic 
outsourcing of services into ten different activities based on evidence collected across 
three case studies. Each of the activities was described and their relationships explored. 
The model highlights the difference in character between groups of activities. Within 
the model three management levels are distinguished, according to each activity's 
nature and purpose. Existing research does not analyse deeply the process of client's on- 
going management of outsourcing. The wide range of activities that take place during 
this phase has not been clearly distinguished. Contrary to current models that structure 
the outsourcing lifecycle suggest - such as Momme and Hvolby's (2002) - the on-going 
outsourcing management process deals with much more than the proposed simple 
communication between the parties, joint development projects and performance 
assessment of results. In the normal daily operations this simplification may indeed 
apply. Suppliers provide the service and the client evaluates it. Then the client gives 
feedback to the supplier according to the evaluation, and may even help the supplier to 
try to improve performance. But the case studies clearly illustrate the frequency with 
which other activities take place, such as when one of the parties decides to try to 
change something in the outsourcing - either due to self-interest or to a better 
understanding of the situation - or when adaptations or clarifications are needed. In 
these circumstances it was observed that the outsourcing management acts at a different 
level and negotiates, corresponding to actions at the `negotiations' level in Figure 32. 
This may also be interpreted within the Momme and Holby model as going back in the 
outsourcing lifecycle to the phase where negotiations and agreements are made, as 
suggested in Figure 34. 
Detached from these daily actions the context that surrounds the outsourcing evolves. 
With this, as well as with the evolution of the outsourcing and the companies, both 
parties' objectives for the outsourcing and strategies to achieve such objectives change. 
The reality is that, albeit not frequently, the philosophy of the outsourcing was also 
observed as changing. These transformations correspond to another management level; 
the `environment' level. Again this may be seen as a step back in the client's 
outsourcing process lifecycle to the earlier phase in which the client defines the strategy 
for the outsourcing, as suggested in Figure 34. When these changes occur, entire 
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outsourcing is adapted. The three management levels are interactive, with 
understandings or decisions at one management level possibly leading to actions in the 
others. The actions at these three levels have different characteristics. While the 
management at the 'operations' level tends to be done at shop-floor level and is 
continuous, the actions at the 'negotiations' level are discontinuous. They were 
observed as only taking place when issues needed to he agreed or clarified. These 
negotiations can he made across various levels in the outsourcing team's hierarchical 
structure from daily operational agreements made by operational engineers to more 
strategic issues agreed by those with prime responsibility for outsourcing depending 
on their seriousness. The frequency of these negotiations tends to be inversely 
proportional to their seriousness, as is suggested by the independent lines of actions in 
the 'negotiations' management level of Figure 34 (the upper line corresponds to 
negotiations undertaken at higher management levels). In extreme cases the negotiations 
may even surpass the outsourcing management team's authority and needs to be 
conducted at the organisation's highest levels of management. The actions taken at the 
'environment' level are also undertaken at these higher levels, often jointly with the 
outsourcing management team. The frequency of management action occurring tends to 
increase from the higher to the lower management level. Figure 34 illustrates the 
frequency (suggested by the proximity of actions, represented by hexagons) and scale of 
efforts, durint the outsourcing management at each management level. 
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A further aspect highlighted by the model is that on-going outsourcing management 
is a continuous learning and adapting process. This is contrary to the norm suggested by 
other outsourcing lifecycle models, where the on-going management phase of the 
outsourcing is presented as relatively stable. The cases show that there are permanent 
adaptations at all three management levels, due to factors either internal or external to 
the outsourcing. Instead of remaining static, and potentially jeopardising their success, 
clients and suppliers choose to adapt to the new knowledge, understanding and 
circumstances. 
The client's management was observed to adapt its outsourcing strategy and its own 
desires and position towards the outsourcing, possibly due to extra understanding from 
the analysis of previous results, or to the recognition of changes in the outsourcing's 
context. When such changes of desires occurred, both parties were seen to negotiate 
changes in the rules of the outsourcing. Due to the identification of problems in 
previous agreements, the parties tried to resolve them with new agreements. Thanks to 
extra understanding obtained through previous experiences, the client's outsourcing 
management team tried to improve its own management practices and gave feedback to 
the supplier, explaining more clearly what it wanted from the outsourcing. Thanks to the 
recognition of the supplier's limitations, clients were seen to take action to help 
suppliers overcome them and improve their performance. In an iterative way, the 
client's understanding about the actual situation and past performance was used to guide 
action with the objective of improving future performances. This learning and 
adaptation can be expressed as a form of experiential learning (Figure 35), as studied by 
classical authors such as Kolb (1984). 
Concrete 
experience 
Active Reflective 
experimentation observation 
Abstract 
conceptualisation 
Figure 35 - Process of experiential learning 
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The model also highlights that even after an activity is outsourced the client still has 
to manage it actively. Often at the beginning of an outsourcing, practitioners think that 
once an activity is outsourced the client does not have to worry about it very much and 
may choose to focus on its core competences. The existing literature and models which 
focus on outsourcing lifecycles also fail to highlight the permanently active 
management needed in outsourcing, even during its on-going management phase. They 
propose that during this phase the client mainly (or even only) exchanges information 
with the supplier, measures the performance and becomes involved in joint 
development projects/This study and the model emphasise the need for active and 
continuous outsourcing management/buring the whole of the outsourcing the client 
needs to have constant and active management to ensure that the supplier's work is 
faithful to the agreements and to the client's objectives. Such management also seeks to 
ensure that the outsourcing adapts to the actual situation, with the objective of 
maximising the outsourcing's potential benefits and minimising its risks. It has been 
observed that clients change their management style: instead of managing operations 
and resources (similar to the management of the outsourced activity when done in- 
house)/clients start to manage the contract, the supplier and its performance, Clients of 
strategic outsourcing of services still need to closely manage and take actions related to 
the outsourced activity//This is illustrated by a client maintenance director who had 
moved from managing in-house maintenance to heading the outsourcing management 
team of one of the case studies: 
"With outsourcing we have even more work! " (Client executive) 
In addition to structuring and describing the process of on-going outsourcing 
management during its mature phase, the chapter presents three new perspectives: 
" The relationship between the three management levels; 
" The constant learning and adaptation mechanism existent in outsourcing 
management; and 
The need for the client to continue to actively monitor and guide an outsourced 
activity and the supplier. 
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6.4. Overview of the chapter 
This chapter suggested a conceptual model to structure and describe the clients' on- 
going outsourcing management process. The model structures the clients' on-going 
outsourcing management process of strategic outsourcing of services into ten activities, 
describes each of them and explores their relationships. It divided these activities into 
three interactive management levels according to the type of issues dealt with. The 
interactive adaptations needed in an outsourcing are suggested by the many loops of the 
model - typical of an experiential learning process (e. g. Senge, 1993; Kolb, 1984) - and 
show that this outsourcing phase is not stable, as outsourcing lifetime models suggest. 
The findings also highlight the need for resources and permanent attention from the 
client to monitor and guide the outsourcing, contradicting conventional wisdom. 
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7. Outsourcing management problems 
The aim of the chapter is to present the management outsourcing problems that were 
uncovered in the study. They are linked with poor practices in on-going outsourcing 
management and to situational contexts. Quotes collected from the reinforcement 
phase of the research are used to enrich the model with illustrative detail. The chapter 
explores twenty-four problems which were observed to affect the day-to-day 
management of outsourcings during their on-going phase and which impact the service 
delivery. It is suggested that some of these problems are originated by ineffectiveness of 
the outsourcing's preparation (e. g. selection of the supplier and construction of the 
contract) and are partly originated by clients' management practices, contrary to what 
is often supposed by clients. Moreover, the chapter suggests that parties' opportunistic 
behaviours to reach extra short-term benefits can jeopardise their long-term gains. 
Finally, the chapter also concludes that many of the outsourced management problems 
are related. 
7.1. Management gaps and problems 
The previous chapter presented the outsourcing management process in which the 
outsourcing management problems occur. Within each step of the process there are 
management or situational deficiencies within parties that contribute to poorer service 
quality and may have negative consequences for the outsourcing. In this thesis those 
deficiencies are called problems. The group of problems that occur within each step of 
the outsourcing management process contributes to the existence of inconsistency and 
lack of alignment between the outsourcing management steps and their objectives. This 
thesis calls such inconsistencies and lack of alignment `gaps'. Gaps are caused by 
general ineffectiveness within each step. 
Each problem that contributes to a gap is called a `contributing factor' to the gap and 
can be divided in causes and consequences. Such division should not be seen in a 
positivistic way (Blaikie, 1993) - using fixed `causal relationships': if this then that - 
but instead in a constructivist way (Blaikie, 1993) -a relationship expressing tendencies 
or powers of things to act in a particular way. The division of the problems into causes 
and consequences is made bearing in mind that the capacity of a cause to exercise its 
powers and consequences, or the likelihood that it will, depends on whether or not the 
circumstances are favourable. This view of causation conceptualises the cause as 
having strong and significant correlation with the consequence, but also allows for the 
113 
possibility that competing or cancelling mechanisms may be operating when the 
consequence is not observed (Blaikie, 2000). 
This chapter focuses on the identification, exploration and understanding of problems 
that occur in the day-to-day management of service-strategic outsourcings during their 
on-going phase. These problems are contributing factors to the gaps presented in Figure 
36. Each gap and its corresponding contributing factors are presented in separate sub- 
sections. For each contributing factor the causes are presented first, followed by the 
consequences. Within each, the findings are presented and supported %ith illustrative 
quotes; at the end the supporting literature is explored. Problems are assigned to the 
gaps according to the location of their cause in the outsourcing management process 
model. 
In this work effectiveness is used to refer to the relationship hctvºeen benefits and 
costs. 
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(jai) I : k)rresponds to the misalignment between what is important to clients 
business strategies and the desires they take to negotiations. This difference was found 
to he based in four contributing factors: first, 'Outsourcing's strategy poorly defined'; 
second, 'Agreements' scopes poorly defined', third, 'incomplete or bad definition of 
desires'; and fourth, 'Lack of regular revision of strategy and desires'. 
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7.2.1. Outsourcing's stratehp poorly defined 
( , 11nc (ompallic-, olten1 are III their o111so11rein ad\ entures \N Ith10llt 
determining 
exactly \k hat they are attempting to accomplish through outsourcing, and how they N ant 
to achieve it. Outsourcing by itself is not the strategy; it is a means of achieving the 
business strategy and thus needs its own strategy. 
"1 had contacts with many companies that are starting the outsourcing process and came 
here to ask our experiences with outsourcing. Normally they just want to reduce costs with 
outsourcing, lacking other type of objectives. Many times the strategy is just that. We 
hale to reduce maintenance costs, so we outsource maintenance and then the supplier 
reduces costs. ' But the general objectives and the strategy are not specified. How to do the 
outsourcing? What for? In which base and path? No, they just went to the market to see 
who does the maintenance and sign contracts specifying big short-term cost reduction. (... 1 
Some clients just go along the outsourcing fad. " (Client executive) 
Although the studied outsourcings had specified strategies, they were little more than 
a common understanding in the head of some senior managers. Clients believed that the 
lack of formalisation of the strategy did not lead to more difficult understanding of the 
outsourcing strategy throughout their company. To guarantee the knowledge flow 
executi%es had meetings with their managers to communicate the objectives and 
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strategy of the outsourcing, asking them to pass the information down in the hierarchy. 
But clients did not monitor the effectiveness of such a communication process, and in 
fact it seemed not to be very effective since suppliers complained that although client 
executives had a well defined strategy, mid-managers did not behave according to it, 
and towards shop-floor level the knowledge about the outsourcing became 
progressively limited. Thus it seemed that the long-term objectives of the outsourcing, 
and the way they were expected to be achieved, were unclear to many people involved 
in it. 
"Sometimes the client has one idea and customers have another idea and expectation. " 
(Supplier executive) 
Lynch (2000a) recognises the neglect of strategic planning in logistics outsourcings. 
Consequence: With outsourcings suppliers control the process, but its strategic direction 
and objectives must be defined by clients. When clients fail to do that and fail to 
orientate suppliers, outsourcings are unlikely to be successful because their operations 
become looser, unfocused in final objectives, and without priorities. 
"What has happened is that outsourcings' objectives are not achieved because their 
strategies were not well thought and planned. (... ) As clients do not know and define what 
they want, outsourcings run without a specific path, services' performances are poor, they 
do not achieve their objectives and it is a disappointment. " (Client executive) 
Even when there are strategies for outsourcings, 4their lack of specificity, clarity and 
documentation have the potential to influence negatively the outsourcing, both inside 
client companies and in their interface with suppliers Inside client companies because 
the lack of documentation of the outsourcing's strategies may lead to ambiguity and to 
different opinions among senior managers, without them realising it. In such a situation 
each will be working according to their own understanding of the strategy, potentially 
resulting in disperse and unfocused efforts which jeopardise the benefits of the 
outsourcing. Besides, the lack of documentation of the strategy makes its specific and 
clear communication across the entire client company more difficult. So mid-managers 
and operational employees may well not know the strategy and have difficulties in 
guiding their efforts and directing the supplier according to the strategy. Thus there is 
the risk that their actions and feedback are misaligned with the outsourcing strategy, 
jeopardising the achievement of its objectives. /In respect of the client-supplier 
interface, unspecific, unclear and non-documented strategies may also contribute to 
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suppliers' poor understanding about what they should accomplish and how it should be 
achieved, / Such lack of understanding about clients' desires and priorities is likely to 
result in suppliers not supplying what clients want, and hence not achieving the 
objectives of the outsourcings. 
Vining and Globerman (1999) suggest that badly defined strategies facilitate 
suppliers' opportunistic behaviours, which are likely to reduce the benefits of the 
outsourcing. 
7.2.2. Agreements' scopes poorly defined 
Cause: The scope of the outsourcing defines the boundaries of the deals and each 
party's responsibilities. Nevertheless outsourcing agreements - and even outsourcing 
contracts - are often not clear about what they include and what they do not, what is 
included in the price and what is extra, what parties will do and what parties will not do, 
what parties can do and what parties cannot do. Although the studied outsourcings had 
full-service and business function outsourcing characteristics - and thus were expected 
to have more involving and clear boundaries than outsourcings of a specific part of an 
activity - they also had problems of scope, and the parties realised that outsourcing 
agreements often have blurred scopes and consequently many `grey zones' of 
responsibility. 
"It is not possible to write agreements about the extensive inter-firm activities that 
outsourcings require. There are too many tasks, connections and uncertainty. (... ) Even 
the best thought agreement is unlikely to leave no doubts about what is included or not in 
the outsourcing. (... ) Frequently who pays has one interpretation [referring to what is 
specified in the agreements] and who delivers has another. " (Client executive) 
The literature does not focus on what happens in intermediate outsourcing 
negotiations and agreements. Nevertheless it recognises that outsourcing procurement 
processes usually focus on getting what is perceived as a good price, leaving the 
definition of the scope for the supplier to establish after the contract is signed. In such 
situation suppliers determine what they will and will not do during the course of the 
agreements (Bendor-Samuel, 2000). 
Consequence: Poorly defined scope can lead parties to dangerous situations in 
outsourcings. /If one signs the contract believing that the scope of the contract is one 
thing but then in practice it turns out to be another, it may end up in a difficult financial 
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position, jeopardising its expected benefitstOne party's situation becomes even worse 
when the other party takes advantage of the favourable situation created by poorly 
defined agreement scopes to have opportunistic behaviours. 
"Many times those `grey zones' define the success or not of an outsourcing [for a party]. " 
(Client executive) 
, 
Parties also referred to the fact that poorly defined agreement scopes can result in 
misunderstandings, discussions, tension, distrusts and conflicts between parties. /Such 
environments can lead to changes of behaviour and an atmosphere unsuited for 
cooperation - which was referred to earlier as the key for outsourcing success. 
The literature reveals that a common practice in outsourcing is for some suppliers to 
attempt to achieve their profits by moving activities that were originally intended by the 
client to be in the scope of the service and then claim they are not a part of the 
outsourcing. /They use poor agreement scopes to behave in an opportunistic way and 
redefine the outsourcing boundaries with the objective of maximising their revenue 
(Bendor-Samuel, 2000). 
7.2.3. Incomplete or bad definition of desires 
Cause: Sometimes the desires that clients define for themselves and then take to 
negotiations are not adequate to their situation. 'Suppliers referred to the fact that it 
seems that clients' negotiators define desires without consulting the direct customers of 
the outsourcing inside their company; the definition of the desires and the negotiations 
are done at a level at which the employees directly related to the outsourcing operations 
are not involved. Clients also admitted that the desires they take to negotiations may not 
be accurate and may need further definition during the outsourcing. Additionally clients 
often use new measurement systems to better control outsourcings and whose target 
values are frequently based in their managers' feelings and opinions, because they lack 
empirical data to specify them. In such situations the specified targets are unlikely to be 
the correct ones/ 
"Our desires to the outsourcing are not always well defined. Sometimes we agree and start 
with general ideas and then with the practice we particularise... There are the general 
desires and they gradually become more concrete through negotiations as the outsourcing 
progresses and divergences appear. The practice helps to define, quantify and particularise 
better those desires. " (Client executive) 
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/ The literature recognises the difficulty for clients to clarify internal requirements and 
acknowledges that often clients fail to tell suppliers of everything they want (Forst, 
1999). 
Consequence: After the desires are specified, they are negotiated with suppliers. When 
clients have not clearly specified their desires for themselves, it is hard for them to 
communicate those desires to their suppliers. Thus, certain desires are likely not to be 
discussed during the negotiations, compromising their delivery and accomplishment. 
Additionally, even if desires address the critical issues, when their target values are not 
the most appropriate to the situation, there is the danger that suppliers accept them and 
that they are agreed in negotiations. Suppliers may be caught up in the enthusiasm 
surrounding a high value agreement and accept unrealistic objectives, or take advantage 
of the situation to opportunistically accept easy and unchallenging desires for the price 
paid. So, in either situation, clients' inappropriate definition of desires is likely to create 
problems for the future of the outsourcing, jeopardising the achievement of their 
objectives. 
"Too high target values are unlikely to be achieved, bringing tension to the relationship and 
lack of motivating to the supplier; low targets can limit the potential benefits that suppliers 
could bring to outsourcings and make clients pay rewards without having the expected 
benefits. " (Client executive) 
The literature states that sometimes suppliers are asked to negotiate with clients 
without a clear understanding of own desires, nor information to provide to suppliers 
about the possibility of their achievement. Often suppliers succumb to the temptation of 
extra business and commit to agreements that do not reflect the reality of the situation, 
to find out later they had made a decision they simply cannot live with (Lynch, 2000a). 
7.2.4. Lack of regular revision of strategy and desires 
Cause: Clients' needs change continuously with the evolution of the context, of their 
activities and of their own outsourcing. When clients do not periodically review their 
outsourcing strategies and desires, they are likely to be inadequate to their actual 
situation. 
Clients said that their strategy was followed informally and was analysed monthly. 
Nevertheless they referred that many client companies were not adapting their 
outsourcings to the evolutions in the outsourcing environment. The actual concurrency 
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from new pulp and paper producers was given as an example: European pulp companies 
need to adapt themselves to the new market conditions where new producers, such as 
those from the Brazilians mills in Amazonia, produce very cheap pulp, helped even 
more by the `weak' dollar at the time; so European producers needed to lower their 
costs and that cost reduction extends to the maintenance outsourcings. 
'They seem to limit themselves to receive the service that was agreed at the beginning of 
the outsourcing, neglecting everything that is changing around them. (... ) They are not 
critic about the all situation. " (Client executive) 
This need for adaptation is expected to be even more pronounced in other industries 
and services, since maintenance in the pulp and paper industry is not volatile in terms of 
needs for strategic changes; operational and tactical modifications arc frequent, but not 
strategic adaptations. 
'The literature recognises that clients' needs change over time (Forst, 1999). 
Nevertheless, outsourcing contracts normally lack the flexibility to accompany these 
changes in clients' needs and strategies (Lynch, 2000b)., 
Consequence: Outsourcing strategies and desires define and guide the service delivered 
by suppliers. If they are not adapted to clients' new understandings and circumstances, 
suppliers are likely to continue delivering services according the last defined strategies 
and desires. Thus the delivered service is likely to be inappropriate to the actual 
situation, diminishing the effectiveness of the outsourcing. 
Parties agreed that the lack of frequent adaptations of outsourcing strategies and 
desires to the actual circumstances is likely to misalign the outputs of the outsourcing 
with clients' wants, and thus result in lost opportunities. /Notwithstanding this view, 
parties also defended that too frequent changes in outsourcing strategies and objectives 
are likely to cause confusion in the outsourcing, having negative impacts on the 
planning, and increasing the costs/ 
"Of course adaptations in the strategy are constantly needed to respond to changes, but I 
defend that outsourcing strategies need to have a coherent direction. " (Client executive) 
The literature states that outsourcing strategies and desires are based on important 
assumptions in terms of technology, personnel, business conditions, and market 
environment, among others. As soon as outsourcing contracts are signed these 
conditions begin to change, and if the strategies and desires arc not adapted to the new 
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situation, at least one of the parties is likely to become dissatisfied with the outsourcing 
Lynch, 2000a). 
7.3. (; ap 
ý,. ýp ' ponds to the misalignment bet\,. een clients' desires and the output and 
specifications of the negotiations always having in mind that there are trade-offs 
hemecn panics' desires. This difference as found to be based on three contributing 
factors: first. 'Lack of negotiations' effectiveness'; second, 'Specifications poorly 
defined'; and third, 'Inflexibility of outsourcing contracts'. 
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Figure 38 Key factors contributing to Gap 2 
7.3.1. Lack of negotiations' effectiveness 
(alts" Sometimes panics do not put as much effort and resources as they should in 
preparing and undertaking contractual and intermediate negotiations. Consequently 
negotiations are not as detailed as they should be, leaving important issues aside. 
egotiatnons sometimes are done in a precipitate way. believing that everything will run 
ok and that if there are problems outsourcings' 'marriage' spirit will solve them. (... ) With 
such a rush it is almost ines itable that certain important issues are not dealt. " (Supplier 
executl% C) 
Additionally, each pane's negotiation team may lack important skills: technical 
competencies, for example if the negotiations are undertaken by people with purely 
commercial backgrounds, or negotiation competencies, for example if the negotiations 
are undertaken by people \b ith technical backgrounds without the support of the 
commercial department. 
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if negotiators do not have skills in the outsourced activity, for sure there will be desires of 
the both parties that are not clarified. (... ) If it is so bad that the negotiators do not have 
people that will execute the work, then you will have a big problem... Because you cannot 
sit and make the negotiations and when you finish you call the guys that should execute the 
work and say: `Hei! Here is the contract. Do it! '" (Supplier executive) 
Sometimes clients do not tell correctly or clearly to suppliers everything they want. 
They often have desires they want suppliers to deliver, but do not specifically 
communicate them. In other cases clients do not formalise some desires in the contract 
or agreements, just informally communicating them to suppliers. 
"The supplier is the world leader in that area... We have big deficiencies in it. Thus, 
although we did not discuss it, we were naturally expecting them to improve our condition. 
(... ) To formally define everything [clients' wants] well is difficult. (... ) We take to 
negotiations the clear desires we have on our mind. But, probably because we supplied the 
service in-house for many years, sometimes we forget to discuss and include certain aspects 
we want to be supplied because for us they are obviously inherent to maintenance... The 
activities intrinsic to maintenance function are not the same everywhere. (... ) [Moreover] 
new aspects occur with the development of the outsourcing. " (Client executive) 
Frequently clients do not communicate during negotiations all the details that they 
consider to be within the scope of the contract. Such unclear communication may be 
simply due to oversight by negotiators, since for them certain aspects are clearly a 
maintenance responsibility, but because the maintenance domain varies from company 
to company they may not be clear for the supplier, or due to lack of effort on the part of 
the negotiators which may be caused for example by bad-will against the outsourcing. 
"Now we are going to start negotiations for renewing the contract and we want to include 
the maintenance engineer part [responsible for analysing process equipment, supporting 
capital investments and planning the annual shutdown, and which initially was still out of 
the contract due to strategic reasons]. (... ) I have to make sure that I clearly communicate to 
the supplier that it involves aspects as responsibility for some of the mill's licensing and the 
DCM management [mill's command system]. They are not automatically attributed to 
maintenance, but here they had always been maintenance responsibility. (... ) I admit that 
there are many people [probably technical persons] involved in outsourcing negotiations 
and which think that it [outsourcing] is a bad solution. So, they go to negotiations without 
deep discussions and just saying: `I want the maintenance as I do it. My output is this. 
That is what I want. '" (Client executive) 
'ince the 1980s client-supplier partnerships emerged in the literature as a model of 
purchasing excellence, based on closeness and trust relationship where contracts played 
a minor role (e. g. Goffin et al, 1997)/Thus well structured outsourcing contracts started 
to be seen as unnecessary (Barthelemy, 2001) and their negotiation was quick 
(Langfield-Smith et al, 2000; Mullin, 1996). Such haste in outsourcing negotiations 
tended to result in a lack of preparation and rigour, leaving important issues undefined 
or unclear. One of the biggest mistakes clients make is signing standard supplier 
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contracts. With those contracts clients' control over the outsourcing is likely to be more 
difficult and they often contain details that not even the client's legal staff can 
understand, and which hide future costs (Lacity et al, 1995). /The posture with which 
parties enter negotiations and the relationship between the people involved are 
important for effective negotiations (Landeros et al, 1995)/ 
Consequence: When desires are not discussed, negotiated, agreed and formalised they 
are unlikely to be delivered during the outsourcing, reducing each party's benefits and 
jeopardising the success of the outsourcing. This may be either because suppliers do 
not know of their existence or because as they were not formalised, suppliers do not feel 
obliged to supply them. Either case has the potential to negatively affect clients' own 
operations and performance. Additionally, when negotiations leave important issues 
unclear, `grey zones' of responsibilities are likely to be created. Such `grey zones' tend 
to emerge in the middle of the outsourcing, causing problems such as misunderstanding 
distrust and conflict between parties. All these situations are likely to magnify 
dissatisfaction and bad-will against suppliers among the client's employees. 
"Leaving aspects that seem small and with limited importance aside outsourcings' 
negotiations may have big consequences during outsourcings! " (Client executive) 
The variety of direct and informal channels of communication existent when the 
activity was performed in-house and which enabled swift changes of wants and desires 
become limited, complicating changes of specifications during outsourcings. With 
outsourcings two companies with distinct interests and objectives are involved, and thus 
it is more difficult to make the trade-offs necessary to modifying objectives and 
specifications. This increases the importance of taking accurate and appropriate desires 
to negotiations, because if not, consequences such as extra payments or non-delivery of 
the desires not specifically agreed in the negotiations are likely to occur. 
When parties' negotiation teams lack important skills such as technical or 
commercial competencies outsourcings may suffer serious consequences: teams are 
likely to fall in commercial traps which create misunderstandings or may favour 
opportunistic behaviours; or teams may not have enough knowledge about their 
companies' own needs for the outsourcing and their importance, making agreements 
that may jeopardise their own firm's activities. This is true for both contractual and 
intermediate agreement negotiations. 
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"We were practically all maintenance men negotiating and clearly we did not have a 
commercial person in the negotiations. Therefore the negotiations were always more 
technical than properly commercial. When the maintenance historic values were referred, 
we simply gave it to the supplier [for them to analyse before bid]. (... ) (Already in the 
middle of the outsourcing] the supplier complained that the maintenance costs we gave 
were not accurate, creating a bad environment around the outsourcing. In fact costs as 
structure costs were not included in the historic costs we gave to them... Our records never 
aimed at analysing those aspects. (... ) We gave with good faith what we had. They should 
have analysed the reports better to see what was included or not. (... ) At the time we did 
not had big commercial worries in negotiations and that was a fault. (... ) But not leaving 
everything in the hands of commercial is not bad. (... ) [Without technical support and 
support from the future outsourcings' internal customers] commercials tend to focus 
negotiations on price, trying to achieve the minimum price possible and leaving important 
issues and guarantees out of negotiations. This could have serious consequences for our 
future production. " (Client executive) 
The literature recognises that spending too little time negotiating. expecting that the 
`partnership' relationship will take care of everything, is a mistake (Barthelemy and 
Adsit, 2003). Despite the importance of trust in relationships, it is still necessary to 
formalise a precise contract (Tuten and Urban, 2001). The draft of a good contract is 
always important because it allows partners to set specifications and to commit 
themselves to the goals of the outsourcing (Barth6lemy and Adsit, 2003). Haste and 
lack of detail in outsourcing negotiations is likely to result in parties not achieving 
expected benefits and consequent dissatisfaction (L, angfield"Smith ct al, 2000; Mullin, 
1996). 
7.3.2. Specifications poorly defined 
Cause: Often the specifications that are included in the contract or in the outsourcing 
agreements are not complete or clear. The outsourcing contracts studied had selected 
indicators which were expected to enable the analysis of performance. Although these 
indicators were partly intended to work as expected performance specifications, many 
even failed to have target values /Suppliers partly blamed the poor definition of the 
specifications on clients' poor definition of desires and on the ineffectiveness of the 
negotiations. " 
"If clients do not define for themselves clearly what they cant. then the specifications are 
unlikely to be precise and well defined. " (Supplier executive) 
Clients admitted that this was not a problem exclusive to contracts. Although 
intermediate agreements tend to have a very limited scope and tend to be implemented 
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to clear up imprecise contractual points, they often fail to achieve their objective, and 
their specifications end up not being as clear and objective as expected. 
/The literature states that clients often define poor specifications (Lynch, 2000a). 
This difficulty is expected to be greater for services than for products, due to the more 
intangible characteristics of services (Fitzsimmons et al, 1998). / 
Consequence: When outsourcing specifications are poorly defined, suppliers are likely 
to misinterpret clients' wants and priorities. Additionally, both parties are in better 
positions to justify opportunistic behaviours, such as suppliers trying to escape from 
responsibilities that are not clearly specified, and clients arguing that particular aspects 
that are in the blurred border between the contract's fixed and variable cost parts belong 
to the fixed cost part, and that hence the supplier should not be paid extra. 
-When certain aspects of the service are not clearly specified in the contract and do not 
involve much money, suppliers tend to deliver them without complaining and arguing that 
they are in the 'spirit of the contract'; but when those aspects involve considerable amounts 
of money they try to escape from their delivery arguing that they are not specified in the 
contract. " (Client executive) 
Such situations were said to create misunderstandings, tension and conflicts in the 
relationship, creating conditions not favourable to improvements and cooperation. 
it is impossible to run like that. Both parties will lose! Both in performances and in 
money wise. You will spend too much time and resources to define what the specifications 
really are, instead of doing the proper outsourcing work. " (Supplier executive) 
The literature recognises that many outsourcing relationships fail because of 
misunderstood and ill-defined specifications (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2002a). The 
quality of the service delivered is influenced by the specifications against which it is 
evaluated, since they signal the client's priorities (Forst, 1999). Poor specifications are 
likely to be misunderstood by suppliers, misdirecting their efforts from what the client 
wants (Lynch, 2000a) and thus not achieving the objectives of the outsourcing. 
Although suppliers sometimes perform poorly, it is also true that many bad outsourcing 
decisions are direct results of the inadequate definition of requirements (Kakabadse and 
Kal: abadse, 2000). Additionally, poor specifications encourage opportunistic 
behaviours between parties (Vining and Globerman, 1999). The more precisely 
specifications are defined and documented, the greater the probability that suppliers 
understand and feel obliged to fulfil them (Moore, 2002). Poorly defined specifications 
are likely to cause problems as each party may understand the specifications and 
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corresponding metrics in different ways (Stank et al, 1999; Landeros et al, 1995). 
Lacity et al. (1995) reported an example of such a situation: "[In an IT outsourcing 
contract the client] clashed with the telecommunications supplier over the interpretation 
of the service levels outlined in the contract. For example, Energcn [the client 
company] had assumed that the 99% availability requirement meant that all nodes on 
the network had to be up and running 99% of the time. The supplier, however, 
interpreted it to mean that the host node had to function 99% of the time. When links to 
20 of its service stations went down, Energen demanded a cash penalty, which the 
supplier refused to pay. " Moreover, poor target values can also jeopardise the objectives 
of outsourcings, since "You get what you ask for" (Forst, 1999). Suppliers arc only as 
good as they have to be, they are unlikely to deliver more than what was agreed 
(Leenders and Blenkhorn, 1988). Outsourcing parties have different objectives 
(Sparrow, 2003; Domberger, 1998), even if simply because profit motives are not 
shared. This makes the change of specifications and target values even more difficult 
since clients' desires normally interfere with suppliers' potential benefits. Suppliers 
make investments to prepare themselves to achieve the agreed specifications and they 
want to amortise those investments over the lives of their contracts. Jointly with 
enhanced negotiation power, and due to lack of competition, these investments make 
suppliers relatively unwilling to agree changes in specifications to meet their clients' 
desires without receiving healthy rewards (Bendor-Samuel, 2000). 
7.3.3. Inflexibility of outsourcing contracts 
Cause: Outsourcing contracts often have all the issues set from the start and do not have 
renewing mechanisms established. Parties recognised that outsourcing contracts tend to 
be rigid and inflexible. 
"I even have an outsourcing where the regularity of revision of the motors is clearly 
specified in the contract. " (Supplier executive) 
The literature identified the naturally static nature of outsourcing contracts (Mullin, 
1996) and their long term. Lacity et al. (1995) observed that the average length of the 
total outsourcing contracts they studied was more than 8 years. 
Consequence :. /Inflexible contracts define from the beginning the rules of the 
outsourcing, making changes in the outsourcing strategy and desires more difficult to be 
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achieved through agreements made during the outsourcing. So, inflexible contracts 
create difficulties for outsourcings to be adapted to the new conditions and to changes in 
parties' needs; but if outsourcings are not adapted to the actual needs then their 
effectiveness is likely to diminish, 
"Inflexible contracts make it difficult for parties to adapt outsourcings to new conditions. 
(... ) But flexibility in contracts does not mean bad or weak rules! It means that there are 
structures and clauses %hich permit outsourcings to adapt to new conditions automatically 
or Which facilitate intermediate negotiations. " (Client executive) 
Inflexibility in outsourcing contracts was exampled to lead almost to the rupture of a 
contract. In that case serious negotiations almost constituting contract re-negotiations 
had to be made because the inflexibility of the contract brought about a situation in 
which one of the parties was losing too much money. Even more than the discontinuity 
to the parties concerned, it was argued that due to the importance of the outsourcing, the 
rupture would be noticed by the media, and that that would have negative consequences 
to both parties' image in the market. Although this was an extreme example, the 
inflexibility of the contract was recognised as not enabling the outsourcings to adapt to 
the actual conditions, and thus having the potential to put at least one of the parties in a 
difficult or uncomfortable position. 
"I can remember an ice-cream business with a fix price full maintenance outsourcing. (... ) 
In a certain )rar the summer was going to be cold and very wet, so the production was 
lower. (... ) Although the client had smaller production [and thus less needed maintenance], 
it paid the same to the supplier. The client lost a lot of money, but the supplier made a lot 
of money. " (Supplier executive) 
/Suppliers also complained that inflexible contracts limit the potential for the 
improvement and innovation that they can bring to outsourcings. l 
'The contract specifies that certain motors have to be reviewed every two weeks. Although 
I think that those motors just needed to be reviewed every two months, I have to respect the 
contract. (... ) [So, ] I am wasting time and resources in things I think are not important. " 
(Supplier executive) 
Such situations were said to lead to uncooperative behaviour, and possibly to 
opportunistic moves by the party that feels prejudiced, creating conflicts and lack of 
trust between parties. / 
The literature defends the notion that the assumptions on which contracts are based 
can change during the outsourcing, and that most contracts do not anticipate the changes 
of their evolving background (Lacity et al, 1995). Within two years of the signing of 
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the contract 70% of outsourcing contracts become irrelevant to clients' business plans 
(Mullin, 1996). Although the average length of the outsourcing contracts studied by 
Lacity et al. (1995) was 8.6 years, they realised that by the third )rar most clients 
complained that the technology supplied by their suppliers was already outdated. Even 
prices and service levels established in the contracts tend not to have meaningful 
mechanisms for adaptations (Lynch, 2000a), which could potentially redirect suppliers' 
efforts and motivate continuous improvements according to actual client needs. 
Absence of improvement targets may jeopardise potential savings and performances, 
diminishing the outsourcing's competitiveness in relation to the market (Fan, 2000). 
Moreover, once a contract is running there is a great temptation for each party to 
attempt to reap benefits at the expense of the other (Lynch, 2000a); inflexible contracts 
normally favour such opportunistic behaviour. Such inflexible contracts usually favour 
suppliers (Lynch, 2000a; Lamming et al, 1996). Sendor-Samucl (2000) recognised that 
suppliers are in a relatively strong bargaining position because they are often the only 
entities that understand what needs to change in the client's processes; this can result in 
a supplier charging relatively high rates for execution of trivial tasks. Additionally 
some of the changes that clients want to make may not be in the supplier's interest, 
making them relatively unwilling to agree changes without opportunistically receiving 
healthy rewards. Langfield-Smith et al. (2000) reported a situation in which the 
inflexibility of outsourcing contracts was a major problem for a company. It was under 
considerable pressure to reduce costs, but was unable to increase efficiency or save 
costs from the supplier because they were locked into long-term and fixed price 
contracts. Furthermore the client was committed to fixed volumes of service with 
suppliers, which did not take into account process improvements that led to reductions 
in volume. 
7.4. Gap 3 
Gap 3 corresponds to the difference between what was specified - and which from 
now on is referred as the clients' expectations - and what suppliers understood to be 
specified. This difference was found to be based on one contributing factor. `Ineffective 
communication of the expectations'. 
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7.4.1.1ncffecti%e communication of the expectations 
au'. ' i a,: h party's ºnterprctatºon, of the agreements are transformed into their 
expectations for the outsourcing. But the formalisation of the agreement in a document 
is not enough for each party to clearly understand hat they should deli\ er and what 
they are going to recei\ e. During and after negotiations there are often not enough 
discussions to clarify Nhat is being agreed and what the agreement really means. Parties 
often fail to put enough effort into to discussing and communicating their desires. This 
is more % isible in cases H here the clients used to perform the outsourced activity in- 
house ox er a long time, because they are used to receiving the service in a certain way, 
%hich is the result of many years of adaptations and internal trade-offs. Clients 
freyuentlý fail to understand that what is clear and normal for them is not clear for the 
supplier and so they do not communicate everything they want and expect in detail, 
assuming that the suppliers vº ill deliver ww hat they want. An agreement is not enough to 
communicate to suppliers Nhat the client \%ants, and how it expects the service to be 
deli\ ereil. There are too many tasks, connections and uncertainties. Without a richer 
communication medium, such as continuous mo-way discussions, it is hard to pass an 
accurate understanding on to suppliers and to respond to their emerging doubts. 
"Somcnmes the all information is not gi%en... After a while you find out 'It should be like 
this instead of that" ( ... ) 
They are used to know that the people knoll what to do, but the 
nc% contpaný [supplier) is likely not to know all that information. " (Supplier executive) 
At an organisational lev el, ineffectiveness of communication between the parties can 
be either unintentional or intentional: unintentionally when they lack communication 
skills or ý%hen they simply do not communicate things to the other party in good faith, 
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such as for example when they forget to mention something, or think it is clear and thus 
unnecessary to mention it; and intentional when they do not communicate certain 
necessary aspects with the intention of behaving in an opportunistic way in the future. 
At an individual level, clients' employees often are not willing to support suppliers in 
reaching a more accurate understanding. Many of them are even against the 
outsourcing, and this is reflected in their behaviour, which creates distancing and 
communication problems. The distancing between client and supplier outsourcing 
teams was highly visible in the exploratory case study, even in terms of physical 
distance, since the suppliers were located far from the client's outsourcing management 
team. Such a distance makes the quality and quantity of communication between the 
parties even more difficult. 
"If the client does not know to explain itself well about what it wants or if it stays with 
`aces up its sleeve' expecting that the supplier is obliged to do something more in the future 
- if there is a not loyal relationship - the supplier will not understand correctly what the 
client wants. " (Client executive) 
(Others reasons, such as differences in culture and language between clients' and 
suppliers' managers were also cited as diminishing the effectiveness of communication? 
"At the beginning we started saying: 'We want you to do the maintenance of the mill with 
all the jobs that the maintenance is responsible. ' But this is a simplistic lecture of the 
situation. When we start to think about what maintenance does, many things appear... 
Some may be even not logic as maintenance's responsibility to the supplier, because 
perhaps he never did it. (... ) Maintenance's responsibilities vary from company to company 
[with its culture]. " (Client executive) 
The literature states that unlike what happens in services to individual people 
(Zeithaml et al, 1990) and in transactions of standardised activities, in business to 
business relationships, clients directly tells suppliers what they want to receive (Araujo 
et al, 1999), but often do not express themselves in clear terms which enable appropriate 
action (Forst, 1999). 
Consequence: When parties do not discuss what they understand to be agreed and 
communicate clearly what they want in detail, they will not have an aligned 
understanding about needs and agreements. If clients do not communicate clearly to 
suppliers what they want and other details important to service delivery but not written 
into the agreement, they create a blurred statement of direction for suppliers. This way 
it is likely that suppliers are not aware of certain aspects that they are expected to 
deliver, or the performance level and constraints of the delivery. Suppliers guide their 
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decisions by what they perceive that the clients want, so if they do not have a clear idea 
of what clients want their efforts are likely to be misguided by the lack of direction. 
%\ asting resources on aspects that their clients do not value. Thus clients are unlikely to 
recei\ e the results they ww anted, creating tension and conflict in the relationship. 
"If clients do not know to express themselves and do not tell everything they want, how can 
suppliers do what they want? " (Client executive) 
The literature (Speknian et al, 1999; Landeros et al, 1995) recognises that unclear 
communication of expectations between parties can jeopardise suppliers' correct 
understanding about what they are expected to deliver, and thus result in poor 
outsourcing; decisions (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2000). 
7.5. Clap 4 
Gap 4 corresponds to the difference between what the supplier understands the client 
to \%ant, and what it delivers. This difference was found to be based on three 
contributing factors: first, 'Supplier is unable to deliver a service correspondent to its 
understanding of the specifications'; second, 'Supplier's performances are affected by 
its own objectives'; and third, 'Client changes its behaviour towards the outsourced 
activity'. 
Main contributing factors for 
(. ap 4: 
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7.5.1. Supplier is unable to deliver a service correspondent to its 
understanding of the specifications 
Cause: Sometimes suppliers are not able to perform at the levels they undcrstood to be 
agreed with the client, due to either lack of ability or lack of resources. 
"They [the supplier] are not achieving the performances ac agrccd and expected. (... ) 
Some of my colleagues believe that this is because the team in-site is not sufficicntly 
backed up with resources. Personally. I think that they may be cry good in other 
industries but lack the needed know-how for maintaining a pulp and parer mill, - (Client 
operational manager)4. 
The literature reports that sometimes suppliers agree to performances that they 
cannot achieve; e. g. referring to financial performances, Forst (1999) reports that to %%in 
and secure outsourcings suppliers sometimes sign contracts with prices lower than the 
cost of the service. 
Consequence: When suppliers are unable to deliver a service correspondent to what was 
agreed, outsourcings are unlikely to reach their objectives. This is likely to affect the 
client's own performance and the relationship between the parties. A client reported that 
while the agreed performances were not being achieved, it was having high downtimes 
and thus losing production. The client was dissatisfied with the poor performance and 
presented a bill correspondent to the reward-punishment system for the supplier to pay, 
accentuating the bad environment surrounding the outsourcing relationship, which 
could jeopardise its success. 
`"The resulting discomfort, conflict, tension and distrusts wert prejudicial for the 
outsourcing. (... ) [Such an environment is] normally the way to outsourcings" diigntrr" 
(Client executive) 
The literature suggests that suppliers often try to avoid the responsibilities of not 
achieving the agreed performance by opportunistically raising issucs related to the 
contract scope, arguing the interpretation of the specifications or supporting its 
performance by saying that the client did not give enough conditions (e. g. information, 
investments) to the supplier for the expectations to be met (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 
4 To be fair to the supplier's performance it is important to say that this declaration sm collected during 
the exploratory study. At the time of the reinforcement study (two years later) the client V, -Is auch 
happier with the supplier's performances. Realising the poor performance, both panics nude changes in 
the organisation of the outsourcing's which enabled this improvement. Morern cr. with time the supplier 
developed its competencies internally and absorbed competencies-related hnovºledge through supplier 
development initiatives made by the client. 
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2000; Bendor-Samuel, 2000; Lacity et al, 1995). This behaviour does not improve the 
situation and is likely to degrade the relationship even more, decreasing the possibilities 
of joint work to try to find solutions to improve performance. 
7.5.2. Supplier's performance is affected by its own objectives 
Cause: The two parties involved in outsourcings normally have different objectives, 
even if only because profit motives are not shared. This was clear in the studied 
outsourcings; while suppliers want to make a profit and increase their reputation in the 
market to facilitate the gain of a bigger market share, clients seek to obtain the best 
value for money from the contract. 
"We [client and supplier] do not have the same objectives. (... ) We may have some 
common objectives; but we all know that their objectives are theirs and ours are ours. For 
example, the low downtime objective is common. (... ) But I do not lose my objectives of 
reducing the maintenance costs and they do not drop the objective of making more profit 
than is expectable. (... ) [Even that common objective may be seen as just indirectly 
common] because they know that if they achieve it, they earn more money [bonus of the 
reward system]. " (Client executive) 
/This is in accordance with the literature (Sparrow, 2003; Domberger, 1998). 
Contrary to many authors (e. g. Greco, 1997), Bendor-Samuel (2000) defends the notion 
that outsourcing parties are not partners: they are allies. For him a partnership is an 
association of entities with undivided interests, where both parties embark on joint 
efforts, having joint interests, joint risks and rewards; `partners' implies joint ownership 
and a permanent relationship, whether good or bad. Allies, on the other hand, act 
together for the benefit of each other in many areas and occasions where their common 
interests match. In an alliance, there is a pact or agreement between the parties to 
cooperate for a specific purpose and to merge their separate interests and efforts for that 
common purpose. For him, the allies' relationship is longstanding but not permanent; in 
fact, where their interests do not match, they may be not allied. / 
Consequence: When parties' objectives do not match, they do not abdicate from their 
own objectives to the detriment of common objectives. To achieve their own objectives 
parties sometimes even take steps that will undercut the other party's objectives or in 
the work quality. 
-If you are going to do a job, before you do it you always make some kind of rough 
calculation. If you see that this job will cost a little bit too much than expected... than 
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maybe you try to do it in a little different way and that can sometimes influence the 
quality. " (Supplier executive) 
Clients stated that because of this misalignment of objectives, suppliers sometimes 
start behaving opportunistically, affecting clients' future performance and neglecting 
situations they know will evolve into problems no longer included in the contract. 
"[The supplier) starts not doing some maintenance actions to save money and then this lack 
of maintenance will have future consequences in equipments' effectiveness. (... ) A 
situation which is current maintenance in a certain time, if not repaired can evolve and gi"c 
origin to a `big repair'. What a certain time was part of the contract and should be done but 
the supplier did not do, after a while the consequences are so big that they are already a 'big 
repair'. And if it is a big repair it is already out of the contract. So, sometimes suppliers 
close their eyes to situations they know will evolve to outside the contract. " (Client 
executive) 
Clients believed that when the suppliers' own objectives arc being achieved, they 
fight for the common objectives, but when they are not achieving their own objectives, 
then they slightly forget these common objectives in trying to achieve their own. This 
opportunistic behaviour on the part of the suppliers results in production losses, extra 
money being spent, conflict and lack of trust in the relationship, adversely affecting the 
synergy of both parties. 
The literature (Vining and Globerman, 1999) recognises that outsourcing panics can 
behave opportunistically and self-interestedly, even with bad faith. 
7.5.3. Client changes its behaviour towards the outsourced activity 
Cause: Sometimes clients change their behaviour towards the outsourced activity 
during outsourcings, directly affecting suppliers' work or changing the conditions on 
which the agreements were based. 
"At the start of the contract the market aas very good for the client. But during the contract 
the market changed, bringing financial problems to the client (... ) and it usrtcd to try to get 
more out of the supplier. (... ) They have changed their behaviour. While before it was 
prepared to pay extra for services that were in contract's 'grey zones' (requ: rer ents that 
were not clear in the contract due to a poorly defined boundary and scope). once it became 
into a worse financial situation it started to pressure us to dclircr the 'grey zones' jobs free 
of charge (arguing that they were included in the contract). increasing dw load on us' 
(Supplier executive) 
Moreover, suppliers complained that changes in their clients' production plans have 
effects on the mills' conditions, and hence on the necessary maintenance. 
"[Metaphorically speaking] one person can almost 'kill' a luxury car hin a %Iercracs in just 
15 thousand kilometres. But the same person can drive a cheap Fiat jexpectcd to be less 
U. 
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reliable] for 150 thousand kilometres without problems [and less maintenance needed]. It 
all depends how the person drives the car. " (Supplier executive) 
Clients partly attributed the change of behaviours to their managers. Clients' 
outsourcing managers were the people who undertook the maintenance in-house and 
were used to have maintenance operations limited by budget restrictions; thus although 
they were willing to do more maintenance, they could not do it because of lack of 
money. Once the outsourcings started, these managers were no longer limited by the 
budget because maintenance works were globally included in the contract. 
Consequently those managers became more exigent with the maintenance, asking more 
of the supplier than they used to do in-house - conditions in which the outsourcings' 
bids were made. So, like suppliers, clients can also display opportunistic behaviours. 
The literature (Lynch, 2000a) points that once the contract is signed there is a 
temptation for both parties to attempt to get benefits from the outsourcing, even at the 
expense of the other. 
Consequence: Changes in clients' behaviour may put suppliers in difficult situations, 
affecting their performance and behaviour in the outsourcing. 
"[With the change of client's behaviour related to the 'grey zones'] the cost to us has 
increased too much! (... ) We have to carry more costs and that has been so much now that 
we are in a trouble situation! " (Supplier executive) 
Clients referred to the fact that suppliers in such financial difficulties were likely to 
take opportunistic shortcuts to avoid extra work, resulting in potential production losses 
for the client and conflict between the parties. 
The literature (Bendor-Samuel, 2000) defends the idea that when allies' objectives 
do not match, they tend to look principally to their own interests, causing 
misunderstandings and distrust. 
7.6. Gap 5 
Gap 5 corresponds to the difference between what is actually delivered by the 
supplier and what is perceived by the client. This difference was found to be based on 
one contributing factors: `Clients' bias in perceiving the service'. 
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7.6.1. C'lient's bias in perceiving the service 
('licnts' enmhloýecs usually hac hard feelings and had will against 
outsourcings because of perceived insecurity or loss of benefits (e. g. power, change of 
duty, relocation and criticisms from the supplier about their normal practices). Such ill 
feeling against the outsourcing is often magnified by factors such as the suppliers' 
employees enjoying greater benefits than their co-worker client's employees. For 
example, this was notorious in one of the studied outsourcings, \%here some of the 
supplier's employees' right to a car provoked reactions from the client's employees. 
"There are many people that for carious reasons are against the outsourcing: because it 
destroys the number of persons in the company and reduces labour, they feel their jobs 
threatened; because it is an attack on the old employees, because the gained power and 
comforts start to deteriorate... There are many reasons - good and bad, as the loss of 
company know-ho\N in which people focus to believe that outsourcing is bad. " (Client 
executive) 
The literature (Greaver, 1999, Domberger, 1998) recognises that as in most 
transformation projects, in an outsourcing the clients' employees' emotions run high, 
resulting in a resistance to change. Sometimes clients' employees do not see the 
benefits of the relationship (Christopher and Juttner, 2000). feeling that they were 
betrayed by their company and that no other company can possibly do the job as well as 
it was done in-house (Bendor-Samuel, 2000). 
Consequence: When clients' employees have bad-will against the outsourcing their 
impartiality is likely to be jeopardised, affecting the way in which the client 
organisations perceive the delivered service. If members of the outsourcing 
management team share that bad-will against the outsourcing, and the members of each 
Chapter 7- Outsourcing management problems 
party's outsourcing teams have bad personal relationships, then the problem becomes 
more serious. Bad feeling against the outsourcing on the part of the client's employees 
means that the supplier's performance will be poorly evaluated and not properly valued. 
Additionally such bad-will also magnifies the importance that the client's employees 
place on any problems that occur. 
if suppliers' performances are poor they [client employees] are implacable saying that 
suppliers are bad, that they would do better and that there was no need for outsourcing; if 
performances are good they say that they would also reach such performances if they had 
more time. "(Client executive) 
In the exploratory study, the client's employees expected such a highly regarded 
supplier to achieve a very good performance, but it transpired that the supplier had little 
experience in the pulp and paper industry, and during the first years the performance 
was not very good. As its performance was worse than the client's employees were 
expecting, they perceived the service to be even worse than it really was. Moreover, the 
client's employees did not have access to information about the actual performance, and 
the way they perceived the service was based almost entirely on their own opinions. 
This did not give them the opportunity to align their understanding of the performance 
with the reality, and they continued to evaluate the outsourcing performance as being 
even lower than it actually was. This environment contributed to the existing bad-will 
towards the outsourcing. 
Often employees' opinions and feelings are made clear to the client's top 
management, and then suppliers have to expend resources and effort to convince them 
that it is not true, explaining the actual situation instead of focusing on the service. 
These situations are high in tension and conflicts between the respective parties' 
employees, resulting in a general distrust and discomfort in the relationship. Such an 
environment has consequences for the way in which both parties behave. 
The literature (Domberger et al, 1993) suggests that perceptions of quality in 
contracting are clouded by the relationship between the two parties involved. 
Additionally, research related to service industries to individuals (Zeithaml et al, 1990) 
defends the suggestion that the expectations that clients bring to the service affects its 
evaluation and way they perceive the service; the higher the expectations, the better the 
delivered service must be to be perceived as high quality. Due to the inherent parallels, 
the same is expected to happen in business to business outsourcing relations. 
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7.7.1. Reý%and system not appropriate to the situation 
Cause: Clients use reýkard systems to orientate and mottýate suppliers. \e'erthcless, 
sometimes these systems are not aligned with clients' pnonties and wants. Such 
misalignment may be due either to an ill-designed or stagnated system, which does not 
translate clients' priorities and wants, or does not accompany their evolution. The 
reward systems studied were almost exclusively dri en by output factors, leaving the 
way the service was delivered which can affect the client's Hork and is a drier for 
internal customers' satisfaction with the outsourcing - aside. Clients associated the fact 
that the reward systems were mainly related to production outcomes with the fact that 
the contract and the reward system were constructed by people a ith technical 
backgrounds. Additionally, reN%and systems were found not to cover all of the 
outsourcings' main objectives and to have key performance indicators (KPh ) which 
were ineffectively or ill-defined. A supplier executive gave an ironic example: 
In the eyes of this reward system. if an employee gets injured it is better to kill him 
because that way we will not be losing working time [vºhich dnves the KPI). " iSupplier 
executive) 
Before the start of the outsourcings, clients created ne" measurement systems 
which drive the reward systems to try to control outsourcings effectively. How ever 
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these new systems had not been tested empirically and so some of their target values 
were established based on managers' opinions and feelings. Sometimes these values, 
not based on factual data, were shown not to be aligned with the client's real 
expectations, and thus, the same was the case with the rewards systems. 
The literature (Lynch, 2000a) notes that pricing issues are normally established at the 
beginning of the contract and usually do not contain meaningful mechanisms for 
continuous adjustment. /This suggests that in the middle of the outsourcing the reward 
system is likely to become misaligned with clients' priorities, needs and desires, since 
these change with time., / 
Consequence: When reward systems are not clear and aligned with clients' priorities 
and wants, their own existence may be counterproductive for the objectives of the 
outsourcing. Such conditions are likely to create conflicts between the parties and a 
misguidance in the supplier's work and motivation. In the cases studied there were KPIs 
which were not being measured and used, due to their poor definition in the contract. 
. 
/The inclusion of ill-defined KPIs in the contract were prejudicial for the outsourcings 
because they created conflicts between the parties and ended up not being used, putting 
the client and its reward system in a fragile position in the eyes of the supplier, / 
"During the outsourcing we [the parties] never reached an agreement of how that KPI 
[related with environmental issues] should be measured and calculated. (... ) We had to 
drop [not use] it. (... ) This may be seen as a sign of weakness. (... ) If there are KPIs 
without well defined rules, the most certain is that the objectives behind their inclusion are 
not dealt by the supplier as carefully as expected. " (Client executive) 
The fact that not all the objectives of the outsourcings were included in the reward 
system was also said to be a flaw which enables suppliers to not suffer the consequences 
of not achieving the outsourcings objectives. In this way suppliers are likely to put less 
effort into those objectives, jeopardising their achievement. Additionally, inadequate 
target values were mentioned as being prejudicial for outsourcings: too high target 
values are unlikely to be achieved, Fringing conflicts to the relationship and lack of 
motivating to the supplier; while low targets can limit the potential benefits that the 
supplier could bring to the outsourcing and make the client to pay high rewards without 
reaping the expected benefits. 
/The literature (Bendor-Samuel, 2000) defends the suggestion that when inadequate 
reward systems exist, the temptation for suppliers is to attempt to achieve increased 
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profitability by reducing service quality. This seems to suggest that reward systems not 
appropriate to the situation may enable suppliers to reach greater benefits by behaving 
opportunistically than by achieving the objectives of the outsourcing. 
7.8. Gap 7 
Gap 7 corresponds to the lack of quality in the processes of clients' supplier 
evaluation, feedback construction and preparation of supplier development activities. It 
was found to be based on three contributing factors: first, `Client does not give much 
importance to outsourcing's management'; second, `Incorrect use of a measurement 
system'; and third, `Lack of quality of the feedback'. 
Main contributing factors for 
Gap 7: 
I- Client does not give much 
importance to outsourcing's 
management 
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3- Lack of quality of the 
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Figure 43 - Key factors contributing to Gap 7 
7.8.1. Client does not give much importance to outsourcing's 
management 
Cause: Sometimes clients do not place much importance on the way they manage 
outsourcings; often they manage them passively, just expecting services to be delivered. 
"It happened to us in the first year. (... ) We adopted that position: We made the 
outsourcing and the way it is developed and the service delivered is the supplier's 
responsibility. We have nothing to do with it. "' (Client executive) 
Even when clients try to manage outsourcings actively, very often they do not give 
sufficient thought to the best way to do it. 
"We give much importance to the outsourcing management. But I have to admit that we do 
not have a systematised management. (... ) We do not look at the outsourcing management 
with the appropriate detail. But we have placed a lot of importance on the outsourcing 
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management. In the last two years 80% of the work I do is to manage the outsourcing. 
(... ) In the last year even the mill director has accompanied the outsourcing. (... ) [But] we 
manage more than think how to manage an outsourcing. " (Client executive) 
Furthermore, clients' outsourcing managers are often the people who had performed 
the outsourced service in-house, and who are not adequately prepared to manage 
outsourcings. They tend to place more emphasis on the operational and immediate side 
of the activity than on its business and strategic side. 
"We are very used to the other management [maintenance management] and not to this 
management [outsourcing management]. (... ) Our [type o fl management is more 
operational (... ) than the management of maintenance as a business. (... ) We are clearly 
not prepared to manage it [the maintenance] as a business. " (Client executive) 
The literature (Lamming et al, 1996) defends the idea that the assessment and 
management of suppliers in general appears to favour clients more than it favours 
suppliers; /nevertheless clients do not spend as much time managing on-going 
relationships as the do making the initial purchasing decision (Bozarth et al, 1998), / 
Buyers frequently underestimate the time and attention required to manage an on-going 
outsourcing relationship-; -a common source of 
difficulty is leaving suppliers to their own 
management devices, expecting them to operate on their own, with little or no direction 
from the client (Lynch, 2000a). Although this is desirable to a certain degree, advice 
and counsel must be available when needed. Managers pay little attention to reflecting 
about how they actually manage theiiroutsourcing-relati on hips (Kern and Willcocks, 
2000) and the majority of outsourcing companies do not have specific programmes in 
place to develop relationship management capabilities for outsourcings (Corbett, 2003). } 
Most companies continue to manage their supplier relationships in a relatively informal 
way (Heckman, 1999) and do not staff their outsourcing management teams sufficiently 
(Lacity et al, 1995). 
Consequence: When clients do not place much importance on outsourcing management, 
they are unlikely to control the path that the outsourcing takes. Thus suppliers probably 
lack a sense of direction and prioritisation in outsourcings, jeopardising the achievement 
of the outsourcing's objectives. Moreover, clients' needs specific to their situation may 
not be communicated or taught to suppliers. 
"In the first year we did not involve ourselves much in the outsourcing management and we did not guide well the supplier. (... ) The supplier was a little disoriented and we did not have control over the situation. (... ) [When this happens] suppliers do not deliver the 
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service we expect (... ) and that can have negative consequences for our production 
performances. " (Client executive) 
Additionally, suppliers may take advantage of their clients' lack of outsourcing 
management to guide the outsourcing opportunistically, trying to achieve their own 
objectives and leaving the clients' objectives in second place. 
"If a client does not manage the outsourcing, the supplier manages the outsourcing as it 
wants, preferentially in its own interest. While it happens in that way clients may have 
prejudice or at least do not reach the expected objectives. (... ) Probably clients also lose 
negotiation capacity, since suppliers are likely to say `You did not tell us that; you did not 
put us in the right path. ' So clients lose. " (Client executive) 
Because clients virtually abdicate the outsourcing management and do not put 
enough thought in it, suppliers retain control of the outsourcing (Mullin, 1996). When 
clients underestimate the time and attention required to manage outsourcings, or when 
they hand over management responsibility to suppliers, suppliers begin to operate in a 
priority vacuum and service quality tends to deteriorate, since the suppliers' agenda is 
not in sync with the clients' business objectives (Lynch, 2000a). After all, the 
objectives of each party are not always the same (Sparrow, 2003; Domberger, 1998). 
7.8.2. Incorrect use of a measurement system 
Cause: Clients often use weak and poorly constructed measurement systems. 
 Frequently measurement systems are simply constituted-o£individual-measures which 
are important for clients, lacking a group rational / ystems constructed in such way 
will hardly follow an outsourcing's strategic structure and gQ=quenlLy will not to be 
aligned with its strategy and objectives, /Such an unstructured way of defining measures 
usually results in performance systems with too many measures, some of which are of 
very limited importance fo jhe outs ourcing.. 
J'zobably motivated by unstructured 
performance measurement construction processes, measurement systems also 
sometimes fail to incorporate important issues for outsourcings. Outsourcing 
performance svstems. of}e,,,, focus on short-term operationa. L. ssuesfailing to include 
other ripe Jmportant. forthe outsourcing's-success-and-strategic measures, f 
"The unique indicator related with cost control was of materials costs. We failed to include 
maintenance's global cost and specific cost as indicators. (... ) We thought of the indicators 
almost just in terms of production. " (Client executive) 
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-Measurement systems are often created just before the start of the outsourcing to try 
to control it. However these new systems have not been tested empirically and some of 
their target values were established based entirely on managers' opinions and feelings. 
Not being based on factual data, these values were sometimes revealed not to be aligned 
with the client's real expectations. More extreme cases exist where even the measures 
included in the performance measurement systems are poorly defined. For example, in 
the studied outsourcings the performance systems had measures that failed to clearly 
define their calculation rules and their target values. Even when calculation rules are 
defined, they may be not clear enough to have consensus between the parties about how 
they should be measured, and may even be wrongly measured and calculated.  
The literature (Dean and Kiu, 2002) states that clients believe that they should 
perform more rigorous performance monitoring and that the frequency of monitoring 
affects the quality of the outsourcing's outcomes. One of the key features in the success 
of an alliance is the presence of constant evaluation and monitoring, since the 
information collected helps both parties to better understand what is going on, 
" permitting adjustments to improve performance (Cravens et al, 2000). Initial studies on 
performance measurement emphasised accounting factors principally related to 
financial issues, which tend to represent past performances and did not report qualitative 
information (Kaplan and Norton, 1996). Arguing that partial measurement may lead to 
incorrect conclusions, the new performance measurement literature (e. g. Neely et al, 
2002; Kaplan and Norton, 2001; Kaplan and Norton, 1996) broadened business 
performance measurement to include both financial and non-financial aspects. 
Although clients' satisfaction depends on both operational and relational performance 
(Stank et al, 1999), this broadening of performance measurement does not appear to 
have been extended to outsourcings; outsourcings' performance measurement usually 
depends on costs, neglecting less tangible issues of performance and quality (Dean and 
Kiu, 2002). f 
Consequence: When outsourcing measurement systems are ill constructed and have 
weaknesses such as not being constructed in line with their strategies, there is the 
danger that important perspectives are not analysed by both parties. On the other hand, 
the inclusion of measures not important for the outsourcing also wastes resources in 
their analysis and may deflect management attention from what is really important. If 
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any measure of the system is difficult to undertake, then neither party is likely to spend 
much time trying to measure it. Vhen the measures are not clearly defined in the 
measurement system, then conflicts about how they should be used are likely to appear 
during the outsourcing. When target values are shown to be inappropriate to the 
situation, then the objectives of the outsourcing are jeopardised, harming its 
development and qualityeToo high target values are unlikely to be achieved, bringing 
conflict to the relationship and a lack of motivating to the supplier; low targets can limit 
the potential benefits that the supplier could bring to the outsourcing and force the client 
to pay high rewards without reaping the expected benefits. If the parties comprehend 
performance systems as ineffective then they are likely to gradually stop using them, 
/cmd the management becomes based more on feelings than on concrete data, creating 
conditions appropriate for management bias, assumptions, game playing and 
opportunistic behaviour/ In one of the case studies, although the measurement system 
had 22 indicators, only 4 were being used, and those 4 were part of the 6 indicators that 
were related to the reward system. 
"Some indicators included in the contract do not tell us anything and so we do not measure 
them. Some others we did not know how to measure and use them. And when indicators 
are not well measured we do not know how to evaluate well what we want and what should 
be delivered. (... ) If we have a bunch of indicators, many of which were not important... 
Then even the important ones that are in the middle of the bunch stop being measured and 
followed. " (Client executive) 
Tension between parties also arises when the defined measures are not well used, e. g. 
the existence of a continuous measurement error, as happened in one of the 
outsourcings, where one measure which drove more than half of the reward system was 
discovered to be continuously wrongly calculated by the client; that created a difficult 
and uncomfortable situation between the parties when the error was discovered. /A 
poorly defined or poorly used measurement system is likely to give a wrong or 
incomplete understanding about the outsourcing's real situation, misdirecting operations 
from the outsourcing's objectives, jeopardising improvements and creating tension 
between the parties. / 
The literature (Lynch, 2000a) states that some outsourcing managers become so 
fascinated by the reports of the measures that they insist on measuring meaningless 
trivia; too many measurements can bury the operation in details and lead to friction 
between parties, but too few or general measures make outsourcings difficult to manage. 
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7.8.3. Lack of quality of the feedback 
Cause: Clients often do not give good feedback to suppliers. Clients may have a 
passive posture within the outsourcing management, or give feedback reflecting the 
immediate situation. Frequently clients are more concerned about and focused on 
informal feedback related to immediate daily operations than on strategic feedback 
regarding long-term objectives and evolution of performance. This is expected to be 
even more pronounced when client employees have bad-will against the outsourcing, 
since they tend to communicate just when problems occur and consequently give 
negative feedback. Moreover if clients do not use correctly the performance 
measurement systems they can even give erratic feedback to the supplier. 
"Poor quality feedback is a general problem; not only in outsourcings. Every time you do 
something that is wrong you get the feedback immediately. But it would also be good to 
get the feedback when you did things well... Because then you know: `This is what he 
expects from me. ' (... ) Most of the people are very good giving bad feedback but not so 
good giving good feedback. " (Supplier executive) 
Suppliers have said that sometimes it seems that clients do not want to show the 
benefits they are having with the outsourcing, either because their employees have 
difficulty in accepting the suppliers' success or because clients want to keep their 
suppliers in an uncomfortable position, expecting that they will do more work or that 
suppliers will continue to have low negotiation power. 
The literature (Bendor-Samuel, 2000) states that as a strategy to preserve harmony 
clients often do not address important issues in the feedback, hoping that their suppliers 
will bring them up. Other clients use performance measurement in an adversarial way: 
parties are engaged in a cat-and-mouse game, where the client is in pursuit and the 
supplier is trying to avoid being caught (Domberger, 1998). Frequently clients fail to 
give a sense of priorities to their suppliers and do not tell them what they need; instead 
of clearly articulating requirements, they suggest solutions, offer opinions or identify 
new services (Forst, 1999). Additionally, clients often rely too much on the indicators 
(Domberger, 1998) and take good performance for granted, not showing recognition 
when good work is supplied (Lynch, 2000a). 
Consequence: When clients do not give good feedback to suppliers - identifying 
what is good and bad in the outsourcing, prioritising and proactively directing suppliers' 
efforts - suppliers are unlikely to have a sense of strategic direction in the outsourcings 
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or to understand the actual situation correctly. /As suppliers control the process, 
feedback is the way in which clients control the outsourcing/ If they do not give good 
feedback to their suppliers, then they are using that control in a bad way, or even losing 
it. Incorrect or untimely feedback has the potential to misdirect suppliers' efforts and 
priorities, resulting in wrong decisions and wasted resources being used; moreover it is 
unlikely to prevent problems from happening before they have serious consequences. 
As a result the effectiveness of the outsourcing erodes and thus its objectives and the 
client's needs are unlikely to be delivered. 
"If clients are not able to transmit to the supplier the outsourcing's real situation and the 
objectives they desire, then the supplier does not deliver what clients desired because it was 
not communicated correctly what the supplier should deliver and thus the supplier does not 
know what the client wants. " (Client executive) 
Suppliers highlighted the importance of feedback, even when clients are happy. It is 
a way to understand better what the client really wants, and then they can develop their 
practices in that direction. "Additionally, exclusive negative feedback puts suppliers 
under permanent pressure, does not help them to understand the situation and the 
client's needs better, and does not help them in directing their efforts. Continuous 
negative feedback may demotivate suppliers from trying to do their best and may cause 
discomfort in the relationship. In such circumstances suppliers were said to be more 
likely to adopt opportunistic behaviour. Bad feedback was also exampled to have 
undermined the suppliers' accountability over the performance of the outsourcing. / 
"That already happened sometimes. We `beat' them so much [always complaining and 
negative feedback] that it was difficult that they did something well. (... ) It was bad. For 
example two site-managers were substituted. They were so `beaten' that they end up going 
away. And then came another one, and now there is a new one. (... ) When the feedback is 
`caustic' [always negative] what happens is that clearly a lack of motivation and the 
abandonment from people. They already do not mind the 'beating' and stop trying to 
improve. Anything they do is wrong. It happened some times and was a problem. " (Client 
executive) 
The literature (Bendor-Samuel, 2000) suggests that suppliers simply ignore 
unappraised issues; when clients do not address issues, suppliers receive an implicit 
message that those issues are not important/ Clients get what they inspect, not what 
they expect. Clients failing to address important issues in the feedback may have 
serious consequences, since their suppliers are unlikely to focus on them (Barthelemy 
and Adsit, 2003)1' his may have future consequences because it creates poor precedents, 
and relationships are built on precedents (Bendor-Samuel, 2000). Too narrow a focus 
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on measures can lead to perverse results because suppliers may give so much attention 
to meeting a particular performance target that the overall consequences can become 
significant (Domberger, 1998); moreover, management and feedback of an outsourcing 
solely done in terms of the defined measures may lead to a sub-optimisation of the 
outsourcing's benefits, or to the loss of the notion of outsourcing as a unit (Bendor- 
Samuel, 2000). Use of performance measurement systems in an adversarial way is also 
not effective because the discussion tends to focus on symptoms and fails to go deep 
into the causes of the problems; furthermore such discussions are likely to poison the 
relationship (Domberger, 1998). When clients' feedback does not prioritise and state 
what they want, it will fail to guide the suppliers' efforts (Frost, 1997) and may create 
problems of accountability. Accountability problems are likely to lead to poor 
performance and to opportunistic behaviour by suppliers (Bendor-Samuel, 2000). But 
few things frustrate suppliers more than giving excellent service and seeing it to go 
unrecognised (Greaver, 1999); approval and recognition are basic human needs (Lynch, 
2000a). 
7.9. Gap 8 
Gap 8 corresponds to ineffectiveness in clients' active outsourcing management 
practices. It was found to be based on three contributing factors: first, `Internal 
resistance to outsourcing's success'; second, 'Supplier does not have liberty to work'; 
and third, 'Outsourcing management team not suited for its role'. 
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7.9.1. Internal resistance to outsourcing's success 
Cause: Clients' employees often have hard feelings and bad will against outsourcings 
because of a sense of insecurity or loss of benefits (e. g. power, change of duty, 
relocation and criticisms from the supplier about their normal practices). 
"Ten years ago when we started the outsourcing business, typical start-up project would be 
one year or one year and a half. (... ) But nowadays start-up is question of one month... the 
basic processes are implemented in one month. The difference is big. This highlights how 
difficult area is change management of the people minds. It can take five years, but still 
some processes are implemented in one month. (... ) While the top management supports 
the outsourcing, the other hierarchical levels [which directly work in the outsourcing] have 
different attitudes. (... ) Shop-floor level employees have limited knowledge about the 
outsourcing, fear its consequences [e. g. lost of job] (... ) [and thus] are against the change. 
(... ) Mid-management have a more refined understanding about the outsourcing, but 
believe that the maintenance was successful when it was done in-house (... ) [Thus] mid- 
managers and production behave as traditionally they have behaved and tend not to change 
their behaviour towards the outsourced activity and do not collaborate openly with us. " 
(Supplier executive) 
The literature (Greaver, 1999; Domberger, 1998) recognises that as in most 
transformation projects, in outsourcing, the client's employees' emotions are 
heightened, resulting in a resistance to change. Sometimes clients' employees do not 
see the benefits, _of the relationship 
(Christopher and Juttner, 2000), feeling that they 
were betrayed by their company and that no other company can possibly do the job as 
well as it was done in-house (Bendor-Samuel, 2000). 
Consequence: Such bad-will against outsourcings tends to be transformed into reactive 
behaviours which prejudice the outsourcing's success. Suppliers reported difficulties in 
changing the client's employees' practices, arguing that some of the client's employees 
had performed the maintenance in-house for more than twenty years and did not want 
anyone to tell them how they should do their jobs. Moreover, many mid-managers 
believed that the maintenance was done well in-house, and that if it was outsourced it 
was because someone thought that the supplier could do it better. So, probably to prove 
them wrong, mid-managers tended not to help the supplier much; they did not give 
important information to the supplier - since the clients' employees knew the mills 
much better than the suppliers - letting it make mistakes. They did not give proactive 
feedback or share experiences, not helping the supplier to understand the situation better 
to improve its practices. They lost the initiative to work and waited passively until the 
supplier's next order, diminishing the dynamics and responsiveness of the outsourced 
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function. They were more exigent with the supplier than when the activity was 
performed in-house, significantly increasing the workload. These practices did not help 
the success of the outsourcing, creating conflicts and limiting the work of the supplier 
and the performance of the outsourcing. 
"When a supplier enters in a client organisation, some of them [client employees] feel that 
`Maybe I have not been successful. ' So, some avoid to give the right information to the 
supplier. And that means that you may make some mistakes before you find out that they 
did not tell what the problem or real expectation was. (... ) Imagine that you [incarnation of 
a client] have been working in a certain thing for 10 years. And you feel `I really can do it 
and I do it in the best way. ' And then, suddenly, there is another guy standing there [the 
supplier] telling you `You should do it like this. ' For sure you feel `Why must somebody 
else come in and tell me how to do my work? ' That is very common. (... ) We tried to 
teach some of the people, but they sometimes said `Don't try to tell me how to do it. I have 
been doing this for 10 years. I know what to do! ' (... ) And if they do not follow my orders, 
how can I do a good job and achieve good performances? " (Supplier executive) 
The literature states that some clients' employees may tend to channel their emotions 
about the outsourcing into two counterproductive streams; self-defence and retaliation. 
Self-defence, because some employees break company policies in order to gain favour 
with management, as exampled by Embleton and Wright (1998): "In one instance 
employees had deduced that the key to job retention was to bring work in time and 
under budget (... ) Quality was being sacrificed for short-term budget savings and the 
chance to attract [supplier's] management's attention. " Retaliation, because other 
employees try to undermine the outsourcing either actively (fighting the outsourcing 
and the change by applying pressure, threatening and sabotage) or passively (opponents 
refuse to fight, but also refuse to change and withhold information, play politics and 
delay decisions) (Greaver, 1999). Both self-defence and retaliation reactions reflect 
changes in behaviour due to the new outsourcing situation and can be very damaging 
for the outsourcing and its parties. 
7.9.2. Supplier does not have liberty to work 
Cause: It is hard for clients to stop managing the outsourced activity directly and start to 
manage the outsourcing. This way they interfere and limit the supplier's work and 
processes. Clients recognised that their managers had not adapted themselves 
completely to their new organisational role and boundaries. They did not change their 
practices significantly, and involved themselves too much in the process of the 
outsourced activity, even bypassing the suppliers and giving direct orders to operational 
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employees, who were the same ones who used to perform the service in-house and thus 
historically used to work under those client mid-managers orders. 
"We performed the activity in-house for many years, so our managers clearly still have the 
natural tendency to try to directly control the process and operations. Even 
I have that 
temptation! " (Client executive) 
-/T-he literature states that with outsourcing the client transfers ownership and control 
of business processes to the supplier; this is what distinguishes outsourcing from other 
business relationships in which the client retains control of the process (Bendor-Samuel, 
2000)t/There are two main control mechanisms: direct supervision over staff and 
operations, and formal and indirect control mechanisms. Many companies believe that 
unless they have direct control over the inputs of the process, they have little if any 
control over the output (Langfield-Smith et al, 2000). One error that clients typically 
make is forgetting that they traded an internal infrastructure with its personnel and 
technical issues for a business relationship with the supplier. So, even though clients 
outsource an activity, they still try to dictate the process (Bendor-Samuel, 2000). 
Consequence: When clients try to control the process of the outsourced activity, the 
supplier loses the freedom to work since it is not free to apply its expertise and 
innovation capacity. Clients often want suppliers to perform the service as it used to be 
performed in-house, killing from the start part of the improvements that the supplier 
could bring. Suppliers reported that when clients try to oblige them to do the work in a 
certain way, after a while they are likely to follow the clients' instructions because 
clients have more rower +hý_relationship. Nevertheless, although suppliers accept 
changes in their processes, they feel unhappy and uncomfortable with the situation 
because they are not allowed to do the work in the way they know is best and thus 
cannot introduce innovations to the outsourcing. Such interference not only limits the 
potential performance of the outsourcing but also reduces the trust and cooperation 
between the parties, bringing tension and conflict to the relationship. 
"[If a client dictates the process] for sure the supplier will not be happy and the team work 
and the trust will diminish and there will be problems in the future. (... ) Supplier will feel 
very, very badly if it is not allowed to do the way it wants to do it, because he knows that 
`If I do it in this way I save 3 hours, but now I have to do as he [the client] says and it will 
cost me 3 hours'. And also, if they pay for a supplier to come here that means that they 
expect to lower costs, to higher efficiency and so on. (... ) And then they do not listen to 
me... So why did they bring me here? " (Supplier executive) 
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Clients noted that when they interfere too much in the outsourced process, suppliers 
need much more time to achieve maturity in the outsourcing than if they had assumed 
all of the responsibility for the outsourcing. /They also revealed that the transfer of 
control over the process to the supplier created concerns over potential loss of control, 
leading to over-monitoring, which resulted in duplication of effort, adding high indirect 
costs to the outsourcingsJ 
The literature (Bendor-Samuel, 2000) recognises that the temptation for a client to 
try to fix problems instead of working through its supplier can be overwhelming, but 
such attempts are likely to be fruitless or further compound the situation. Problems tend 
to occur when buyers try to continue to manage and dictate the process and do not allow 
the expert supplier to deal with the way in which the results will be provided. In doing 
so, conflicts occur and clients undermine their suppliers' accountability for the results of 
the process, which is one of the most valuable elements of outsourcing. 
7.9.3. Outsourcing management team not suited for its role 
Cause: Outsourcing managers frequently do not have the characteristics needed for their 
role, and outsourcing management teams are not balanced with the different 
characteristics needed for complete management. Suppliers reported that although 
outsourcing managers have a big impact on an outsourcing's success, they are 
sometimes not well suited to their roles. 
Ttiey stated that outsourcing management is 
completely different from maintenance management, because with outsourcing 
managers need to be flexible between both the client's and the supplier's teams. / 
Moreover, outsourcing managers often do not understand the outsourcing's overall 
context and do not take a balanced approach to issues. 
"Outsourcing in theory seems simple, but its implementation is far from simple. (... ) [To 
make it worse] companies are trying to implement concepts [as outsourcings] without 
having people that clearly understand them. (... ) Issues as the partnership spirit behind the 
relationship, the discipline that is needed, the need for a global view instead of a narrow 
vision of isolated bottlenecks and the necessity of constant investment are many times not 
understood. " (Supplier executive) 
Clients tend to put the people who previously performed the outsourced activity in- 
house in charge of the outsourcing management. It is difficult for client managers to 
remove themselves from the operational maintenance and many are not prepared to 
manage maintenance as a business. Although clients' executives who headed the 
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studied outsourcing management teams had technical backgrounds, their previous 
experience - reflected by their hierarchical level - gave them some business 
characteristics. Nevertheless-the rest of the management teams - who were operating 
the outsourcing on a day-to-day basis with direct contact with the supplier - tended to 
be very skilful in terms of maintenance engineering, but with little expertise in business. 
They had a tendency to lack a general overview, analysing individual work in extreme 
ways (or good or bad, right or wrong) making communication and cooperation between 
parties more difficult. Additionally many of those managers believed that the 
maintenance was well done in-house and did not believe in the outsourcing, thus 
magnifying such problems. Z 
/The 
literature supports the suggestion that with outsourcing, the client manager's role 
changes (Barthelemy and Adsit, 2003) from managing resources to managing the result 
of the contract (Gadde and Snehota, 2000). Successful outsourcing requires a shift in 
managerial and organisational learning, from how to do something to how to manage a 
supplier doing something (Allen and Chandrashekar, 2000). Thus outsourcing 
managers need different skills from those needed to manage the outsourced activity in- 
house: strategic thinking, negotiation and deal making, relationship governing, 
managing change, problem solving and communication (Kern and Willcocks, 2000; 
Langfield-Smith et al, 2000; Useem and Harder, 2000). Lynch (2000b) specifies for 
logistics outsourcing: "Although managers may be good logistics problem solvers, they 
may lack the necessary managerial and leadership capabilities". Outsourcing 
management teams must also have enough authority and power to commit their 
organisations to their decisions and agreements (Huiskonen and Pirttila, 2002). But 
because the major outsourcing challenges are not with the supplier but within the client 
organisation itself (Lynch, 2000a), those teams need the capacity to effectively 
coordinate not only inter-firm but also intra-firm activities (Takeishi, 2001). 
Consequence: When outsourcing managers are not suited and prepared for their role, 
problems are likely to occur in the outsourcing. Clients recognised that when 
operational people are responsible for the management of the outsourcing there is a 
natural tendency to place a greater focus on the operational side of the activity than on 
its business and strategic side, limiting the innovation that the supplier could bring to 
the outsourcing, and decreasing the guidance to the supplier. Notwithstanding these 
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drawbacks, clients highlighted that it is important to retain good technical know-how in 
the management team. It is the only way to enable an effective monitoring, control, 
help, development and guidance over the supplier. Such know-how keeps 
organisational memory inside client companies, preventing practices that by experience 
they know are erratic and which could potentially jeopardise clients' production. 
Additionally, clients defended the idea that retaining technical know-how within the 
company prevents clients from being completely dependent on suppliers, guaranteeing 
the continuation of the activity whenever needed. Suppliers noted that sometimes 
outsourcing managers are against outsourcings and feel threatened by suppliers. Thus 
their behaviour can create difficulties for the outsourcing and the relationship between 
the parties, negatively affecting the delivered service. 
"Clients' managers many times do not have interest in cooperation and joint work to enable 
better results. (... ) [It seems that] they prefer to look for conflicts than for solutions. " 
(Supplier executive) 
The literature gives examples of problems that can occur when technical people 
make the leap to managing outsourcing contracts: "... the two Energen [the name of the 
company] experts retained to manage the telecommunications contract had difficulty 
understanding that their job had changed. Instead of actually operating and maintaining 
the network, they were now responsible for interpreting users' needs and 
communicating them to the supplier. When a technical problem arose, the two experts 
still wanted to solve it themselves rather than just report it to the supplier's account 
manager, who argued that technical matters were his domain" (Lacity et al, 1995). In 
fact when technical people are in charge of managing outsourcing contracts, due to 
traditional habits they tend to keep managing the outsourced activity in the same way as 
they did before the outsourcing, interfering with suppliers' work (Corswant and Tunaly, 
2002). When outsourcing management teams do not have power to commit their 
organisations to their decisions, then their credibility in the other firms' eyes is at risk, 
affecting future agreements and the relationship between parties (Huiskonen and 
Pirttila, 2002). When outsourcing management teams do not have the power and 
capability to influence internally the functions related to the outsourcing, problems may 
exist inside the client organisation due to critics and the resulting unpleasant 
environment, or even due to undermining of the outsourcing (Lynch, 2000a). 
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7.10. Gap 9 
Gap 9 corresponds to ineffectiveness in clients' ability to maintain suppliers' 
understanding permanently in sync with their needs. It was found to be based on five 
contributing factors: first, `Ineffective communication'; second. `Bad relationship 
between parties'; third, `Power imbalances'; fourth, `Lack of trust', and fifth `Existence 
of conflicts'. 
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Figure 45 Key factors contributing to Gap 9 
7.10.1. Ineffective communication 
Cause: Often communication between outsourcing parties is not of a high quality. 
Frequently communication just focuses on problems, lacking the positive and proactive 
spirit to overcome them. At other times there is a certain distance between parties that 
can cause difficulties for the effectiveness of communication. Ineffectiveness of 
communication between parties can be either unintentional or intentional: unintentional 
when they lack communication skills or when they simply do not communicate things 
to the other party in good faith, such as for example when they forget to mention 
something or think it is clear and thus unnecessary; and intentional when they do not 
communicate certain necessary aspects to enable them to adopt opportunistic behaviour 
in the future. 
When clients' employees have bad-will against the outsourcing or do not have a 
good relationship with suppliers, communication problems are likely to be magnified. 
Clients' employees by themselves often are not willing to support suppliers in 
developing an understanding. Many of them are even against the outsourcing and this is 
reflected in their behaviour, when they create problems of distance and communication. 
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The distancing between client and supplier outsourcing teams was highly visible in the 
exploratory case study; even physically, since suppliers were located far from the 
client's outsourcing management team. Such distance makes quantity and quality of 
communication between the parties even more difficult. 
"There has been some communication barrier between us. (... ) When a supplier enters in a 
client organisation, some of them [client employees] feel that `Maybe I have not been 
successful. ' So, [to avoid outsourcing's success] some avoid giving the right information to 
the supplier. " (Supplier executive) 
Negotiations were also pointed to as an indirect obstacle to communication. Their 
ineffectiveness may create role ambiguity and lack of communication rules between 
parties, potentially leading to a situation where clients do not understand that they need 
to tell the suppliers what they want, and suppliers do not know how to get information 
from clients. -Others reasons, such as the differences of culture and language between 
clients' and suppliers' managers were also referred to as diminishing communication 
effectiveness. / 
The literature (Lynch, 2000b) notes that problems in communication between parties 
are not unusual. They might be originated by insufficient communication (Bozarth et 
al, 1998), one way communication (Lynch, 2000a), ambiguous communication 
(Wynstra and Pierick, 2000), low width communication limited to a number of contact 
points (Landeros et al, 1995), and inadequate communication medium (Lynch, 2000a) 
among others. 
Consequence: When communication between parties is not good, suppliers are likely to 
become confused, not understanding clearly what clients want. In such situations they 
make errors, waste resources on aspects clients do not value and are unlikely to deliver 
the benefits that clients want. Such situations create tension and conflict between 
parties, jeopardising the trust in the relationship. Additionally, lack of communication 
was also mentioned as diminishing suppliers' motivation and making their development 
more difficult. 
"One problem for this outsourcing company has been the communication problem, because 
to achieve fully the performance you [the supplier] have to be able to communicate to the 
guys [the client]. And that influenced our work because we have not been able to come 
close to the [client] organisation as we expected [wanted]. (... ) [If there is lack of 
communication] in the worse case the outsourcing will not do what the client is expecting; 
in other cases it puts the trust in a difficult situation (... ) The worse case is that you [the 
supplier] do not know what the client wants from you. " (Supplier executive) 
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The literature (Spelanan et al, 1999; Landeros et al, 1995) recognises that unclear 
communication of expectations between parties can jeopardise suppliers' correct 
understanding about what they are expected to deliver, and thus resulting in poor 
outsourcing decisions (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2000). Additionally when clients do 
not address issues with suppliers, outsourcing performance is likely to suffer. Suppliers 
take shortcuts that are not caught and corrected, or do not get answers to doubts and 
suggestions for improvement; these situations may result in delays or inappropriate 
assumptions being made, which are likely to create future problems (Greaver, 1999). 
Additionally, suppliers not communicating to clients issues such as changes of 
operations may also have a negative impact over clients' operations and performance 
(Lynch, 2000a). 
7.10.2. Bad relationship between parties 
Cause: Often the relationship between clients and suppliers is problematic. Aspects 
such as lack of diplomacy between managers (more evident when managers are 
technical people), bad-will against the outsourcing by the clients' employees and 
performances weaker than expected accentuate these problems. Frequently they are 
even created at a personal level between clients' and suppliers' managers. 
"In the past I even had to change site managers because of bad personal relationships with 
clients. " (Supplier executive) 
The literature (Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000) acknowledges the influence that 
the social context of outsourcings can have over them and over the behaviour of both 
parties. 
Consequence: When the relationship between clients and suppliers is problematic, the 
parties involved regard each other as strangers and suspicious characters. Tension arise 
and communication problems, such as clients not giving the supplier all the information 
necessary are likely to occur. In such an environment distrusts and conflicts affecting 
cooperation are likely to occur. These conditions have the potential to sabotage the 
outsourcing. 
"It is better to have a not so good contract with two [clients and suppliers'] management 
teams which have a good relationship than a very good contract and two management 
teams which have a bad relationship. " (Client executive) 
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The literature recognises that to an important extent alliances are between people; 
due to the complexity of outsourcings, contracts do not cover all aspects of it (Lewis, 
1995). Many believe that contracts are just pieces of paper; it is the people that make 
them work (Kern and Willcocks, 2000; Christopher and Juttner, 2000). When 
relationships between parties' employees are not good, distrust and destructive 
behaviour appear, and although often overlooked, the human side of outsourcings may 
impede its value creation (Bendor-Samuel, 2000). 
7.10.3. Power imbalance 
Cause: Clients are normally the strongest part in outsourcing relationships. They pay 
for the service and they say what they want to receive. Many contracts even have 
clauses to ensure that certain changes are not made without the clients' approval. 
'The customer is the customer and the client is always right! " (Supplier executive) 
The literature of outsourcing (e. g. Kern and Willcocks, 2000), partnerships (e. g. 
Tuten and Urban, 2001), alliances (e. g. Ramaseshan and Loo, 1998) and normal client- 
supplier relationships (e. g. Gadde and Snehota, 2000) is unanimous in recognising the 
existence of power imbalances between the parties in a relationship. 
Consequence: When there are power imbalances between outsourcing parties, they are 
sometimes used by the stronger party to control the relationship, and that may have 
negative consequences for the outsourcing. Trust, cooperation and the relationship 
between the parties are likely to be negatively affected. The stronger party has more 
negotiation power and is likely to use it to protect its interests; the weaker part is likely 
to become frustrated and to adopt opportunistic behaviour to protect itself. 
"If a party has more power, it can condition the outsourcing. If the client has more power 
the relationship may not to work as an outsourcing... It is an outsourcing, but it is the client 
that rules. So the activity is performed as it was before [before the outsourcing]... Its ideas 
and how it wants continue to be done. If the supplier is stronger in the relationship, then it 
may cheat the client: selling one thing but delivering another worse, not doing the 
maintenance it should and saving money where it should not. " " (Client executive) 
When clients control the relationship and try to control the processes of the 
outsourced activities, suppliers are likely to provide in the way how clients want after a 
while, but become frustrated. When suppliers' processes are commanded by clients, 
they take much longer to reach maturity within the outsourcing, and the potential for 
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innovation they could bring to the outsourcing is limited. So, in such circumstances, the 
outsourcings' performances are also limited. 
The literature (Tuten and Urban, 2001) suggests that power imbalances may lead to 
conflicts and opportunistic behaviours by both parties. Such a situation diminishes the 
perception (Ramaseshan and Loo, 1998) and the effectiveness of the relationship 
(Gadde and Snehota, 2000). 
7.10.4. Lack of trust 
Cause: Often parties do not trust completely each other, because they are afraid that the 
other party is behavin opportunistically. 
"Suppliers are afraid that clients will ask things they think they do not have to do; clients 
are afraid that suppliers do not do what they should and that they are winning money at 
clients expenses and that clients later have consequences of the work not being well done. " 
(Client manager) 
Parties occasionally even distrust the competences of the other in relation to the 
outsourced activity. 
"We believe that they [suppliers] do not have enough competencies to do the outsourced 
activity all by themselves; by another side I believe that they have all the right of saying 
`You did a not very good maintenance; we arrived and nowadays it is much better. You 
were not very competent in terms of maintenance. We arrived and it improved. '" (Client 
manager) 
/The literature (Langfield-Smith et al, 2000) recognises that often mistrust arises due 
to different cultures between the parties Additionally, most business executives 
practice gaming ethics in the routine discharge of their responsibilities, failing to honour 
compromises (Lynch, 2000a). The resulting lack of trust between parties is magnified 
when there is risk of information leaks and breaches of confidentiality (Momme and 
Hvolby, 2002; Elmuti and Kathawala, 2000). 
"Sako 
(1992) divides inter-firm trust into 
three types: contractual trust, based on moral standards of honesty and keeping one's 
word; competence trust, based on the expectation that the supplier has the necessary 
technical and management competencies at his disposal; and goodwill trust, based on 
the expectation that parties have an open commitment to each other. _/ 
Consequence: When parties do not trust each other even at a personal level, there tends 
to be more conflict and parties are more careful in dealing with issues related to the 
outsourcing. Distrust limits the degree of risk that parties are willing to take, thus 
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limiting the outsourcing's potential benefits. Outsourcing management becomes even 
more difficult; everything takes more time, and resources to be analysed and 
implemented. Past behaviour influences future behaviour. 
"When there is no trust parties are always with full attention and trying to read the 
invisible signs of what is coming from the other side. It creates a permanent difficulty for 
management. One person is always much more cautious. " (Client executive) 
Additionally, parties are more likely to try to reap additional benefits from the 
outsourcing through opportunistic behaviour and to try to control the outsourcing, 
limiting the other party's actions. In such an environment there also tends to be a 
reduction of each party's cooperation and commitment, jeopardising the outsourcing's 
success. 
The literature (Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000) suggests that this lack of trust 
makes both parties think more about the risks of outsourcing and behave accordingly; 
e. g. hiding information from the other party (Huiskonen and Pirttila, 2002) or taking 
advantage of situations for opportunistic moves (Spekman et al, 1999). 
7.10.5. Existence of conflicts 
Cause: Often there are conflicts in outsourcings. These conflicts may have different 
degrees of severity, ranging from conflicts that could lead to the rupture of the contract 
to conflicts with virtually no impact on the outsourcing, and can be so distinct that they 
can occur at a personal or company level. Conflicts were said to be more frequent in 
outsourcings with ill-defined agreements, since the parties have more liberty to behave 
according to their own interests. /Distrust between parties as well as the presence of 
managers not suited for the role of outsourcing management are also likely to bring 
about conflict. / 
"Outsourcing is a permanent management of conflicts! " (Client executive) 
The literature identifies many grounds for conflict: parties' objectives are not the 
same (e. g. Domberger, 1998), agreements (e. g. Langfield-Smith et al, 2000) and 
mechanisms for sharing benefits are ill-defined (e. g. Spina and Zotten, 2000), lack of 
mutual respect (e. g. Brinkerhoff, 2002), tendency for over-control by one party (e. g. 
Tuten and Urban, 2001) among others. 
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Consequence: Conflicts in outsourcings were shown to be potentially catastrophic for 
outsourcings, even leading to their premature ending. Conflicts affect parties' 
satisfaction with outsourcings and limit their motivation and cooperation in terms of 
quality and quantity. Conflicts and their resolution may lead parties to modify their 
behaviour towards the outsourcings, and these changes can be positive or negative. 
Jointly with the resulting lack of trust, such an environment is likely to limit the 
potential benefits of the outsourcing. 
"If suppliers are not able to make clients pay extra for some works already done they 
believe are outside the scope of the contract, after losing the conflict they many times study 
the contract much better to look for things that until then it did not charge, but from then on 
it will charge all. Even insignificant things... It is like revenge... And it creates 
discomforts and probably more conflicts. (... )[In such situation] distrusts increase... 
Everything gets worse. " (Client executive) 
It was also mentioned that outsourcing conflicts can have global consequences for 
parties in the marketplace. 
"If that conflict was not solved, it was sure that it would be published by the media 
[because it was one of the biggest outsourcings in Portugal]. That would have great 
negative impact for our [client and supplier's] image in the market and could affect parties' 
future businesses. " (Client executive) 
The literature (Spina and Zotten, 2000) recognises that conflicts are likely to lead to 
a degradation of the relationship between parties and to a reduction of the relationship's 
performance. The way they are handled affects the level of satisfaction with the 
relationship (Selnes, 1998). When conflicts are not resolved but just smoothed over, it 
is unlikely that their cause is rectified, and the conflict is likely to stay in people's 
minds, potentially undermining the relationship at any moment. Ramaseshan and Loo 
(1998) distinguish conflicts in a relationship as dysfunctional and functional: 
dysfunctional conflicts are disagreements that cannot be solved by parties, whereas 
functional conflicts are disagreements that can be solved in a friendly manner. While 
dysfunctional conflicts negatively affect an alliance's effectiveness, functional conflicts 
have the potential to enhance their effectiveness. Absence of conflicts is not always a 
good sign, since it normally hides games of power or represents a lack of mutual 
influence. 
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7.11. Comment on data not supporting findings 
The research also sought to identify data that contradicted the findings. Although 
they were strongly supported by data, some aspects are not entirely supported. Such 
aspects are now presented. 
7.11.1. Gap 1 
7.11.1.1. Outsourcing's strategy poorly defined 
The existence of outsourcing strategies does not guarantee that they are followed 
because their implementation may be conditioned by issues outside the outsourcing. 
"We almost breed that we have to do preventive maintenance. The problem is in the 
practice. We cannot always put in action that strategy. (... ) When we calculate some 
indicators we notice that the preventive maintenance still does not have more `height' than 
the corrective. (... ) Not everything depends on the maintenance. Doing preventive 
maintenance involves stopping production. That involves negotiations with production. If 
they are inflexible it is difficult to make programmed stops. " (Client executive) 
Nevertheless, this does not contradict the analysis concerning the identified problem. 
A poor outsourcing strategy compromises the outsourcing's success, whatever the 
conditions. This section notes that even when the outsourcing strategy is well defined, 
it may have difficulties in being implemented. 
7.11.1.2. Agreements' scopes poorly defined 
Even when in theory the scopes seem to be well defined, in practice the situation 
may be different. 
"There are always issues that are a little grey. We go to the contract and we see: 'Full- 
maintenance to the equipments according to the AFNOR norm - level 4'. But if we go and 
see what that norm says and the other norms that it obliges to analyse to determine for 
example what is damage by usage and what is non-normal damage... We would be 
disgraced because we would discuss for hours and hours to discuss that a certain pump that 
went out three times and then we substituted part of the rotation group because we did not 
know what was happening... When we get it out we have to have a big group of inspectors 
to understand if the failure was by normal usage or because the thermal was poorly 
regulated or even if that was the production that put there something it should not. It would 
be a great confusion. " (Client executive) 
This does not contradict the analysis concerning the identified problem, since a 
poorly defined scope compromises the outsourcing's success, whatever the conditions. 
What is suggested is that even when the scope seems to be well defined, it may prove 
the contrary in practice. 
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7.11.1.3. Lack of regular revision of strategy and desires 
Notwithstanding the necessity of adapting objectives and strategies to the actual 
reality, too regular changes can be counterproductive. 
"I believe that things must adapt to reality. But I believe that the strategy must be followed 
and achieved. We have to establish a strategy and adapt it until we reach objectives. From 
the moment they are achieved we have to refine the strategy... We can even have to change 
it because for example we want to jump to another level of performances and the strategy to 
reach the new objective has to be very different. But permanently changing strategy, I 
believe it is wrong. I admit that paths are changed, but not the objectives. If not we will 
look like a `lose cannon': always shooting in every direction without a specific target. " 
(Client executive) 
This is not to say that the lack of regular revision of the outsourcing strategy and the 
client's desires does not jeopardise the outsourcing's success. The analysis concerning 
the identified problem is valid, but it was added that too regular modifications of 
strategies and desires may also lead to confusion and defocus efforts. 
7.11.2. Gap 4 
7.11.2.1. Client changes its behaviour towards the outsourced activity 
In the middle of an outsourcing, clients may also change their behaviour in a way 
that favours the outsourcing. 
"Since we started with the open-book accounting, we are much more aware of supplier's 
costs. We became aware that everything had a cost and so we understand now that we can 
not ask supplier to put the mill impeccable next day because everything has costs. (... ) We 
now even saw the other side: before the supplier asked us more and now that they are in a 
more comfortable situation, it even offers more things that are in the scope. But this also 
varies from person to person. It also has to do with the personal relations and with the 
persons that are in front. (... ) If in my relationship with the site manager this is more or 
less clear, he knows that when he has possibilities he should do a little more than is 
specified; and he knows that I will not ask him extra things than the needed to maintain the 
stability of the mill when I see that he is troubled. " (Client executive) 
This does not contradict the analysis concerning the identified problem; just 
highlights that not all changes in clients' behaviour towards the outsourcing activity are 
prejudicial for the outsourcing. 
7.11.2.2. Supplier's performances are affected by its own objectives 
The problem is not that the parties' objectives are different, but that they may be 
incompatible. 
"The fact that our objectives are different is not prejudicial per se. The problem is when 
they are not compatible... and many times they are not. " (Client executive) 
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This does not contradict the analysis concerning the identified problem. Just clarifies 
that the problem for outsourcings is not that parties' objectives are different, but that 
they are incompatible. And many times they are incompatible: e. g. clients want to spend 
as little as possible in the outsourcing, while suppliers want to make as much profit as 
possible. 
7.11.3. Gap 7 
7.11.3.1. Incorrect use of a measurement system 
The potential for an ill-constructed measurement system to prejudice an outsourcing 
is limited, because outsourcing management is not exclusively based on it. 
"But the measurement system is just part of our management. Our understanding and 
critical mind is important to solve some of the incongruence that appear. " (Client 
executive) 
But the measurement system is a very important tool, that when used incorrectly can 
create erratic ideas which may trigger erratic actions, jeopardising the outsourcing's 
benefits. So the analysis concerning the identified problem remains valid. 
7.11.4. Gap 8 
7.11.4.1. Internal resistance to the outsourcing's success 
Notwithstanding the negative impact that negative behaviour on the part of the 
client's employees can have against outsourcings, some of them can indirectly 
contribute to outsourcings in a positive way. 
"Employees stay in that situation: 'Let see what these guys [supplier] want, what they tell 
me to do. And so I just do what they tell me to do! '--(... ) They do not make the decisions 
by themselves. (... ) [They think] `Now it has to pass by A and B and C to decide what to 
do. So let it be! ' And therefore the process' dynamics is partly lost when compared with 
when the power decision was a little more divided. But it has all the pros and cons. This 
behaviour enables a better control about costs... If everyone does what he thinks is the 
best... Then at the end you have the old story of the credit card... Sometimes when you 
wake up you have invoices to pay, many times without really knowing where they come 
from. " (Client executive) 
But this does not contradict the analysis done earlier, when discussing the problem. 
The prejudices that internal resistance to the outsourcing's success can have largely 
outweigh the benefits they potentially can bring. 
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7.11.4.2. Supplier does not have liberty to work 
Although it may limit some benefits of the outsourcing, sometimes clients do not 
give total liberty to their suppliers as self-defence mechanism in order to prevent 
potentially serious problems. 
"[In another outsourcing] we used to do thermography every two months. Our supplier 
needed to reduce costs and passed the thermography to twice a year. When we knew about 
that we told them: 'Be careful! ' Because my initial idea was to let them work. We needed 
to let them work freely for things to change. And he argued. And I said: `We already had 
experiences that the end of two months and something, three months, hot points appear and 
the centrals blow. And this is experience from many years. ' And he said: `But during this 
year we always did every two months and nothing happened. ' And I said: 'Ok, but we are 
here not to happen. ' He insisted and we accepted. 'Let see! ' We did not need to wait one 
month... Pummm! One of the centrals blow, then another blow in another place and the 
supplier came to speak with us very worried. And we said: 'See, and now? What are you 
going to do? ' `I am going to pass it to every two months again. ' In this outsourcing, not 
long ago, the supplier manager also said: `This every two months... It is better to pass it to 
every four or every six months... ' And I said: `Look, I am going to tell you one story ... ' He listened and of course he let it stay to every two months. We controlled what should be 
done... May be it is wrong! But I also think that if we do not do that we have the risk of 
prejudicing ourselves. (... ) We have imposed them some things, but we also have given 
them some liberty... For example, the diminishing of the wood yard team... (... ) [After 
explaining the change] First I did not agree but I accepted. (... ) The change had good 
results. There we did not impose our own opinion. " (Client executive) 
Active involvement of clients in the outsourcing may also have advantages for 
outsourcings. 
"The client is much more involved in the outsourcing. Now this is becoming co-sourcing. 
This way we can also better use clients' knowledge and experience about the mill and 
industry. " (Supplier executive) 
But this does not contradict the analysed problem that when clients try to control the 
process of the outsourced activity, they may jeopardise the outsourcing's potential 
benefits. This section just notes that clients' involvement in the outsourcing activity can 
also have some advantages for the outsourcing. 
7.11.5. Gap 9 
7.11.5.1. Existence of conflicts 
Notwithstanding the negative impacts that conflicts have, they may end up having 
positive aspects for outsourcings. 
"Sometimes conflicts can reduce the `grey zones'. They can also teach both parties 
thinking and how to look at things. In some cases conflicts can even be a development of 
the relationship... if they are not too big... Small conflicts can help parties understand 
better each other. " (Supplier executive) 
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As expressed during the analysis of the problem, conflicts tend to be negative for 
relationships. But, they may also end up creating conditions or actions which favour 
outsourcings. 
"The adoption of open book accounting [which was extremely important for the 
improvement of the outsourcing] resulted from a big conflict. " (Client executive) 
7.12. Discussion 
Execution of the research design led to the identification and understanding of 
problems in the clients' on-going outsourcing management. The findings are now 
discussed. 
Reflections on the identified problems 
Although some problems are sporadically identified in the literature, no investigation 
focusing on the topic was found. This work partly fills this gap in the literature by 
reporting on and exploring twenty-four problems which affect on-going outsourcing 
management and which have an impact on service delivery. The author believes that a 
good understanding of such problems is important in order to prevent them. 
/The 
study revealed that problems in this outsourcing's on-going phase are often 
originated by ineffectiveness of previous phases:. the chosen supplier is not able to 
operate at the expected performance levels, the contract does not specify clearly the 
scope of the outsourcing, and the reward system is misaligned with the outsourcing's 
objectives. This fact highlights the importance of a careful preparation of arrangements 
for the outsourcing to ensure its success. 
When suppliers do not achieve the expected results, blame is usually automatically 
attributed to them. But this study highlights the fact that suppliers' lack of success can 
also be partly due to their clients' behaviour. 
/Moreover, it was shown that unsupportive client managers are a common problem, 
as well as outsourcing management teams inadequate for their roles. 'Outsourcing 
management is different from managing the outsourced function in-house; nevertheless 
many outsourcing managers pass from managing the outsourced function in-house to 
managing the outsourcing itself without special preparation for the change. Client 
executives even complained that they did not have many people with whom they could 
discuss outsourcing management. The outsourcing literature reveals that outsourcing 
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managers do not reflect very deeply about how they actually do and should manage 
their outsourcings (Kern and Willcocks, 2000) and less than half of outsourcing 
companies have specific programmes in place to develop their outsourcing relationship 
management (Corbett, 2003). 
fThe 
study also uncovered the existence of opportunistic behaviours from both 
outsourcing parties, through which parties try to enhance their outsourcing benefits, 
even if that represents losses to the other party. 
fiese behaviours were found to be 
negative to the outsourcing, since these tendencies towards short-term benefits are likely 
to have an impact on the relationship between parties, on their behaviour, and ultimately 
on the quality of the service. Many of these practices for immediate, easy gains at the 
other party's expense jeopardise the comfort of the other party and thus their behaviour 
in the outsourcing, influencing the outsourcing's performance and putting at risk future 
larger gains. A client executive clearly showed this, saying that in the past his supplier 
had experienced serious financial losses in the outsourcing (some people said that this 
was partly due to the client's opportunistic behaviour); thus it was trying to save money 
with a tendency to do less maintenance than was needed. This caused continuous 
conflicts with the client because his production was being affected. When the financial 
situation of the outsourcing became untenable for the supplier, the client was made 
aware of the situation and accepted a renegotiation of the value of the contract. From 
then on the supplier became more comfortable in the outsourcing and thus made 
investments, improving the quality of the service, and thus enabling the client to achieve 
better production performance. 
, 
/Additionally, 
the study suggested the existence of performance gaps. Unlike 
management gaps, performance gaps do not represent bad management practices, but 
differences that exist between types of performance J The 'contraEtHual gap' is the 
difference between a standard performance that was agreed to be delivered (the contract 
reference) and the performance delivered. The gap may be positive - when the 
supplier's performance is better than that expected - or negative - when the supplier's 
performance is worse than expected., The `contractual gap' drives the reward systems. / 
The `seyjce_gap' is the difference between the service that the client expects and the 
service that it perceives that it gets. It is normally a driver of the client's satisfaction: if 
the client perceives that it is receiving from the supplier what it was expecting or even 
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more, then it will likely be satisfied with the service; if not it will likely be dissatisfied 
with the outsourcing and the supplier's performance. rhe `alignment gap' is the 
difference between the results of the contractual reward system and the supplier 
evaluation! For a good reward system the alignment gap is zero. The results of the 
reward system should always be in accordance with the evaluation that the client 
undertook about the supplier's work and performance. If this is not true, there is the 
danger of influencing contractors to make things (because they will be rewarded) that 
are not in the client's interest (which will not increase the client's satisfaction and hence 
make the evaluation of the supplier better). The `realisatio gap' is the difference 
between the service that the client perceives and the service that is supplied in reality. 
As seen, the way the client perceives the supplied service is affected by many 
intangibles and is also dependent on the capability that the client has to make a good 
evaluation of the service. Thus, it is normal that there is a misalignment between the 
service that is delivered and the one that the client's managers perceive. This 
misalignment may be either positive - when the perceived service is better than what is 
delivered in reality (for example due to the influence of a good supplier's reputation 
which can blind the client somewhat) - or negative - when the perceived service is 
worse than what is delivered in reality (for example due to bad-will from the client's 
management team against the outsourcing). Management gaps were discovered to have 
an influence on the existence of performance gaps and vice-versa. The performances 
gaps are represented in Figure 46. 
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Figure 46 Performance gaps 
Finally, one theme that underlies the findings is that many of the identified problems 
are related. ; 
Although problems may not be associated with each other in every case, it 
became clear that problems frequently had direct or indirect effects that led on to other 
problems. This suggests the existence of a snowball effect in which the existence of a 
problem creates more favourable circumstances for the occurrence of other problems or 
to the increase of a problem's seriousness, even if the problems correspond to different 
gaps. For example, outsourcing management teams not suited for their roles are more 
likely to define the scope of the agreements poorly, which is later likely to create 
conflicts and a bad relationship between parties. 
So, beyond identifying and exploring the problems that occur in each step of the 
clients' on-going outsourcing management, the chapter uncovers five broad aspects. 
These are: 
" Problems in the on-going phase of the outsourcing can be originated by 
ineffectiveness in previous phases of the overall outsourcing process; 
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" Outsourcing's lack of success can partly be the fault of the clients; 
" Both outsourcing parties sometimes adopt opportunistic behaviours which can 
jeopardise the outsourcing's objectives; 
" Identifying that misalignments between aspects of the activities of the 
management process are to a certain extent a consequence of the existence of 
the outsourcing management problems; 
" Many of the identified problems are related and thus it is expected that the 
minimisation of a problem can lead to the minimisation of other problems. 
Reflections on the research design 
It is expected that the findings uncovered have value to general strategic 
outsourcings of services. Although focused on outsourcing of the maintenance function 
in the pulp for paper industry, and specifically within Portuguese companies, it is 
expected that the insights and conclusions emerging from the research have value to a 
much wider variety of outsourced activities and industries. The cases did not exhibit 
extreme or unusual contexts or behaviours (when compared to the broader literature on 
outsourcing); the analysis also drew upon the limited extant literature and the wider 
international and cross-sectoral experience of some of the interviewees to provide 
limited support for the findings outside of the specific context of Portuguese pulp for 
paper companies. 
One aspect of the research design was the fact that data related to both sides of the 
outsourcing dyad was collected. The exploratory study revealed that clients' and 
suppliers' perceptions about the existence of the identified problems are not very 
different, increasing the confidence about their existence. Nevertheless the degree of 
seriousness attributed by both parties to each problem varied. 
7.13. Overview of the chapter 
The chapter structured and presented the twenty-four problems that were uncovered 
by the research. Each of the problems was presented, positioned within the outsourcing 
management process model, developed and commented upon. 
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8. Conclusion 
The previous chapters discussed in detail, then summarised the major findings from 
the research. This chapter briefly highlights the general conclusions drawn and 
outlines the researcher's own view of the strengths and weaknesses of the approach 
taken in the investigation. A statement of its contribution to knowledge is also made. 
The chapter ends with recommendations for future research and practitioners. 
8.1. Overview 
The thesis began by tracing the evolution that lead to the generalisation of 
outsourcing and presented a definition of it. Then, after presenting the overall process 
of outsourcing, it identified the type of outsourcings that were dealt by this 
investigation. The research is focused on strategic outsourcings of services; more 
specifically in its on-going management. 
Strategic outsourcings of services 
Outsourcing Choice of Contract 
decision supplier negotiation 
Contract Transfer v 
termination 
ýAMN--4 
activity to 
Figure 47 - Focus of the research: clients' on-going management of strategic outsourcing of services 
Previous research discovered that managers do not tend to reflect very deeply about 
how they actually do or should manage their outsourcings. The literature review 
showed that this outsourcing on-going management was also an aspect almost neglected 
by academic research. To highlight the necessity for further research about the 
management of outsourcing was one of the objectives of this investigation. Aiming to 
provide an initial knowledge about the outsourcing management process, the researcher 
decided to focus his research on the structure of the clients' outsourcing on-going 
management process and one the identification of some of its problems. 
The research was divided into two distinct phases. The first phase - the exploratory 
phase - was based on a single case study and its objective was to develop a model to 
describe the clients' outsourcing on-going management process and the problems that 
occur in each of its steps. This model was called the outsourcing management model 
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and constituted two components: the outsourcing management process model and the 
outsourcing management problems. The second phase - the reinforcement phase - was 
based on three case studies and its objective was to support the appropriateness of the 
outsourcing management model developed in the exploratory phase. 
8.1.1. Outsourcing management process model 
The outsourcing management process model shows how the management of 
outsourcing is influenced by the overall context in which it develops and the objectives 
of the intervenient parties. The outsourcing and outsourced activity's objectives and 
strategy are defined by the client. During the outsourcing's lifetime the client may 
decide to change them due to, for example, changes in the overall context in which the 
outsourcing fits. When this happens the client thinks out its role in the outsourcing and 
defines a posture that characterises its behaviour in the outsourcing. At the same time 
the client translates its objectives into operational desires that are taken to negotiations 
with the supplier. Negotiations can also be started by the supplier when its desires for 
the outsourcing change or when it would like to change some aspect of the outsourcing. 
After reaching an agreement both parties understand the desires and expectations of the 
other party and may adapt their strategies for the outsourcing accordingly. Then the 
supplier delivers the service, trying to achieve what the client expects, even though its 
own strategy and desires for the outsourcing may influence the service delivery. The 
client continuously measures and perceives the service that it receives from the supplier. 
The client uses this information to motivate and guide the supplier in two different 
ways: at a contractual level, in which the reward system defines bonuses or penalties 
according to the performance achieved and the rigid rules defined during the contractual 
negotiations; and at a feedback level, where the client regularly evaluates the actual 
performance of the outsourcing and the supplier, giving feedback about its wants, needs, 
suggestions, opinions and wishes to the supplier. The reward system is expected to 
motivate the supplier to achieve the expected performance, while the feedback is 
expected to guide the supplier in its efforts and to improve its understanding about the 
outsourcing's situation and the client's expectations. Faced by the collected 
information, the client may also decide to undertake supplier development initiatives 
with the objective of improving the supplier's potential to achieve the expected 
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performance. Moreover, the analysis of the information collected by the client may 
even lead it to change its position in the outsourcing and, in a more extreme situation, to 
even change the outsourcing's objectives and strategy. Figure 48 illustrates the process 
of outsourcing management described in this paragraph. 
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Figure 48 -- Final outsourcing management process model 
8.1.2. Outsourcing management problems 
The main problems that occurred in each step of the outsourcing management 
process were identified and analysed. The main problems identified were related to the 
poor definition of the outsourcing rules and strategy, with problems in the supplier's 
understanding about what it should deliver, lack of adaptation to the changes in the 
outsourcing and its context, opportunistic and selfish behaviour by either party, lack of 
preparation for the outsourcing, and problems between the two companies and their 
employees. The problems were distributed according to each step of the outsourcing 
management process and constituted contributing factors for the existence of 
ineffectiveness in each of those steps (Figure 49). 
The problems identified in the exploratory phase were revealed to be appropriate to 
describe what happened in all the three outsourcings studied in the reinforcement phase, 
although their importance varied from case to case. No significant differences between 
data collected from the client and the supplier were found. The two parties of the 
outsourcings seemed to have a common general understanding about what happened in 
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the outsourcings, even though they placed different emphasis on different types of 
problems. 
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Figure 49 - Final outsourcing management model 
8.2. Contribution to knowledge 
Previous outsourcing research has tended to focus on general issues related to 
outsourcing success and planning, leaving operational issues of real world outsourcings 
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aside. This exploratory research therefore investigated what happens in real world 
strategic outsourcing of services during their on-going phase. Although focused on 
outsourcing of the maintenance function in the pulp for paper industry, and specifically 
within Portuguese companies, it is expected that the insights and conclusions emerging 
from the research have value to a much wider variety of outsourced activities and 
industries. The cases did not exhibit extreme or unusual contexts or behaviours (when 
compared to the broader literature on outsourcing); the analysis also drew upon the 
limited extant literature and the wider international and cross-sectoral experience of 
some of the interviewees to provide limited support for the findings outside of the 
specific context of Portuguese pulp for paper companies. 
The research therefore contributes new knowledge by: 
" Describing and modelling in an exploratory way the process by which clients 
manage their on-going strategic outsourcings of services; 
o Identifying three management levels in such a management process, with 
different objectives and characteristics; 
o Structuring such management process into ten activities and exploring their 
characteristics; 
o Recognising the constant learning and adaptation mechanism existent in 
strategic outsourcing of services on-going management; 
o Recognising clients' continuous and active monitoring and guidance over an 
outsourced activity and corresponding supplier; 
" Identifying and exploring problems that occur during the on-going 
management of strategic outsourcing of services, which might have an impact 
on its effectiveness; 
o Identifying nine management gaps and twenty-four problems, and 
distinguishing and exploring their causes and consequences in a 
constructivist way; 
o Recognising that problems in the on-going management of strategic 
outsourcing of services can be originated by ineffectiveness in previous 
phases of the outsourcing overall process; 
o Concluding that both outsourcing parties sometimes adopt opportunistic 
behaviours which can jeopardise the objectives of outsourcing; 
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o Identifying misalignments between aspects of the on-going management 
process activities which are, to a certain extent, a consequence of 
outsourcing on-going management problems; 
o Concluding that many of the identified problems are related; 
9 Identifying the need for further research related to on-going outsourcing 
management. 
8.3. Strength and potential weaknesses of the approach 
8.3.1. Strengths 
Grounded investigation and directly connected with the real world: 
The findings are grounded in a real world investigation and understanding of 
outsourcings; 
. The findings were revealed to have a high degree of relevance to those 
involved in the research and experience of outsourcings; 
"Managerial research relies on a complex web of conventions and rules which 
determine what counts as research and what does not. (... ) It is possible to have 
academic research which scores high on `rigour' and `cleverness' but low on 
connection to `real' problems. However, in management more than any other 
discipline (and operations management at that) there is a fundamental 
commitment to an encounter with that which managers and workers do. If this 
is not the case, then research could perhaps be more accurately labelled under a 
different heading" (New and Payne, 1995). 
Dual nature of the research: 
" The exploratory phase of the research is designed as an exploratory study, 
aiming for in-depth context-specific understanding; 
" The comparison with the literature and the reinforcement study support the 
appropriateness of the results to describe what happens in other outsourcings; 
" The overall design is novel; it has contributed to the approach and objective of 
going deep in one case and show the appropriateness of the findings to other 
outsourcings. 
178 
Chapter 8- Conclusion 
Uncovering of a new, interesting and important topic: 
" The research focused on a topic that, in spite of its importance for outsourcing 
success, has been almost neglected by academics; 
" The research has generated valuable insights that form the basis for further 
investigation and generation of new theories related to the on-going 
management of outsourcing; 
" This is considered to be important to the outsourcing research area. 
8.3.2. Potential weaknesses 
Rigid boundaries in the identification of problems: 
" The exploratory research was based on a single case study and the 
reinforcement study did not aim at the identification of further problems; 
" The exploratory study only collected evidence from the client; 
" Thus the identification of problems was based just on one case and on insight 
brought from one side of the dyad; 
" Even though the problems identified were revealed to be significant to other 
outsourcings, more problems than those identified are likely to exist in normal 
outsourcing management. 
Use of some indirect data: 
" In the exploratory research not all the steps of the outsourcing management 
could be directly observed; 
" Even though the researcher had almost total freedom during the exploratory 
phase to speak with whomever he wanted, he never had direct contact and was 
assisted with some steps of the outsourcing management process (e. g. 
negotiations); 
" This way the data collected corresponding to these steps was based on accounts 
that the participators gave, and on indirect means to understand the outputs 
(such as analysis of resulting documents); 
" This type of data may be infected by a certain (even if not intentional) bias 
brought to bear by the outsourcing managers; 
" The reinforcement study was based solely on interviews - indirect data - thus 
there is also the danger of reflecting some bias that outsourcing managers bring 
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to the supplied data; nevertheless data from both sides of the dyads was 
collected. 
The cases focused on by the research had some similar characteristics: 
" All the cases studied were outsourcings of the same service and in the same 
industry; even though this restricted the research, it was important to clearly 
define the sector of the population under study for the purposes of comparison 
and appropriateness; 
" The clients of all the cases studied belonged to the same group of companies 
(parallel to what happens with Ford, Volvo and Land Rover) and the supplier 
in two of the cases was the same; 
" Notwithstanding this proximity, the studied outsourcings were not all based in 
the same contract; they were independent, different, and were managed by 
different people with different backgrounds; the outsourcings had differences 
in terms of philosophies and scope, different practices, different problems and 
were achieving different results. 
8.4. Recommendations for future research 
As argued during the whole thesis, there is a lack of research related to the 
management of on-going outsourcings. In many respects it is felt that this research has 
provided a starting point for future research on the on-going management of 
outsourcings. The research has provided an understanding and deeper insights about the 
on-going outsourcing management process and some of its problems. A conceptual 
model was developed and each of its steps populated with problems that may occur. 
Some recommendations for further research and work to continue the development of 
on-going outsourcing management research area are now suggested: 
Check findings: 
" It would be interesting to check the findings through replication of the study 
and through other studies using different tools with the same purposes. 
Refinement of the outsourcing management model: 
" The present research only focused on three outsourcings, two of which were 
used just to reinforce the findings related to the first. Thus it would be 
interesting to undertake research that aimed at refining the outsourcing 
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management process model and to develop further each of the identified 
problems. 
Extension of the outsourcing management model: 
" The development of the outsourcing management model was based on a single 
case study. Even though these findings have been supported by other case 
studies, it would be interesting to undertake research in the same sector of the 
population with the aim of identifying and exploring other problems that occur 
in each step of the outsourcing on-going management. 
/Expansion of the outsourcing management model: 
4 The outsourcing management model was developed just considering the 
outsourcing of maintenance in the Portuguese pulp for paper industry. It would 
be interesting to see how appropriate the model is to describe what happens in 
other strategic outsourcing of services in other industries; 
" It would also be interesting to compare the management of strategic 
outsourcing of services with the management of other types of outsourcings; 
" It would also be interesting to compare the outsourcing of services with the 
outsourcing of products, thus research studying the management of product 
outsourcing would also be welcome. 
Identification of the most serious problems: 
" The outsourcing management research would benefit from knowing which are 
the most common and most serious problems that occur in outsourcing 
management (both globally and within each gap). Thus it would be interesting 
to do a survey which answers these questions and compares the data collected 
from clients and from suppliers. 
Solutions for the problems: 
Now that some of the on-going outsourcing management problems' are clearly 
identified and analysed it would be interesting to study how ioutsourcing 
managers - from both the client and supplier companies - avoid or solve those 
problems; 
'ý" It would also be useful to compare how managers in different industries or 
managing different outsourced services solve their problems, since some 
solutions can be extrapolated to other industries or services; 
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It would also be important for some academics to focus their research on 
suggesting possible solutions or minimisations for those problems; 
" The aim of such investigations would be the creation of a tool to support on- 
going outsourcing management and that helps to avoid some of its problems. 
The researcher believes that the balanced scorecard has much potential to be 
customised to help managers overcome some of the identified problems. 
Study of the development towards co-sourcing: 
" As this thesis testifies, the researcher assisted in the evolution from outsourcing 
to co-sourcing. It would be interesting to study this evolution: the factors that 
lead to co-sourcing, the problems that existed and created difficulties for co- 
sourcing and collaboration, the conditions that had to be created for the success 
of co-sourcing and of the collaboration (e. g. open-book accounting), the results 
of the co-sourcing collaboration, among others. 
8.5. Recommendations for practitioners 
The interviews undertaken during the reinforcement phase of the research were proof 
of the importance that this research may have for outsourcing managers. Most of the 
interviewees commented on their lack of reflection about how to manage the 
outsourcing. Instead, they react and manage the outsourcing in the best way they can. 
The interviewees said that the structure of the outsourcing management model helped 
them to better understand the overall outsourcing management mechanism, and enabled 
them to realise some links that before were not clear. They complained about the lack 
of time they have to reflect about the best way to manage the outsourcing and the lack 
of people with whom to discuss it. Most of the outsourcing managers interviewed 
clearly recognised that they found the discussions around the outsourcing management 
process model and the outsourcing management problems very useful for them to 
improve their understanding about what goes on in an outsourcing management. 
Thus the research is expected to: 
Motivate practitioners to reflect about how to manage an outsourcing: 
" The research showed the need for outsourcing managers to stop managing 
outsourcing based on `gut feelings' and to start to reflect more on the way they 
manage this new type of relationship with another company. So practitioners 
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should use the presented outsourcing management model to start thinking more 
about how they manage their on-going outsourcings and about the best way to 
manage such a relationship. 
Help practitioners understand better all the main interactions that exist in on-going 
outsourcing mann eý ment: 
" The description of the outsourcing on-going management process is expected 
to make practitioners understand better the entire process, mechanism and 
connections. So practitioners should be able to take advantage of such 
knowledge to improve their management practices and achieve greater benefits 
from the outsourcing. 
Help practitioners understand better some of the problems that exist in on-going 
outsourcing management: 
" The identification of outsourcing management problems is expected to make 
practitioners realise their existence and thus think of ways of avoiding them, 
minimising their consequences or even solving them. So practitioners should 
take advantage of this knowledge to adapt and improve their practices in a way 
that permits them to avoid or overcome some of the problems identified in each 
step. This is expected to diminish the costs of outsourcing and increase its 
benefits, contributing to the likelihood of increased outsourcing success. 
Examining the factors that negatively affect the effectiveness of outsourcing 
may provide additional insight into what outsourcing managers and their 
organisations should do to ensure its effectiveness and success. 
8.6. A final comment 
The present research was conducted with the aim of enabling both academics and 
practitioners to better understand the process of managing a strategic outsourcing of 
services during its on-going phase. A better understanding of on-going outsourcing 
management is expected to serve as a basis for further academic investigation and to 
help practitioners to realise the real potential of outsourcings. This work is expected to 
contribute to academic and practitioner communities' realisation that outsourcing on- 
going management is different from what happens in normal client-supplier 
relationships. Thus such realisation is expected to increase the reflection about the best 
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way to manage on-going outsourcings and how to avoid some of its usual problems, 
contributing to the increased likelihood of outsourcing success. 
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B. Appendix B 
This appendix includes a mind map document correspondent to an early distribution 
of the causes of problems by the management gaps. Such map should be read in a 
sequential way. The following picture illustrates the all map and shows which page of 
the thesis corresponds to each map's part. 
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C. Appendix C 
Protocol of the semi-structured interviews correspondent to the outsourcing 
management problems part of the outsourcing management model (in Portuguese): 
INTRODL(' äO 
Obj ccti % Os geral Mesta entrevista: 
. Discutir problernas que ocorreni durante a gestäo on-going do outsourcing. 
Quais os Problemas a serem discutidos: 
. Problemas identificados no estudo exploratörio dente trabalho. 
Oblectivo concreto da entrevista: 
. Recolher infomlacäo que suporte ou näo a possivel existencia dos problemas identificados. 
. Todos os problemas estäo divididos em causa e consequencia. Estes dois factores seräo 
discutidos separadamente. 
Que tipp de infomlacäo gostaria de receber: 
. Gostaria que respondesse as perguntas näo sö baseado no que acontece neste outsourcing 
especifico, mas tivesse em conta a sua experiencia passada de outros outsourcings e 
conhecimentos do que acontece noutros outsourcings. 
. Se me pudesse dar exemplos concretos destes problemas que se tenham passado neste 
outsourcing ou noutros agradecia, jä que os exemplos sdo importantes para mim. 
Rey : 
. Se näo se importar you gravar a entrevista. Ajuda-me na anälise da inforrnacao. 
. Se a qualquer momento quiser que pare de gravar e sö dizer. 
Assunto: 
.0 processo de gestäo do outsourcing discutido na nossa ültima conversa sugere a existencia 
de nove possiveis conceptuais ineficäcias na gestäo do outsourcing (apresentar as gaps). 
. Problemas que gostaria de discutir hoje säo, pelo menos parcialmente, os responsäveis por 
essas ineficäcias conceptuais. 
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GAP I 
Main contributing factors for 
Gap I: Gap 1 
1 Out urciný's strategy 
poorly defined 
2- Agreements' scopes poorly 
defined 
3- Incomplete or bad definition 
of desires 
4- Lack of regular re,. ision of 
strategy and desires 
Sen icc delivered 
Measured and 
` 
rceived senvice 
Contractual reward I Supplier evaluation, 
system iý feedback and actions 
Problem 1: Outsourcing's strategy poorly defined 
('aura 1: 
/)rupo., ic Mio: Outsourcing's specific long-term objectives and strategy are 
unspecified or unclear in some companies. 
o Perguntu: Acha que os objectivos do outsourcing no longo prazo ea estrategia 
de como os atingir estäo betu especificados nas empresas que fazem outsourcing? 
0 que quero dizer com isto? Por exemplo acha que: 
. Estrategias dos outsourcings tendem a ser bem pensadas, discutidas e 
estruturadas dentro da empresa? 
. Estrategias e objectivos dos outsourcings säo mais elaboradas e bem 
documentadas do que um simples entendimento na cabeca dos gestores mais 
seniores? 
c Pedido de exemplo: 
. Como e que a estrategia foi definida neste outsourcing? 
. Essa estrategia estä bem especificada, clara e documentada? 
.0 que acha que acontece nas outras empresas? Acha que hä empresas que näo 
tenham a estrategia dos seus outsourcings bem definida e clara? 
. Sera que podia dar uni exemplo? 
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Supplier's 
understandin___J 
C 
ý,, ti j Consequencia 1: 
Proposi4ao: Unspecified or unclear outsourcing's long-term objectives and 
strategy can be prejudicial for outsourcing's effectiveness. 
(i Pergunta: Imagine se faz favor uma situacäo na qual os objectivos de longo 
termo ea estrategia do outsourcing näo foram hem pensadas, discutidas, 
estruturadas e documentadas. 
O que acha que e possivel acontecer em tail situacöes em relacao ao potencial de 
criacäo de problemas que afectem a eficäcia do outsourcing'? 
Exemplos do que pode acontecer: 
. Entendimento comum da estrategia na cabeca dos gestores poderä divergir 
(mesmo se sö em pormenores) sem eles se aperceberem; 
o Em tal situacäo e provävel que haja uma ideia alto ambigua em rela4 o 
aos objectivos e estrategia do outsourcing dentro da pröpria empresa 
cliente; 
o. Assim sendo e natural que haja esforcos dispersos e näo tocados em 
accbes näo interligadas, porque cada gestor senior irä faier o que acha o 
melhor para atingir o que ea sua ideia de objectivos e estrategia; 
o Como consequencia os gestores medios e os trabalhadores operacionais 
com certeza ficaram confusos sobre as verdadeiras prioridades do 
outsourcing. 
o Esta confusäo tenderä a ser passada ao fornecedor em todas as interaccöes, 
feedback e discussöes entre trabalhadores dos dois lados. 
. Uma estrategia näo clara pode guiar um fornecedor ä confusäo ou assuncöes 
erradas que provavelmente desviaräo o fornecedor dos esforcos mais correctos, 
reduzindo os beneficios que poderiam ser atingidos pelo outsourcing. 
.A existencia de uma estrategia mal definida facilita comportamentos 
oportunisticos por pane do fornecedor. Tais comportamentos provavelmente 
resultaräo num aumento de custos do outsourcing e numa diminuicäo dos seus 
beneficios, diminuindo a sua eficäcia. 
Pedido de exemplo: 
. Sera que me podia dar um exemplo que conheca (neste ou noutro outsourcing) 
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em que objectivos de longo ten-no ou estrategia do outsourcing näo tenham 
sido bem pensadas, discutidas, estruturadas e documentadas e isso tenha 
diminuido a eficäcia do outsourcing? (diminuicao dos beneficios ou aumento 
dos custos) 
Problem 2: Agreements' scope poorly defined 
('aura 1: 
/' -oposiS Io: Sometimes outsourcing's scope is poorly defined. 
© Pergunta: Acha que o que estä incluido no outsourcing ea abrangencia do 
outsourcing estäo sempre bem definidos'? 
O que quern diner corn isto? Por exemplo acha que: 
.0 contrato e os acordos feitos dentro do outsourcing säo sempre claros sobre 
as actividades que estäo e näo estäo incluidas no acordo? (os limites do 
acordo) 
.0 que estä incluido no preco eo que e extra? 
.0 que o cliente, 'fornecedor podem fazer eo que o cliente/fornecedor näo 
podem fazer" 
Pedido (Je exemplo: 
. Neste outsourcing houve algum problema em relacäo aos limites e scope do 
outsourcing'? 
. Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
.0 que acha que acontece nas outras empresas? Acha que hä outsourcings em 
que os seus limites näo sejam claros? 
. Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
I 
? "M 
kij ('onsequencia 1: 
V/ Proposi4 do: A poorly defined outsourcing's scope is likely to influence 
negatively outsourcing's effectiveness. 
C 
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Pergunta: Imagine se faz favor uma situaFäo na qual os limites. o scope eo 
que estä incluido no outsourcing näo estäo muito bem c claramente definidos. 
O que acha que e possivel acontecer em tal situacöes em relaFäo ao potencial de 
criacäo de problemas que afectem a eficäcia do outsourcing? 
Exemplos do que podc acontecer: 
O fornecedor pode tirar vantagem da situacäo para. ter comportamentos 
oportunistas; 
o Atraves de tais comportamentos o fornecedor pode atingir lucros extra 
movendo por exemplo actividades ou custos originalmente pretendidos 
pelo cliente ser pane do acordo de outsourcing para fora e depois 
reivindicar que dies näo faiiam parse do serviFo acordado, 
. Esta prätica subiria os custos para o cliente ou reduiiria os henctiL ios do 
outsourcing para o cliente, reduzindo a sua eficäcia. 
. Existencia de discussöes e conflitos entre as duas parses que podem ateetar 
negativamente o seu relacionamento futuro, o seu entendimento e trabalhos 
conjuntos futuros. 
Pecliclo de eremplo: 
. Sera que me podia dar um exemplo que conheca (neste ou noutro outsourcing) 
em que os limites, scope e abrangencia do outsourcing näo estivessem hem 
definidos e isso tenha diminuido a eficäcia do outsourcing? (diminuicäo dos 
beneficios ou aumento dos custos) 
Problem 3: Incomplete or bad definition of desires 
Causa 1: 
 Proposicüo: Client companies sometimes have unwritten expectations. 
® Pergunta: Acha que as empresas clientes negoceiam sempre e discutern com o 
fornecedor todas as expectativas que tem para o outsourcing e tudo o que querem 
receber dele? 
O que quero dizer com isto? Por exemplo acha que: 
. No firn das negociacöes hä sempre um documento em que tudo o que o cliente 
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quer receber do outsourcing e agrupado, acordado e assinado por ambas as 
panes? 
. Acha que o cliente deixa bem claro nesse documento tudo o que o ele quer 
rcceber? 
Pediclo de c'xc'mplo: 
. Neste outsourcing o cliente tern algumas expectativas ou desejos que näo tenha 
, ido formalizados? 
. Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
.0 que acha que acontece nas outras empresas? Acha que todas definern e 
formalizam claramente todas expectativas e desejos que tern para o 
outsourcing durante as negociacoes'? (negociacöes iniciais e negociacöes 
durante o outsourcing) 
. Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
POWM 
('onseyuencia 1: 
Proposicüo: The absence in the contract of client's unwritten expectations is 
likely to influence negatively outsourcing's expected effectiveness. 
® Pergunta: Imagine se faz favor uma situacäo em que o cliente deseja receber 
do outsourcing algo que näo estä documentado. 
0 que acha que e possivel acontecer em tal situacöes em relacao ao potencial de 
criacäo de problemas que afectem a eficäcia do outsourcing? 
Exemplos do que pode acontecer: 
.0 cliente nao irä receber os desejos que näo estäo formalizados; 
o Ou porque como näo estäo documentados o fornecedor ignora-os; 
o Ou mesmo porque o fornecedor nem sabe de tais desejos e portanto näo os 
fornece. 
. Isto provavelmente poderä levar a insatisfacäo do cliente e possiveis conflitos. 
. Qualquer uma destas consequencias levarä a que o cliente näo receba todos os 
seus desejos ou trazendo conflitos para o outsourcing diminuindo a eficdcia do 
outsourcing. 
235 
Appendix U 
ö Pedido de exeniplo: 
. Sera que me podia dar um exemplo que conheca 
(neste ou noutro outsourcing) 
em que o cliente tivesse desejos näo documentados e isso tenha diminuido a 
eficäcia do outsourcing? (diminuicäo dos beneficios ou aumento dos custos) 
Causa 2: 
Proposi4'tio: The desires that clients take to negotiations sometimes do not 
reflect exactly the desires inside their own organisations. 
© Pergunta: Acha que As vezes a equipa de gestäo do outsourcing do cliente 
poderä levar a negociacöes desejos que näo correspondern integralmente aos 
desejos dentro da sua pröpria empresa? 
O que quern dizer com isto? Por exemplo acha que: 
.E possivel que a equipa de gestäo do outsourcing possa levar para negociacöes 
desejos apenas relacionados com o output final do servico, mas os desejos das 
pessoas dentro da empresa e que trabalham directamente com o outsourcing 
possam incluir aspectos relacionados com o modo como o servico e tornecido? 
. Que a equipa de gestäo sö leva para negociacöes assuntos relacionados corn a 
empresa corno urn todo e os objectivos empresariais, näo levando para 
negociacöes assuntos que os sews trabalhadores gostassem de receber e 
considerem importantes? 
Pedido de exemplo: 
" Neste outsourcing acha que aconteceu isso? Que o cliente näo tenha levado ou 
näo leve para as negociacöes os desejos dentro da sua pröpria organizacao? 
" Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
.0 que acha que acontece nas outras empresas? Acha que todas levam para as 
negociagbes os des Jos dos seus trabalhadores? (negociacöes iniciais e 
negociagbes durante o outsourcing) 
. Serä que podia 
dar um exemplo? 
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Consequencia 2: 
 ProposiS aio: When the desires that clients take to negotiations do not reflect 
exactly the desires inside their own organisations, outsourcing's effectiveness is 
likely to be affected negatively. 
(1) Pc, unto: Imagine se faz favor urna situacäo em que os desejos que o diente 
negoceia com o fornecedor näo reflectem exactamente os desejos dentro da 
empresa diente. 
O que acha que e possivel acontecer em tal situacöes em relacäo ao potencial de 
criacäo de problemas que afectem a eficäcia do outsourcing? 
Exemplos do que pode acontecer: 
.Of rnecedor apenas fornece o que foi negociado e ndo terä em conta os 
desejos e necessidades dos trabalhadores do diente; 
o Deste modo os clientes internos do outsourcing no cliente (ou seja, os 
trabalhadores do cliente) näo estaräo satisfeitos com o outsourcing; 
Os trabalhadores do cliente, näo estando a receber o que gostariam e 
portanto estando insatisfeito provavelmente reagiräo negativamente ao 
outsourcing dificultando a accäo do fornecedor; 
o Outro caso mais extremo que pode acontecer e que os trabalhadores do 
cliente näo estejam a receber do outsourcing as condicbes necessärias para 
executarem eficazmente as suas pröprias actividades; 
o Neste caso pode acontecer que o fornecedor sö mude o seu desempenho 
perante o pagamento de um custo extra. 
. [sto provavelmente poderä levar a insatisfacäo dentro da empresa cliente e 
possiveis conflitos. 
. Qualquer uma destas consequencias levarä a que o cliente näo receba todos os 
seus desejos, a um aumento do custo do outsourcing ou a conflitos no 
outsourcing diminuindo a eficäcia do outsourcing. 
Pedido de exemplo: 
. Sera que me podia dar um exemplo que conheca (neste ou noutro outsourcing) 
em que a equipa de gestäo do cliente näo tenha levado a negociagoes assuntos 
importantes para os seus pröprios trabalhadores e isso tivesse reflexo na sua 
actividade (obrigando por exemplo o cliente a entrar em negociagoes com o 
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fornecedor) e isso tenha diminuido a eficäcia do outsourcing? (diminuicäo dos 
beneficios ou aumento dos custos) 
Causa 3: 
Proposicdo: Non regular revision of the strategy and desires is likely to 
influence negatively outsourcing's effectiveness. 
Pergunta: Acha que os desejos que os clientes levam para as negociacöes 
podem näo ser betu apropriados e podem näo reflector o que eles realmente 
querem receber do outsourcing? 
O que quero dizer com isto? Por exemplo acha que: 
. Os desejos podem ser negociados com base num novo sistema de media o de 
performances (jä que os clientes muitas vexes renovam os sous sistemas de 
medicäo de performances para poder ter uma `melhor' gestäo do outsourcing) 
mas que esse sistema näo esteja ainda testado? 
o Nessas situacöes o cliente poderä ter dificuldades em definir valores alvo e 
poderä levar para negociacöes valores que reflectem a opiniäo da equipa 
de gestäo do outsourcing sobre o que sera uma boa performance vista nos 
olhos do novo sistema; 
o Assim sendo esses desejos que o cliente leva para as negociacbes podem 
näo reflectir exactamente o que o cliente quer receber do outsourcing; 
. Acha que podem acontecer esta ou situacöes semelhantes em que o cliente levy 
para as negociacöes desejos que näo correspondam exactamente ao que eles 
querem ou que näo incluam actividades que querem que sejam fornecidas? 
Pedido de exemplo: 
. Neste outsourcing acha que aconteceu isso? Que o cliente tenha levado para as 
negociacöes desejos que depois se revelaram näo apropriados para o 
outsourcing? 
. Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
.0 que acha que acontece nas outras empresas? Acha que pode acontecer que 
elas levem para negociacöes desejos näo apropriados pars a sua situacäo? 
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(negociacöes iniciais e negociacöes durante o outsourcing) 
Serä que podia dar um exemplo? 
('onseyuencia 3: 
Proposic-tio: When the desires taken to negotiations by the client are 
inappropriate to its situation (bad desires), outsourcing's effectiveness is likely to 
become negatively affected. 
Pergunta: Imagine se faz favor uma situagdo em que o cliente näo leva para 
negociagOes os desejos apropriados para a sua situacäo. 
O que acha que e possivel acontecer em tal situacöes em relacäo ao potencial de 
criaFäo de problemas que afectem a eficäcia do outsourcing? 
Exemplos do que pode acontecer: 
.0 fornecedor näo fornece um servico de acordo com os desejos do cliente (mas 
sim de acordo com o que foi negociado); 
o Se nada for feito, o cliente tambem fica com menos beneficios do 
outsourcing do que esperava 
.E pouco provävel que o fornecedor aceite mudancas nas performance alvo 
previamente acordadas ou no que foi acordado a näo ser que haja pagamentos 
extra; 
o Mesta situacäo os custos do outsourcing aumentam, diminuindo a sua 
eficäcia. 
. Isto provavelmente poderä levar a insatisfacäo dentro da empresa cliente e 
possiveis conflitos. 
. Qualquer uma destas consequencias levarä a que o cliente näo receba todos os 
sous desejos, a um aumento do custo do outsourcing ou a conflitos no 
outsourcing diminuindo a eficäcia do outsourcing. 
c Pedido de eteniplo: 
Sera que me podia dar um exemplo que conheca (neste ou noutro outsourcing) 
em que a equipa de gestäo do cliente tenha levado a negociacöes desejos näo 
apropriados para a sua situacäo e isso tenha diminuido a eficäcia do 
outsourcing? (diminuicäo dos beneficios ou aumento dos custos) 
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Problem 4: Lack of regular revision of the strategy and desires 
1% Causa 1: 
Proposicäo: Clients sometimes do not revise regularly their strategies or 
desires. 
( Pergunta: Acha que a estrategia e desejos que o cliente tern para o outsourcing 
säo regularmente revistos pelo cliente? 
O que quero dizer com isto'? Por exemplo acha que: 
.0 cliente adapta a sua estrategia e desejos para o outsourcing de acordo corn o 
seu actual contexto? 
. Que as mudancas nas condicöes do mercado ou na tecnologia resultam logo 
em adaptacöes da estrategia e desejos para o outsourcing? 
. Acha que o contrato pode ser um impedimento para tais adaptacöes? 
ö Pedido de exemplo: 
. Neste outsourcing acha que aconteceu isso? Que o cliente tenha adaptado a sua 
estrategia ä evolucao do outsourcing? 
. Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
.0 que acha que acontece nas outras empresas? Acha que pode acontecer que 
Blas näo adequem a estrategia do outsourcing ä evolucao da realidade? 
. Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
0 
Consequencia 1: 
,/ Proposicdo: Non regular revision of the strategy and desires is likely to 
influence negatively outsourcing's effectiveness. 
0 Pergunta. Imagine se faz favor uma situacäo em que a estrategia e desejos do 
outsourcing näo estäo revistos regularmente. 
0 que acha que e possivel acontecer em tal situacöes em relacäo ao potencial de 
_24> 
criacäo de problemas que afectem a eficäcia do outsourcing? 
Exemplos do que pode acontecer: 
As necessidades dos clientes mudam com o tempo jä que sdo baseadas em 
assuncöes importantes em termos de tecnologia, condicöes do negöcio, 
ambiente do mercado entre outros. Estas assungbes mudam com o tempo e se a 
estrategia e desejos näo säo adaptados para a nova realidade e provävel que a 
eficäcia do outsourcing diminua jä que o cliente deixa de receber o que quer, 
diminuindo os seus possiveis beneficios. 
Pediclo c/c' e. tenmplo: 
Sera que me podia dar urn exemplo que conheca (neste ou noutro outsourcing) 
em que a estrategia do outsourcing e da actividade do outsourcing näo tenha 
sido adaptada ao longo do tempo e isso tenha diminuido a eficäcia do 
outsourcing? (diminuigdo dos beneficios ou aumento dos custos) 
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Problem 1: Lack of negotiation's effectiveness 
1% Causa 1: 
, V/ Proposi( Jo: Sometimes outsourcing negotiations leave 
important issues aside. 
O Pergunta: Acha que por vezes hä assuntos importantes para o outsourcing que 
näo sdo discutidos durante as negociacöes? 
O que quero dizer com isto? Por exemplo acha que: 
. Por vezes assuntos importantes säo deixados de lado nas negociacöes porque o 
cliente acredita que o fornecedor vai ter um espirito de parceria e que se 
alguma coisa precisar de ser mudada no outsourcing, näo haverä problemas; 
.0 contrato ou as adaptacöes (correspondente as negociacöes durante o 
outsourcing) podem ser negociadas ä pressa e näo täo cuidadosamente como 
devia; 
"A equipa de negociacäo pode näo ter competencias para as negociagoes ou 
porque näo tinham experiencia em negociacöes ou porque näo sabiam tudo 0 
que era importante receber do outsourcing; 
.0 cliente aceita assinar contratos standard que os fornecedores jä tem 
elaborados; 
. As relacöes pessoais entre as pessoas envolvidas dos doffs lados pode afectar 
negativamente a eficäcia do contrato? 
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Pc'dido de exemplo: 
. Acha que nas negociacöes que houveram neste outsourcing 
ficaram assuntos 
importantes por discutir? 
. Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
.0 que acha que acontece nas outras empresas? Acha que 
hä empresas que 
possam deixar de discutir alguns assuntos importantes nas negociacöes que hä 
no outsourcing? 
. Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
0 
('onsequencia 1: 
v/ Proposis, üo: A diminishes of negotiations' effectiveness 
is likely to reduce 
outsourcing's effectiveness. 
© Pergunta: Imagine se faz favor uma situacäo em que alguns assuntos 
importantes para o outsourcing näo foram discutidos nas negociacöes. Em tal 
situacäo a eficäcia das negociacöes näo e alta. 
0 que acha que e possivel acontecer em tais situacöes em relacäo ao potencial de 
criacäo de problemas que afectem a eficäcia do outsourcing? 
Exemplos do que pode acontecer: 
.0 fornecedor vai-se manter fiel ao contracto e assim sendo estä ainda numa 
melhor posicäo para se comportar oportunisticamente; 
.0 acreditar piamente que a relacäo de parcena resolverd tudo e portanto 
negligenciar um pouco a elaboracäo do contrato e dos acordos poderä ter 
consequencias graves resultando em insatisfacao durante a vida diäria do 
outsourcing; 
. Se o cliente quiser mudar algo no contrato ou se estiver disposto a faier 
negociacöes extra para o fazer, corn certeza sö o conseguirä se estiver disposto 
a pagar ao fornecedor. 
. Em qualquer destas situacöes o cliente recebe menos beneficios do que estava 
ä espera ou tern que ter maiores custos para ter tais beneficios, portanto tal 
situacäo diminui a eficäcia do outsourcing. 
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Pedido tie e emplo: 
. Sera que me podia dar um exemplo que conheca (neste ou noutro outsourcing) 
em que a ineticäcia de negociacöes tenha contribuido para uma diminuicäo da 
eticäcia do outsourcing? (diminuicäo dos beneficios ou aumento dos custos) 
Problem 2: Specifications poorly defined 
Causa 1: 
Sometimes the expectations and specifications that are included in 
the outsourcing contract are poorly defined. 
Pe, guniu: Acha que as expectativas e especificacöes acordadas nas 
negociacöes e incluidas nos contracto e acordos de outsourcing säo sempre muito 
been definidas'? 
0 que quero dizer com into? Por exemplo acha que: 
. Todas as medidas de performances acordadas e definidas nas negociacöes e 
incluidas nos contractos säo claras especificas e completas? 
. Por exemplo, essas medidas nunca falham em dar os seus valores alvo e 
especificar a maneira como säo medidas'? 
. Este tipo de especificacöes e mais dificil de definir para servicos do que para 
produtos devido ä sua natureza muito intangivel. 
Peilklo de exemplo: 
. Acha que as expectativas e especificacöes acordadas nas negociacöes e 
incluidas neste contracto e nos acordos que foram feitos durante o outsourcing 
sao sempre muito betu definidas? 
.0 que acha que acontece nas outras empresas? Acha que hä empresas que 
possam näo definir betu as suas expectativas e especificacöes? 
. Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
k,, k -ý ('onsequencia 1: 
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Proposicdo: Poorly defined expectations and specifications of the expected 
performances in the outsourcing contract are likely to reduce outsourcing's 
effectiveness. 
© Pergunta: Imagine se faz favor uma situacäo em que as expectativas e as 
especificacOes para o outsourcing depois das negociacöes näo estäo hem definidas. 
O que acha que e possivel acontecer em tais situacöes em relagao ao potencial de 
criaFäo de problemas que afectem a eficäcia do outsourcing? 
Exemplos do que pode acontecer: 
.0 fornecedor näo vai perceber muito bem o que e esperado que ele forneca ou 
vai tentar tirar partido da situacäo de mä definiFäo das especificacöes para 
fornecer um servico de menor qualidade. podendo-se defender argumentando 
que o servico respeita o que foi negociado e incluido no contracto ou acordo; 
o Quanto pior as especificacöes sdo definidas e documentadas. menor as 
probabilidades que os fornecedores percebam e se vejam obrigados a 
cumprir as especificaq6es porque se as especificaq6es no forem claras 
näo säo eficazes a guiar o fornecedor e se as especificaq6es näo forem 
claras os fornecedores tem mais defesas parajustificar o näo alcancar das 
performances esperadas; 
A falta de boas e precisa definicäo de especificaq6es podem levar a unia 
situacäo em que as duas partes definam as medidas com maneiras de cälculo 
di ferentes. 
o Desta forma e provävel que haja conflitos. 
.A mä definicäo de algumas especificacöes pode levar ao seu negligenciar e 
esquecimento; 
. Em qualquer destas situacöes o cliente recebe menos beneficios do que estavva 
ä espera ou tem que ter maiores custos para ter tais beneficios. portanto tal 
situacäo diminui a eficäcia do outsourcing. 
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'\ Pelliclo de exemplo: 
. Sera que me podia dar um exemplo que conheca (neste ou noutro outsourcing) 
eng que a mä definicäo das expectativas e especificacöes acordadas tenha 
contribuido para uma diminuicäo da eficäcia do outsourcing? (diminuicao dos 
be: neticios ou aumento dos custos) 
Problem 3: Inflexibility of outsourcings contracts 
Causa 1: 
ProposiS'ao: Sometimes outsourcing contracts are inflexible. 
Pc'rgunta: Acha que os contractos de outsourcing as vezes säo inflexiveis? 
O que quero dizer corn isto? Por exemplo acha que: 
Os contractos de outsourcing säo estäticos e que e muito dificil fazer 
adaptacöes ao outsourcing atraves deles? (mesmo atraves de negociagoes 
paralelas) 
Peclido de exe np1o: 
. Acha que este contrato e inflexivel? 
.0 que acha que acontece nas outras empresas? Acha que hä empresas que 
tenham contratos inflexiveis? 
. Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
P"m 
w ('onseyutncia 1: 
Proposi(ý o: Inflexible contracts are likely to influence negatively the 
outsourcing's effectiveness. 
Pergunta: Imagine se faz favor uma situacäo em que o contracto de 
outsourcing e inflexivel. 
O que acha que e possivel acontecer em tais situacöes em relacäo ao potencial de 
criacäo de problemas que afectem a eficäcia do outsourcing? 
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Exemplos do que pode acontecer: 
.0 contexto do outsourcing vai evoluir, tal como aquilo que o cliente quer 
receber. 
" Como o outsourcing estä ligado a um contracto inflexivel, o outsourcing näo 
acompanha essas mudancas. 
" Em tal situacäo ou o cliente vive com o actual contracto (sub-optimitando o 
possivel potencial do outsourcing) ou entra em negociagoes com o 
fornecedores. 
" Essas negociacöes normalmente representarn e resultarn em custos extra para o 
cliente, e portanto tambem diminuem a eficäcia do outsourcing. 
Pedido tie exemplo: 
. Sera que me podia dar um exemplo que conheca (neste ou noutro outsourcing) 
em que a inflexibilidade do contrato de outsourcing tenha contribuido para 
uma diminuicäo da eficdcia do outsourcing'? (diminuicäo dos beneficios ou 
aumento dos custos) 
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Problem 1: Ineffective communication of the expectations 
1% Causa l: 
Pruposic-iio: Sometimes clients do not communicate clearly and effectively its 
expectations to the supplier. 
c Pe, gunru: Acha que por vezes hä falhas na comunicagao das expectativas do 
cliente ao fornecedor'? 
0 que quero dizer corn isto? Por exemplo acha que: 
.0 cliente pode estar täo habituado a fornecer (ou receber) o servico 
internamente que nem se apercebe que hä muitas coisas e aspectos que espera e 
tem que direr ao novo fornecedor e portanto näo o faz; 
.0 cliente pode näo pör esforco suficiente na comunicacäo destas expectativas, 
cndo-a como secundärias; 
.An definicäo de especificacöes contribua para problemas na comunicagao. 
Pedido de exemplo.. 
. Acha que as expectativas e especificacöes acordadas nas negociacöes e 
incluidas peste contracto e nos acordos que foram feitos durante o outsourcing 
säo sempre muito betu comunicadas e percebidas pelo fornecedor? 
O que acha que acontece nas outras empresas? Acha que hä empresas que 
possarn näo comunicar betu as suas expectativas e especificacöes ao 
fornecedor? 
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. Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
Consequencia 1: 
Proposicdo: Ineffective communication of clients expectations to the supplier 
is likely to reduce outsourcing's effectiveness. 
(Di Pergunta: Imagine se faz_ favor uma situaq o em que as expectativas do cliente 
para o outsourcing näo foram bem comunicadas ao fornecedor. 
O que acha que e possivel acontecer em tais situag6es em relacäo ao potencial de 
criacäo de problemas que afectem a eficdcia do outsourcing? 
Exemplos do que pode acontecer: 
Se as expectativas e especificacöes do cliente que depois das negociacöes 
traduzem o que o cliente quer receber do outsourcing -- näo forem bem 
comunicadas, o fornecedor pode näo entender bem o que deve fornecer, 
afectando as suas decisöes no processo de outsourcing. 
o Assim sendo os beneficios do outsourcing devem reduzir-se, tal Como a 
sua eficäcia. 
4\ Pedido de exemplo: 
. Sera que me podia dar um exemplo que conheca (neste ou noutro outsourcing) 
em que a mä comunicacäo das expectativas e especificag6es acordadas tenha 
contribuido para uma diminuicäo da eficäcia do outsourcing? (diminuicäo dos 
beneficios ou aumento dos custos) 
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GAP 4 
Main contributing factors for 
(; ap 4: 
I- Supplier is unable to delis er 
a scrN ice correspondent to its 
understanding of the 
specifications 
2- Supplier's performances are 
affected by its own objectives 
3- Client changes its behaviour Gap 4 
toH ards the outsourced activity 
Supplier's. 
understanding 
Sen ice dc livered 
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1 feedback and actions 
Problem 1: Supplier is unable to deliver a service correspondent to its 
understanding of the specifications 
Causa I a: 
,/ /'roj)O. sroio: Sometimes the supplier 
is not capable to achieve the performances 
expected by the client. 
0 Pergunta: Acha que os fornecedores por vezes näo säo capazes de atingir as 
performances acordadas com o cliente, embora quando as acordaram acreditasse 
que sim'' 
O que quero dizer com isto? Por exemplo acha que: 
. Uni fornecedor inexperiente pode acordar performances que acha que pode 
atingir mas depois apercebe-se que näo consegue atingir; 
. Alteracöes no contexto do outsourcing ou mesmo internas ao outsourcing 
podem levar a que o fornecedor näo seja capaz de atingir as performances 
acordadas corn o cliente? 
Pedido de exemplo: 
Acha que o fornecedor neste outsourcing deixou de ser capaz de fornecer 
performances que acreditasse que conseguia atingir na altura em que foram 
acordadas? 
. Sera que podia dar uni exemplo? 
.0 que acha que acontece nas outras empresas? Acha que hä fornecedores que 
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acordem performances que depois acabam por näo consc; zuir atingir? 
. Sera que podia 
dar um exemplo? 
1% Causa lb: 
Proposicäo: Sometimes the supplier knows exactly hat the client %% ants, but 
chooses not to deliver it. 
(J Pergunta: Acha que podem acontecer casos eng que 0 fornecedor sabe o que o 
diente quer, mas decide näo o fornecer? 
0 que quero dizer com isto? Por exemplo acha que: 
.E possivel que um fornecedor pudesse atingir as performances acordadas, mas 
por motivos internos decide näo atribuir recursos suficientes ä equipa local e 
assim estes ficam incapacitados de atingir essas performances? 
Um fornecedor numa situacäo financeira mä possa decidir comportar-se e 
actuar de uma maneira que the permita atingir as recompensas monetärias extra 
disponiveis no contracto ao mesmo que tempo que poupa recursos e dinheiro 
ao näo pör o esforco necessärio noutros aspectos ligados As expectativas e 
satisfacäo do cliente, mas que näo estäo ligadas As recompensas tinanceiras'? 
c Pedido de exemplo: 
. Acha que o fornecedor neste outsourcing alguma %ez tinha capacidades para 
atingir as performances acordadas e esperadas pelo cliente mas por algum 
motivo decidiu näo o fazer? 
. Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
.0 que acha que acontece nas outras empresas? Acha que hä fornecedores tern 
capacidades para atingir as performances que acordaram mas por algum 
motivo decidam näo o fazer? 
. Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
0 
Consequencia 1: 
'C, 
Appendix C 
 Proposisüo: Sometimes the supplier does not deliver the service it understands 
clients' wants, diminishing outsourcing's effectiveness. 
Q) Per gunta: Imagine se faz favor uma situacdo em que o fomecedor ndo fornece 
o servico que entende que o cliente quer -- ou porque ndo consegue ou porque 
decide näo o fazer. 
O que acha que e possivel acontecer em tais situacöes em relacdo ao potencial de 
criacäo de problemas que afectem a eficäcia do outsourcing? 
Exemplos do que pode acontecer: 
As performances do outsourcing säo inferiores do que aquilo que o cliente 
esperav a. 
Isto vai directa -- atraves da reducäo dos beneficios do outsourcing - ou 
indirectamente atraves da influencia negativa que a mä performance do 
fornecedor pode ter na empresa cliente, por exemplo limitando o seu 
processo reduzir a eficäcia do outsourcing. 
Peclido dice eiemlVo: 
Sera que me podia dar urn exemplo que conheca (neste ou noutro outsourcing) 
em que o fornecedor tenha decidido näo fornecer as performances acordadas 
com o cliente e isso tenha contribuido para uma diminuicao da eficäcia do 
outsourcing'? (diminuicäo dos beneficios ou aumento dos custos) 
Causa 1: 
Proposic o: Sometimes suppliers agree in the contract performances they 
know they can not achieve. 
O Pergunta: Acha possivel que alguns fornecedores durante as negociacoes 
acordem performances que sabem que näo podem atingir ou que saibam que sö 
muito dificilmente as poderäo atingir? 
O que quero dizer com isto? Por exemplo acha que: 
. Alguns fornecedores acordem performances altas para captar o cliente mas 
sabem que näo estäo ä altura de as atingir? 
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. Alguns fornecedores acordem performances altas que gostariam de atingir mas 
que sabem ser muito dificil atingir? 
. Alguns fornecedores possam acordar precos mais baixo do que o pröprio custo 
do servico? 
o Esses fornecedores sabem ä partida que durante o outsourcing podem-se 
comportar oportunisticamente e portanto ganhar dinheiro extra do cliente 
atraves de algumas tecnicas como defender que certas actividades 
inerentes ao servico näo estäo incluidas no contrato e portanto tem que se 
fazer pagamentos extra? 
Pedido de exemplo: 
. Acha que o fornecedor neste outsourcing ja acordou performances que sabia 
ou pelo menos desconfiava que näo seria capaz de atingir? 
. Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
.0 que acha que acontece nas outras empresas? Acha que hä fornecedores que 
acordem performances que sabem que näo väo conseguir atingir? 
. Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
Consequencia 1: 
Proposicäo: Agreement of performances that the suppliers know they are not 
able to achieve is likely to affect negatively the outsourcing. 
Ui, Pergunta: Imagine se faz favor uma situacäo em que um fornecedor negoceia 
e acorda performances que sabe ä partida que näo consegue atingir. 
O que acha que e possivel acontecer em tais situacöes em relacao ao potencial de 
criacdo de problemas que afectem a eficäcia do outsourcing? 
Exemplos do que pode acontecer: 
.0 fornecedor näo atinge as performances acordadas e portanto o cliente näo 
vai atingir os beneficios que ele estava a espera do outsourcing e portanto a 
eficäcia do outsourcing e reduzida; 
.0 fornecedor provavelmente justifica o näo atingir das performances com 
muitas desculpas; 
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Isto provavelmente aumenta ainda mais os conflitos entre as duas partes 
tendo consequc ncias como a reducäo da comunicacäo, do trabalho 
conjunto e mudanca na postura das panes no outsourcing - que 
inevitavelmente reduziram a eficäcia do outsourcing. 
Pedido dce Cxemplo: 
. Sera que me podia dar urn exemplo que conheca (neste ou noutro outsourcing) 
em que um fornecedor tenha negociado e acordado performances que Babe ä 
partida que näo conseguia atingir e isso tenha contribuido para uma diminuicäo 
da eticäcia do outsourcing'? (diminuicäo dos beneficios ou aumento dos custos) 
Problem 2: Supplier's performances are affected by its own objectives 
('aura I a: 
'/ Prohosic"c'ro: 
Client's objectives are many times different from supplier's 
objectives. 
Q) Pc'rgunta: Acha que nos outsourcings o cliente e fornecedor tem sempre 
exactamente os mesmos objectivos e tentarn atingi-los? 
O que quero direr com isto? Por exemplo acha que: 
.A realidade normal nas relacöes cliente-fornecedor em que o diente quer pagar 
o minimo possivel por um certo servico eo fornecedor quer fazer tanto lucro 
quanto possivel estä ausente numa relacäo de outsourcing? 
Sý Pecliclo cle exemplo: 
. Acha que neste outsourcing o cliente eo fornecedor tem exactamente os 
mesmos objectivos? 
. Serä que podia dar urn exemplo? 
.0 que acha que acontece nas outras empresas? Acha que o cliente eo 
fornecedor säo sempre parceiros com os mesmos objectivos? 
Seth que podia dar urn exemplo'? 
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Causa I b: 
Proposicdo: Rewards systems sometimes are not completely aligned with 
client's expectations. 
( Pergunta: Acha que o sistema de premios estä sempre exactamente alinhado 
corn o que o cliente quer receber do outsourcing apös negociacöes? 
O que quero dizer corn isto? Por exemplo acha que: 
. Como a satisfagdo do cliente corn o outsourcing de servicos e muitas vezes näo 
sö ligada ao resultado final mas tambem ligada ä forma como o servico e 
fornecido o sistema de premios näo estä penas ligado aos resultados da 
actividade mas tambem ä maneira como o servico e fornecido'? 
. Hä clientes que definem novos sistemas de medicäo das performances 
especialmente para o outsourcing com o objectivo de controlar melhor a 
actividade? 
o Acha que estes sistemas possam ser construidos num väcuo de dados reais 
e informacäo concreta e que portanto os valores alvo definidos sejam 
baseados em opiniöes? 
o Acha que e possivel que essas opiniöes nem sempre estejam bem alinhadas 
com a realidade e portanto com o que o cliente realmente quer? 
öIt, Pedido de exemplo: 
. Acha que peste outsourcing o sistema de premios estä completamente alinhado 
com o que o diente espera do outsourcing? 
" Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
.0 que acha que acontece nas outras empresas? Acha que os sisternas de 
premios das empresas estäo sempre completamente alinhado com o que o 
diente espera do outsourcing? 
. Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
11 
Consequencia 1: 
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ProposiC o: As client's and supplier's objectives sometimes are not the same, 
a rew, ýand system that is not aligned with client's real wants and expectations is 
likely to diminish outsourcing's effectiveness. 
Pc'rgunta: Imagine se faz favor uma situacäo em que os objectivos do cliente e 
do fornecedor näo säo exactamente os mesmos ou que o sistema de premios do 
outsourcing näo estä alinhado com o que o cliente quer. 
O que acha que c possivel acontecer em tail situacöes em relacäo ao potencial de 
criacäo de problemas que afectern a eficäcia do outsourcing? 
Fxemplos do que pode acontecer: 
outsourcing pode ter problemas porque o fornecedor provavelmente vai-se 
tiuiar pelos sous pröprios Interesses. 
o Por exemplo no caso eng que o sistema de premios näo estä alinhado com o 
que o cliente quer o fornecedor provavelmente tenta obter o mäximo de 
premio possivel e atingir os seus pröprios objectivos, deixando os 
objectivos do cliente para segundo piano; 
o Desta maneira o cliente näo vai atingir todos os seus objectivos, 
diminuindo a eficäcia esperada para o outsourcing. 
Pecliclo tic exemplo: 
. Seth que me podia dar um exemplo que conheca (neste ou noutro outsourcing) 
em que o fornecedor se tenha guiado principalmente pelos seus interesses e 
isso tenha contribuido para uma diminuicäo da eficäcia do outsourcing? 
(diminuicäo dos beneficios ou aumento dos custos) 
Problem 3: Client changes its behaviour towards the outsourced 
activity 
('ausa 1: 
llroposic-, io: With outsourcing the client sometimes changes its behaviour 
towards the outsourced function. 
257 
(' 
( Pergunta: Acha que os clientes podem mudar o seu comportamento para com 
a actividadc outsourcingzada depois do acordo ser assinado? 
O que quern dizer com into? Por exemplo acha que: 
.A partir do momento que certa actividade 
e alvo de outsourcing com um 
acordo baseado num preco maioritariamente fixo o cliente pode comecar a usä- 
la mais ea aumentar o seu volume de trabalho? 
c Pedido dc exemplo: 
. Acha que neste outsourcing isso se passou? Ou seja, acha que neste 
outsourcing o cliente estä mais exigente com a manutencäo do que quando a 
realizava em casa? 
. Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
.0 que acha que acontece nas outras empresas? Acha que hä clientes que se 
tomam mais exigentes com a actividade outsourcingzada do que quando ela 
era efectuada por si pröprio`? 
. Seth que podia dar um exemplo? 
Consequencia 1: 
Proposicdo: A change of behaviour by the client towards the outsourcing may 
reduce outsourcing's effectiveness. 
0 Pergunta: Imagine se faz favor uma situacäo em que o cliente mudou o seu 
comportamento em relacäo ä actividade outsourcingzada, aumentando o seu 
volume de trabalho. 
O que acha que e possivel acontecer em tais situacöes em relacäo ao potencial de 
criacäo de problemas que afectem a eficäcia do outsourcing? 
Exemplos do que pode acontecer: 
O preco que o fornecedor negociou foi provavelmente baseado no volume de 
trabalho que havia antes do outsourcing; 
o0 aumento do volume de trabalho aumenta os custos para o fornecedor, e 
portanto o fornecedor corn certeza näo ficarä contente corn a situacäo; 
o0 fornecedor pode nem ter capacidade para responder ao novo volume de 
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trabalhos; 
Se o cliente näo estiver disponivel para pagar mais ou para converter os 
v'alores da quantidade de trabalho para valores pröximos dos que eram 
normais aquando da negociacäo do contrato, e natural que conflitos 
aparecam e que o fornecedor comece a tentar fazer lucro de outras 
maneiras ou näo consiga responder a todas as solicitagbes; 
Em qualquer dos casos a eficäcia do outsourcing sera diminuida ou porque 
os beneficios esperados pelo cliente näo säo todos atingidos ou porque os 
Gustos aumentam. 
Pecüclo (le exemplo: 
. Sera que nie podia dar um exemplo que conheca (neste ou noutro outsourcing) 
em que o cliente mudou a sua atitude em relacäo ä actividade outsourcingzada 
e isso tenha contribuido para uma diminuicäo da eficäcia do outsourcing? 
(diminuicäo dos beneficios ou aumento dos custos) 
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Problem 1: C'lient's bias in perceiving the service 
Causa I: 
Proposic'cio: Sometimes client's employees are against the outsourcing and 
have bad-will against it. 
U Pergunta: Acha que por vezes os funcionärios do cliente estäo contra o 
outsourcing e tern mä vontade em relacäo ao outsourcing? Ou entäo vem-mo 
demasiado betu sem espirito critico? 
O que quero direr corn isto? Por exemplo acha que: 
. Os funcionärios do cliente podern resistir ao sucesso do outsourcing porque 
estäo com medo de perder o emprego ou poder e conforto do seu emprego? 
. Os funcionärios do cliente podem ficar deslumbrados por terem uma grande 
empresa de grande reputacäo a trabalhar para eles e aperceberem-se que o 
servico e nielhor do que aquilo que realmente e porque "Eies e que sabern"? 
.A maneira corno o servico 
e percebido pelo cliente pode ser afectado pela 
capacidade tern de `vender' o servico e convencer o cliente da sua qualidade'? 
Qk, Pedido de exemplo: 
. Acha que os funcionärios do cliente estäo contra o outsourcing e que tem mä 
vontade contra ele? Ou que estäo täo deslumbrados com a grandeza do 
fornecedor que nern se apercebern betu do servico que realmente estä a ser 
fornecido? 
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. Sera que podia dar um exemplo 
de como essa mä vontade ou deslumbramento 
se reflecte? 
.0 que acha que acontece nas outras empresas? 
Acha que os funcionärios da 
empresa cliente tem por vezes mä vontade contra o outsourcing ou que ficam 
deslumbrados com o fornecedor? 
. Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
P"m 
Consequencia 1: 
Proposi4Jo: When client's employees are against the outsourcing and have 
bad-will against the outsourcing outsourcing's effectiveness may be affected 
negatively. 
0 Pergunta: Imagine se faz favor uma situacäo em que os funcionärios do 
cliente estäo contra o outsourcing e tem mä vontade em relacäo a ele, uma 
situacäo em que os funcionärios do cliente estäo maravilhados por trabalhar com 
um fornecedor de Brande renome ou uma situacäo em que o fornecedor labe 
vender muito bem o servico. 
O que acha que e natural acontecer em tais situacöes e que possa afectar a eficäcia 
do outsourcing? 
Exemplos do que pode acontecer: 
.A percepcäo que os funcionärios do cliente tem sobre o servico 6 afectada pela 
sua mä vontade em relacäo ao outsourcing. Assim sendo eles provavelmente 
entendem o servico como sendo pior do que aquilo que realmente e, o que 
tambem afecta o seu comportamento em relaqäo ao outsourcing. Tal 
insatisfacäo, mä avaliacäo e resultantes comportamentos provavelmente 
comprometem a eficäcia do outsourcing. 
oA percepcäo que os funcionärios do cliente tem Bobre o servico pode ser 
melhor do que a real quando essa percepcäo e influenciada pela boa 
reputacäo do fornecedor ou quando o fornecedor sabe vender bem o 
servico. Assim sendo embora os funcionärios achem que estäo a receber 
um bom servico isso pode näo estar a acontecer e portanto tambem näo 
actuam de modo a melhorar o servico. Assim sendo o cliente näo recebe 
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todos os beneficios que estava a espera. 
P('ilido de c'xemplo: 
. Sera que me podia dar uni exemplo que conheca (neste ou noutro outsourcing) 
em que os funciondnos do cliente näo estivessem a aperceber-se correctamente 
do servico e isso tenha contribuido para uma diminuicäo da eficäcia do 
outsourcing'? (diminuicäo dos beneficios ou aumento dos custos) 
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Problem 1: ReNsard system not appropriate to the situation 
('aura 1: 
Sometimes rewards systems are not appropriate to the 
outsourcing. 
® Pergunra: Acha que o sisterna de premios säo sempre bem definidos e 
apropriados para o outsourcing especifico'? 
O que quero dizer corn isto? Por exemplo acha que: 
O sisterna de premios estä sempre alinhado com os objectivos do cliente e foca 
sempre os assuntos mais importantes'? 
3 Por exemplo acha que mesmo quando o sistema de premios näo e 
renovado ao longo do outsourcing este estä sempre a focar os aspectos 
mais importantes para o cliente naquela altura; 
o Que o sisterna de premios tem sempre valores alvo correctos e que foca 
sempre os pontos mail importantes - por exemplo medidas relacionadas 
corn o processo quando o modo como o servico e fornecido e importante 
em vez de uni sistema de premios exclusivamente ligado aos resultados 
finais. 
' Pedido tie exemplo: 
. Como e que o sistema de premios estä definido neste outsourcing? Acha que 
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como estä leva sempre o fornecedor a fornecer o sen"ico que o cliente quer? 
. Serä que podia dar um exemplo? 
.0 que acha que acontece nas outras empresas? Acha que hä enipresas que os 
sistemas de premios näo motivem os fornecedores a fornecer o que o cliente 
quer receber? 
. Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
Z 
Consequencia l: 
Proposi(do: When rewards systems are not appropriate for the outsourcing, 
outsourcing's effectiveness is likely to be reduced. 
®i Pergunta: Imagine se faz favor uma situacäo em que o sistema de premios näo 
e apropriado para o outsourcing especifico e no instante especifico portanto näo 
motiva o fornecedor a fornecer exactamente o que o cliente quer. 
O que acha que e possivel acontecer em tais situacöes em relacäo ao potencial de 
criacäo de problemas que afectem a eficäcia do outsourcing? 
Exemplos do que pode acontecer: 
.0 fornecedor pode estar a receber premios ao mesmo tempo que o cliente näo 
estä satisfeito com o outsourcing ou vice-versa. 
. Os premios costumam ser usados para sinalizar ao fornecedor quais säo as 
prioridades dos clientes e que tipo de performances säo mais importantes, 
motivando o seu alcance. Mas se o sistema de premios näo estiver alinhado 
com as expectativas do cliente e os niveis de performance esperados, entäo o 
sistema de premios vai ser provavelmente contra-produtivo ja que o fornecedor 
tenderä a tentar maximizar os seus pröprios beneficios -- tenta ter o maior 
premio possivel - deixando a satisfacäo do cliente para segundo piano. 
o Assim os beneficios do outsourcing seräo menores do que aquilo que o 
cliente esperava e portanto a eficäcia do outsourcing diminui. 
Pedido de exemplo: 
. Serä que me podia dar um exemplo que conheca (neste ou noutro outsourcing) 
em que sistema de premios näo fosse adequado para a situacäo do cliente e isso 
I 
lppsullx ( 
tenha contribuido para uma diminuicäo da eficäcia do outsourcing? 
(diminuicäo dos benetcios ou aumento dos custos) 
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Problem 1: Client does not give much importance to outsourcing's 
management 
1% Causa 1: 
PrupusiS-41o: Sometimes clients do not give much attention to the way they 
manage the outsourcing. 
Pergunta: Acha que As vezes as empresas clientes subestimarn o tempo, 
atencäo e recursos necessärios para gerir um outsourcing? 
0 que quero dizer com isto? Por exemplo acha clue: 
. Os clientes por vezes näo guiam suficientemente os 
fornecedores?; 
. Que a gestäo dos clientes por vezes 
foca principalmente assuntos operacionais 
ein vez de assuntos estrategicos?; 
. Que os clientes näo pensam e reflectem profundamente em como gerir um 
outsourcing nein tentam melhorar a sua maneira de gerir um outsourcing, ja 
que a gestäo de um outsourcing e um tipo de gestäo diferente daquele que se 
costurna usar no seio da empresa e ao qual os gestores tendem a näo estar 
habituados? 
c% Pedido de exemplo: 
. Como e que av aliaria a gestäo deste outsourcing por parte do diente? Esse tipo 
2ha 
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de gestäo foi bem pensado e adaptado as exigencias de um outsourcing desde e 
inicio? 
. Sera que podia dar um exemplo`? 
.0 que acha que acontece nas outras empresas? 
Acha que hä empresas que 
gerem a actividade outsourcingzada como a geriam antes, quando era 
executada dentro da empresa? 
. Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
0 
Consequencia 1: 
,. I Proposicäo: 
When clients do not give much attention to the way they manage 
the outsourcing, outsourcing's effectiveness is likely to be reduced. 
Perguntu: Imagine se faz favor uma situacäo na qual um cliente näo dä muita 
atencäo ä forma como gere o outsourcing eä gestäo do outsourcing propriamente 
dita. 
O que acha que e possivel acontecer em tais situacöes em relacao ao potencial de 
criacäo de problemas que afectem a eficdcia do outsourcing? 
Exemplos do que pode acontecer: 
.0 fornecedor vai operar num väcuo de prioridades; 
o Assim sendo as performances do outsourcing provavelmente pioram jä que 
a agenda do fornecedor näo estä de acordo como os objectivos do cliente - 
ou porque o fornecedor pöe os seus objectivos em primeiro lugar ou 
porque näo Babe bem quais säo os objectivos do cliente. 
Assim sendo os beneficios que o cliente esperava receber do outsourcing 
säo reduzidos, diminuendo tambem a eficäcia do outsourcing. 
Pedido de exemplo: 
. Sera que me podia dar um exemplo que conheca (neste ou noutro outsourcing) 
em que diente näo tivesse dado muita atencäo ä gestäo do outsourcing eä 
maneira como o fazia e isso tenha contribuido para uma diminuicäo da eficäcia 
do outsourcing? (diminuigdo dos beneficios ou aumento dos custos) 
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Problem 2: Incorrect use of a measurement system 
('au%a 1: 
v PI .- ýon: ctºnmes Clients make an 
incorrect construction and use of 
measurement systems. 
1'ß r Lu': ti Acha que os clientes constroem e usarn sempre bem os seus 
, ist<<nas de medi4äo de performances? 
0 que quero differ com isto? Por exemplo acha que: 
. Os sistemas de medicäo de performances estäo sempre completamente 
alinhados corn o que o cliente quer receber?; 
.0 sisterna de medicäo traduz correctamente a estrategia do cliente e näo apenas 
o output final imediato da actividade'?; 
.0 sistema de mediqäo das performances colhe sempre a informacäo necessäria 
para o cliente fazer uma boa gestäo'?; 
.0 sistcma de gestäo limita-se a reunir informacäo directa ou indirectamente 
ligada a performances financeiras, ou tambem se preocupa corn performances 
de qualidade: ' 
.0 sisterna de gestäo foca-se apenas no que foi atingido ou tambem se preocupa 
corn o como foi atingido'? 
. Todas as medidas incluidas no sistema de gestäo estäo bem definidas e de 
forma completa tem o modo como se deve medir, os valores alvo, a forma 
cones vai ser calculada, ...? 
. Os sistemas de medicäo säo completos - focam os resultados finais eo modo 
como o senvico e fornecido, focam tanto as perspectivas operacionais como as 
estrategicas?; 
. Os sistemas de medicäo de performances säo actualizados e renovados 
frequentemente pars reflectir e acompanhar as mudancas que hä nos objectivos 
e prioridades dos outsourcings? 
. As performances poderäo ser mal medidas pelo cliente? 
. As medicöes säo suficientemente regulares para identificar problemas a tempo 
de evitar consequencias serias? 
. Num outsourcing normalmente hä dois tipos de riscos: relacionados com a 
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performance e relacionados com o relacionamento. Ambos estes aspectos säo 
incorporados nos sistemas de medicäo de performances? 
%. Pedido de exemplo: 
. Como e que avaliaria a gestäo deste outsourcing por Parte 
do cliente? Esse tipo 
de gestäo foi bem pensado e adaptado As exigencias de um outsourcing desde e 
inicio? 0 sistema de medicäo tern as caracteristicas referidas anteriormente? 
. Scrä que podia dar um exemplo? 
.0 que acha que acontece nas outras empresas? Acha que hä empresas que 
gerem a actividade outsourcingzada como a geriam antes, quando era 
executada dentro da empresa? 
. Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
FV9M 
Consequencia 1: 
,/ Proposicdo: An 
incorrect construction and use of measurement systems is 
likely to reduce outsourcing's effectiveness. 
« Pergunta: Imagine se faz favor uma situacäo em que o sistema de mediFdo das 
performances ou näo era bem construido ou bem usado. 
O que acha que e possivel acontecer em tail situacöes em relacao ao potencial de 
criacäo de problemas que afectem a eficäcia do outsourcing'? 
Exemplos do que pode acontecer: 
.0 cliente ao ver que o sistema de medicäo näo 6 eficiente pode deixar de o 
usar, pelo menos em toda a sua plenitude. 
o Em tal situacäo a gestäo comeca a ser baseada em opiniöes e sentimentos e 
portanto a gestäo baixa de qualidade jä que alguns aspectos podem passar 
despercebidos ao cliente ea gestäo estä mais susceptivel a intanyiveis e 
problemas de relacionamento. 
o Assim sendo os beneficios do outsourcing provavelmente reduzem-se e 
portanto o mesmo acontece ä sua eficäcia. 
.0 diente torna-se demasiado fascinado com o sistema de medicäo e ate 
comecam a medir assuntos com pouco significado; 
o Como poucas medidas tornam as performances da actividade dificeis de 
272 
Appendix C 
gerir, demasiadas podem afundar a gestäo em detalhes fazendo com que a 
equipa de gestäo deixe de ver o panorama geral do outsourcing; 
o Este tipo de problemas para alem de uma mä gestäo do outsourcing podem 
tambem levar a conflitos entre as parses. 
Pedido dc, e emp/o: 
. Sera que nie podia dar um exemplo que conheca (neste ou noutro outsourcing) 
em que o sistema de medicäo das performances näo fosse bem usado ou 
construido e isso tenha contribuido para uma diminuicäo da eficäcia do 
outsourcing'' (diminuicäo dos beneficios ou aumento dos custos) 
Problem 3: Lack of quality of the feedback 
('au%a 1: 
Prup)osiS do: Sometimes the client gives feedback poor in quality to the 
supplier. 
Pe gunta: Acha que por vezes os clientes däo uni feedback pobre e fraco ao 
fornecedor'? 
O que quero dizer com isto? Por exemplo acha que: 
. Alauns clientes baseiam o seu feedback apenas em termos operacionais 
reflectindo os problemas imediatos das operacöes didrias -- em vez de o usar 
para articular uma direccäo estrategica (preventiva e pro-activa) para o 
outsourcing - tendo em conta a evolucäo a longo-termo das performances? 
. Alltuns clientes näo analisam bem as performances do outsourcing, ficando 
portanto numa posicäo n1ä para definir prioridades e guiar o fornecedor'? 
. Alltuns clientes no feedback näo dizem exactamente o que precisam mais do 
outsourcing'? 
. Alltuns clientes podem apenas usar as medidas do sistema de medicäo das 
performances para gerir o outsourcing, esquecendo-se de analisar a situacäo 
gerat do outsourcing'? 
. Alauns clientes näo especificam assuntos importantes no feedback porque 
esperam que o fornecedor se aperceba deles e assim a harmonia no 
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relacionamento entre as duas partes se mantem? 
. Por vezes alguns clientes em vez de dizerem os problema e dizer qual o 
resultado que querem tentam arranjar e sugerir a soluFäo? 
.0 cliente apenas dä feedback negativo ao 
fornecedor, näo o congratulando do 
atingido? Ou seja, o cliente toma boas performances como garantidas e 
portanto näo mostra reconhecimento no feedback quando boas performances 
säo atingidas. 
0 feedback por vezes se torna como um jogo do gato e do rato: o cliente 
procura a identificacäo de problemas eo fornecedor foge para tentar escapar de 
ser apanhado. 
c Pedido de exemplo: 
. Como e que avaliaria o feedback que o cliente dä ao fornecedor? Acha que 
esse tipo de feedback eo indicado para dar a entender ao fornecedor o que o 
cliente acha do servico e quais as suas prioridades, direccionando os esforgos 
do fornecedor para esses assuntos? 
. Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
.0 que acha que acontece nas outras empresas? Acha que hä empresas em que o 
feedback que o diente dä ao fornecedor näo e indicado ou suficiente para este 
melhorar as suas performances ea satisfacäo do diente? 
. Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
Consequencia 1: 
Proposi(do: Lack of quality of the feedback given by the client to the supplier 
may reduce outsourcing's effectiveness. 
© Pergunta: Imagine se faz favor uma situacäo em que hä falta de qualidade no 
feedback que o cliente dä ao fornecedor. 
O que acha que e possivel acontecer em tais situacöes em relacäo ao potencial de 
criacäo de problemas que afectem a eficäcia do outsourcing? 
Exemplos do que pode acontecer: 
.A mä qualidade do feedback cria uma falta de direccäo ao fornecedor, 
dificultando o dar prioridade e sequenciar accöes para melhorar o senviFo. 
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Assim sendo o potencial para mäs decisöes e recursos mal utilizados aumenta. 
.A mä qualidade do feedback ou um feedback sö negativo pode deixar o 
fornecedor sem perceber o que estä a fazer bem, o que estä a fazer mal eo que 
o cliente realmente quer, dificultando tambem a organizagao do seu trabalho e 
das prioridades; 
.0 exclusik o use do feedback de uma maneira adversarial pode envenenar a 
relacäo entre as duas panes, jä que as discussöes tendem a andar ä volta dos 
sintomas dos problernas e tende a näo haver trabalho para descobrir as suas 
causas e solucöes; 
. Como reconhecimento e urna necessidade humana a falta dele no feedback 
pelas boas performances atingidas pode tambem levar a perdas de motivacäo; 
. Para alem do mais se assuntos importantes nao sao medidos e comentados, hä 
o perigo de eles näo serem respondidos pelo fornecedor, jä que assuntos näo 
niedidos nem comentados säo normalmente ignorados pelo fornecedor. Deste 
modo os beneficios do outsourcing diminuiam e portanto tambem a eficäcia do 
outsourcing seria reduzida. 
. Feedback apenas focado nas medidas pode levar a resultados preversos, jä que 
o fornecedor pode pör demasiado peso a atingir um certo valor alvo e esse 
esforco pode acusar consequencias negativas; ou seja, gerir o outsourcing so 
baseado nas medidas do sistema de monitorizacao tem o perigo de sub- 
optimizar o outsourcing ou de se fazer perder a nocäo de outsourcing como 
unia unidade; 
.A falta de urn bom feedback pode levar a um outsourcing com problemas de 
atribuicäo de responsabilidades jä que o fornecedor poderä entäo sempre 
defender-se dizendo que nunca foi alertado para os problernas; 
Falta de atribuicäo de responsabilidades pode levar a mäs performances 
dos fornecedores e ate permitir aos fornecedores ter comportamentos 
oportunistas. 
. Assuntos que näo säo discutidos com o fornecedor podem ser entendidos como 
näo sendo importantes: muitas vezes os clientes recebem o que inspeccionam e 
avaliam, näo o que desejam. 
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Pedido de exemplo: 
. Sera que me podia dar um exemplo que conheca (neste ou noutro outsourcing) 
em que o feedback que o cliente desse ao fornecedor näo fosse de grande 
qualidade e isso tenha contribuido para uma diminuicäo da eficäcia do 
outsourcing? (diminuicäo dos beneficios ou aumento dos custos) 
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Problem 1: Internal resistance to outsourcing's success 
No 
('aura l: 
Sometimes clients do not give much attention to the way they 
manage the outsourcing. 
(DPergunta: (JA FOI VISTO ANTERIORMENTE NA GAP 5) Acha que as 
ezes as empresas clientes subestimam o tempo, atengdo e recursos necessärios 
para gerir urn outsourcing? 
O que quern dizer com into? Por exemplo acha que: 
. Os clientes por vezes näo guiam suficientemente os fornecedores?; 
. Que a gestäo dos clientes por vezes foca principalmente assuntos operacionais 
em vez de assuntos estrategieos?; 
. Que os clientes näo pensam e reflectem profundamente em como gerir um 
outsourcing nem tentam melhorar a sua maneira de gerir um outsourcing, ja 
que a gestäo de um outsourcing e um tipo de gestäo diferente daquele que se 
costuma usar no seio da empresa e ao qual os gestores tendem a näo estar 
habituados? 
Pt'dido (le exemp/o: (JA FOI VISTO ANTERIORMENTE NA GAP 5) 
" Acha que os funcionärios do cliente estäo contra o outsourcing e que tem mä 
vontade contra ele? Ou que estäo täo deslumbrados com a grandeza do 
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fornecedor que nem se apercebem bem do servico que realmente estä a ser 
fornecido? 
. Sera que podia dar um exemplo de como essa mä vontade ou deslumbramento 
se reflecte? 
.0 que acha que acontece nas outras empresas? Acha que os funcionärios da 
empresa cliente tern por vezes mä vontade contra o outsourcing ou que ficam 
deslumbrados com o fornecedor? 
. Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
Consequencia 1: 
Proposi4. do: When client's employees are against the outsourcing and have 
bad-will against the outsourcing outsourcing's effectiveness may be affected 
negatively. 
Pergunta: Imagine se faz favor uma situacäo em que os funcionärios do 
cliente estejam contra e tenham mä vontade em relacao ao outsourcing. 
O que acha que e possivel acontecer em tais situacöes em relacao ao potencial de 
criacäo de problemas que afectem a eficäcia do outsourcing? 
Exemplos do que pode acontecer: 
. Os funcionärios que ficaram na empresa cliente väo ter tendencia a näo ajudar 
o fornecedor ea constantemente criticar o trabalho do fornecedor, 
. Os funcionärios que ficaram na empresa diente väo ter tendencia para retaliar 
contra o outsourcing, lutando contra ele ou simplesmente recusar mudar. 
o Algumas das tecnicas usadas säo a aplicacäo de pressäo negativa, o näo 
partilhar e ate esconder informacäo, fazerjogos politicos, ameagar, atrasar 
decisöes que interfiram com o planeamento do fornecedor, näo ajudar o 
fornecedor e em casos mais extremos ate sabotar o outsourcing; 
Por outro ]ado outros funcionärios podem querer cair nas gracas dos novos 
chefes (o fornecedor) mesmo que tenham que quebrar algumas das regras dos 
seus pröprios patröes (o diente). 
o Por exemplo se os funcionärios deduzirem que a chave para reter o seu 
emprego 6 acabar o trabalho a tempo e abaixo do tempo, entäo os 
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funcionärios podem tentar chamar a atengdo sobre eles acabando o 
trabalho rapidamente e de forma econömica, mesmo que para isso a 
qualidade seja reduzida; 
. Em qualquer um destes casos os beneficios obtidos pelo outsourcing säo 
diminuidos e portanto a sua eficäcia tambem o e. 
Pediclo de exemplo: 
. Sera que me podia dar um exemplo que conheca (neste ou noutro outsourcing) 
eng que os funciondrios do diente estejam contra o outsourcing e isso tenha 
contribuido para uma diminuicäo da eficäcia do outsourcing? (diminuicäo dos 
beneficios ou aumento dos custos) 
Problem 2: Supplier does not have liberty to work 
Causa 1: 
Proposi(o: Sometimes the client organisation tries to continue having direct 
control over the outsourced activity. 
© Pergunta: Acha que por vezes os clientes tentam continuar a ter controlo 
directo sobre a actividade outsourcingzada? 
O que quero dizer com isto? Por exemplo acha que: 
. Clientes que tenham fornecido a actividade agora outsourcingzada durante 
muito tempo podem ter dificuldades em mudar as suas präticas e tentem 
continuar a ter controlo directo e operacional Bobre as actividade? 
. Tais empresas clientes podem ter dificuldades em mudar de uma supervisäo 
directa Bobre a actividade para uma supervisäo e gestäo baseada num 
mecanismo de controlo indirecto? 
. Que o cliente por vezes tenta ditar o que o fornecedor deve fazer, näo the 
dando liberdade para trabalhar ao seu gosto e aplicar todas as suas 
capacidades? 
.0 cliente tern a tentagdo de resolver directamente os problemas que aparecern 
tomando o controlo directo da situacäo em vez de os trabalhar atraves do 
fornecedor? 
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c Pedido de exemplo: 
. Como e que classificaria a gestäo 
deste outsourcing por parte do cliente'? 0 
cliente dä liberdade ao fornecedor para trabalhar? Que limites c präticas 
impöe? 
. Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
.0 que acha que acontece nas outras empresas? Acha que 
hä empresas que 
ditem a maneira como o fornecedor deve efectuar o serv-ico? 
. Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
Consequencia l: 
Proposi(do: When the client organisation tries to continue having direct 
control over the outsourced activity, the outsourcing's effectiveness may be 
reduced. 
(1) Pergunta: Imagine se faz favor uma situacäo em que a empresa cliente tente 
continuar a ter controlo directo e operacional sobre a actividade outsourcingzada e 
o seu processo. 
O que acha que e possivel acontecer em tais situacöes em relacao ao potencial de 
criacäo de problemas que afectem a eficäcia do outsourcing? 
Exemplos do que pode acontecer: 
.0 fornecedor näo tem condicöes para aplicar todas as suas expertises e 
portanto a possivel inovacäo que o fornecedor podia trazer ä actividade 
outsourcingzada e limitada; 
.A acontabilidade e responsabilizacäo pelos resultados ao fornecedor e 
degradada jä que este pode-se defender dizendo que as performances esperadas 
näo foram atingidas devido ä interferencia do cliente; 
. Por causa das tentativas do cliente tentar ter controlo directo e operacional 
sobre a actividade e suas consequencias, muitos conflitos tendem a aparecer 
degradando o relacionamento entre as duas panes e pondo em risco futuros 
entendimentos e trabalho conjunto. 
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Pedido de exemplo: 
. Sera que me podia dar um exemplo que conheca (neste ou noutro outsourcing) 
em que a empresa cliente tenha tentado continuar a ter controlo directo e 
operacional sobre a actividade outsourcingzada eo seu processo e isso tenha 
contribuido para uma diminuicäo da eficäcia do outsourcing? (diminuicäo dos 
beneficios ou aumento dos custos) 
Problem 3: Outsourcing management team not suited for its role 
Causa 1: 
Proposicäo: Sometimes outsourcing managers (elements of the management 
team) are not suited for their roles. 
of Pergunta: Acha que os elementos das equipas de gestäo de um outsourcing 
por vexes näo tem o perfil indicado para essa posicäo? 
O que quero dizer com isto? Por exemplo acha que: 
. As pessoas encarregues de gerir o outsourcing tem sempre caracteristicas 
relacionadas com bom pensamento estrategico, competencias em negociacöes 
e em fazer acordos, governacäo de um relacionamento, resolucäo de problemas 
e comunicacäo? 
. Que hä uma tendencia natural para pör ä frente da gestäo de um outsourcing 
um homem de negöcios em vez de um especialista operacional da actividade 
outsourcingzada? 
o0 hornern de negöcios terä caracteristicas na area de gestäo de contratos e 
de gerir um fornecedor a fazer algo; o especialista operacional da 
actividade terä caracteristicas na area de como fazer algo e gerir 
funcionärios para o fazer. 
. As equipas de gestäo de outsourcings estäo bem balanceadas entre homens de 
negöcios e pessoas mais operacionais que permitam um maior espirito critico 
sobre a actividade do fornecedor? 
. As equipas de gestäo de outsourcings tern capacidade para coordenar tanto 
internamente (na sua pröpria organizacäo) como externamente (influenciar a 
outra organizacäo) os interesses do outsourcing? 
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Uma caracteristica importante neste aspecto sera a leadership. 
. As equipas de gestäo 
de outsourcings tem poder e autoridade suficientes para 
fazer acordos e comprometer as suas empresas nas suas decisöes e acordos? 
Pedido de exemplo: 
. Como e que caracterizaria a equipa 
de gestäo neste outsourcing? Como e 
constituida? Acha que e completa e que tem as caracteristicas necessärias? 
. Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
.0 que acha que acontece nas outran empresas? 
Acha que hä empresas em que 
as equipas de gestäo do outsourcing näo sejam adequadas? 
. Scrä que podia dar um exemplo? 
P"m 
,, 
x j Consequencia 1: 
ý/ 
Proposicdo: When outsourcing managers (referring to members of the 
management team) are not suited for their roles, outsourcing's effectiveness may 
be reduced. 
C) Perguntu: Imagine se faz favor uma situacäo em que a equipa de `,, estAo de um 
outsourcing näo tem caracteristicas apropriadas para o seu papel. 
O que acha que e possivel acontecer em tal situacäo em relacäo ao potencial de 
criacäo de problemas que afectem a eficäcia do outsourcing? 
Exemplos do que pode acontecer: 
. Quando a equipa de gestäo e sö constituida por pessoas com caracteristicas 
mais operacionais: o cliente tem maior tendencia em se meter nos problemas 
tecnicos, na actividade e operacöes do fornecedor, cnando insatisfaFäo no 
fornecedor; 
o Pessoas mais operacionais ä frente de um outsourcing teräo tendencia a 
gerir o outsourcing da maneira como antes geriam a actividade quando esta 
era fornecida dentro da empresa, ou seja, ter controlo directo sobre a 
actividade; 
. Quando a equipa 
de gestäo e sö constituida por pessoas com caracteristicas 
mais relacionadas com o negöcio: o cliente corre o risco de perder o controlo 
sobre a actividade outsourcingzada, ficando incapacitado de fazer o 
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outsourcing acompanhar a evolucäo do contexto e perdendo o controlo Bobre o 
futuro da actividade. 
Pessoas de negöcios ä frente de um outsourcing tenderä a piorar a 
monitorizacäo e gestäo critica da actividade outsourcingzada. 
. Se a equipa de gestäo de um outsourcing näo tiver recursos humanos 
suficientes entäo a gestäo do outsourcing pode ser afectada e portanto tambem 
os seus resultados; 
. Se a equipa de gestäo näo tiver forca suficiente dentro da sua empresa entäo a 
sua credibilidade aos olhos da outra empresa e comprometida, tendo 
consequencias na relacäo entre as equipas de gestäo do outsourcing das duas 
empresas. 
Pedido de exenplo: 
. Sera que me podia dar um exemplo que conheca (neste ou noutro outsourcing) 
em que a equipa de gestäo de um outsourcing näo tenha caracteristicas 
indicadas para o seu papel e isso tenha contribuido para uma diminuicäo da 
eficäcia do outsourcing? (diminuicäo dos beneficios ou aumento dos custos) 
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Problem 1: Ineffective communication 
Causa 1: 
Proposi(do: Sometimes the communication between the outsourcing 
management team of the two parties is not very effective. 
Di Pergunta: Acha que por vezes hä problemas na comunicacao entre as dual 
empresas envolvidas no outsourcing e entre as equipas de gestäo do diente e do 
fornecedor'? 
O que quero dizer com isto? Por exemplo acha que: 
. Por vezes hä comunicacäo insuficiente entre as partes do outsourcing'? 
. Por vezes parece que sö um dos lados e que quer comunicar? 
. Por vezes a comunicacäo e apenas reactiva eä volta de problemas faltando-Ihe 
um caräcter pro-activo? 
. Por vezes a comunicacäo entre as dual partes do outsourcing e ambigua? 
. Por vezes a comunicagdo e feita por um nümero muito/demasiado limitado de 
pessoas? 
. Por vezes o meio de comunicacäo usado näo e apropriado ä importäncia do 
assunto em discussäo? (por exemplo, muitas vezes as coisas säo tratadas por 
mail ou telefone mas certos aspectos mais importantes teräo que ser frente a 
frente) 
. Por vezes o mau relacionamento pessoal entre as equipas de gestäo pode 
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comprometer a comunicacäo entre as duas empresas? 
Pedido de exemplo: 
. Acha que hä ou houve problemas 
de comunicacäo neste outsourcing'? 
. Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
.0 que acha que acontece nas outras empresas? 
Acha que hä problemas de 
comunicacäo entre as duas panes envolvidas no outsourcing? 
. Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
P"m 
Consequencia 1: KLJ 
v" Proposi4"üo: When the communication hct\\ cen the t%%o parties i., not \ cri 
effective, outsourcing's effectiveness may be reduced. 
0 Pergunta: Imagine se faz favor uma situagAo em que hä problemas na 
comunicacao entre as duas empresas envolvidas no outsourcing e entre as equipas 
de gestäo do cliente e do fornecedor. 
O que acha que e possivel acontecer em tais situacöes em relacäo ao potencial de 
criacäo de problemas que afectem a eficäcia do outsourcing? 
Exemplos do que pode acontecer: 
As partes envolvidas no outsourcing näo se entendem bem (portanto as 
ambicöes e expectativas näo säo esclarecidas e alinhadas) e acabam-se por 
gastar recursos a fazer coisas que o cliente näo valoriza; 
. Se o cliente näo comunicar eficazmente os assuntos que o preocupam e 
provävel que a performance do fornecedor diminua, ja que este pode tomar 
atalhos que näo säo descobertos nem corrigidos, porque o fornecedor näo 
recebe respostas as suas perguntas (causando atrasos ou levando o fornecedor a 
fazer assuncöes que poderäo ser erradas) ou pedidos de mudanca; 
o Estas situacöes säo proväveis em acabar no 
fornecedor fazer coisas que o 
cliente näo quer (porque a gestäo do fornecedor näo percebeu bem o que o 
diente queria, porque uma cadeia de mäs decisöes e uma sub-optimizada 
distribuicäo de recursos pode comecar ou porque o fomecedor pode-se 
comportar de forma oportunista) com os respectivos custos. 
286 
Appendix C 
.A mä comunicacäo leva ä existencia de conflitos, de maus entendidos e um 
peso emocional na relacao entre as duas empresas que väo condicionar o 
relacionamento entre as duas partes; 
. Uma mä comunicacäo pode levar a um clima de incerteza, diminuir a 
flexibilidade da relacäo, reduzir a capacidade de identificacäo e resolucäo 
räpida de problemas, reduzir a coordenacäo, cooperacäo ea qualidade de 
trabalho conjunto entre as duas empresas; 
,, Todos estes factores teräo consequencias negativas para o outsourcing. 
Q,,,, Pedido de exemplo: 
. Sera que me podia dar um exemplo que conheca (neste ou noutro outsourcing) 
em que os funcionärios do cliente estejam contra o outsourcing e isso tenha 
contribuido para uma diminuicäo da eficäcia do outsourcing? (diminuicäo dos 
beneficios ou aumento dos custos) 
Problem 2: Bad relationship between parties 
Causa 1: 
Proposicdo: Sometimes the relationship between the management team of the 
two parties involved in the outsourcing is not very good. 
0 Pergunta: Acha que o relacionamento entre as duas partes de um outsourcing 
e sempre boa? 
O que quero dizer com isto? Por exemplo acha que: 
. Hä sempre bom entendimento, confianca e respeito entre as duas partes do 
outsourcing e as pessoas envolvidas na relacdo? 
Pedido de exemplo: 
. Acha que neste outsourcing as duas equipas de gestäo e as duas empresas em si 
tem urn bom relacionamento? 
" Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
.0 que acha que acontece nas outras empresas? Acha que pode haver problemas 
de relacionamento entre as duas partes envolvidas no outsourcing? 
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. Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
('onsequencia 1: 
ý/ Prufposic-cio. 
When the relationship bet%ºeen the rna nabrmcnt scam of the tvºo 
parties involved in the outsourcing is not very good. outsourcing's cffecti%cncss is 
likely to be reduced. 
D f'ergunta: Imagine se fai favor uma situacäo em que o rclacionamento entre 
as dual partes de um outsourcing e ma. 
O que acha que e possivel acontecer em tais situaSaes em rclacAo ao potencial de 
criacäo de probiemas que afectem a eficäcia do outsourcing? 
Exemplos do que pode acontecer: 
. ('omo e impossi%el escrever contratos sobre todas as acti%idades entre-tirmas 
que aliancas cliente-fornecedor necessitam (demasiadas tarefas, IigaSöes e 
incerteza), essas aliancas säo muitas vezes entre pessoas. Essa ahanca entre 
pessoas que confiam uma na outra e se percebem ea ünica maneira de fazer 
ajustamentos ao mesmo tempo que se garante que o empenhamento ea 
satisfacäo se mantem-. 
. Um mau relacionamento social entre as pessoas que gerem o outsourcing 
poderä diminuir a qualidade e quantidade de comunicacäo, cooperacAo e 
trabalho conjunto entre as duas empresas e contribuir pars o aparecimento de 
desconfiancas e comportamentos destrutivos do relacionamento. 
\ Pedido de exemplo: 
. Sera que me podia dar um exemplo que conheca (neste ou noutro outsourcing) 
em que houvesse um mau relacionamento entre as pessoas das dual equipas de 
gestäo ou entre os funciondrios das dual empresas e isso tenha contnbuido 
para uma diminuicäo da eficäcia do outsourcing? (diminuicäo dos beneficios 
ou aumento dos custos) 
Problem 3: Power imbalance 
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Causa 1: 
Sometimes there are power imbalances in outsourcing 
relationships. 
QDf'eerguuºuu: Acha que por vezes uma das panes do outsourcing tem mais poder 
na rela43o do que a outra? 
0 que quero direr corn isto: ' Por exemplo acha que: 
. Acha quc por % Gres o cliente tern poder para impor mudancas no fornecedor e 
impor a maneira como o servico e executado'? 
Pedido (le eremplo: 
. Acha que neste outsourcing as parses tem urn peso de poder diferente" 
. Sera que podia dar urn exemplo? 
.0 que acha que acontece nas outran empresas? Acha que o poder estä dividido 
igualmente entre cliente e fornecedor'? 
. Sera que podia dar uni exemplo? 
U 
('onsequencia 1: 
Propposi4-t! (). The existence of power imbalances in an outsourcing relationship 
may diminish outsourcing's effectiveness. 
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Pergunta: Imagine se faf favor uma situacäo em que nAo hä uma igualdade de 
poder no outsourcing. 
O que acha que e possivel acontecer em tais situacöes em relacäo ao potencial de 
criacäo de problemas que afectem a eficäcia do outsourcing'' 
Exemplos do que pode acontecer: 
. Se cliente tiver maior poder e obrigar o 
fornecedor a trabalhar dc detcrminada 
forma o fornecedor pode ficar frustrado, perdendo motiv acäo c diminuindo 
ino\ acöes que o fornecedor podena tra/er; 
Niveis de poder diferente, podem levar a comportamentos oportunistas por 
uma das partes ea conflitos entre etas. 
/'diele tie exemplo: 
. Sera que me podia dar um exemplo que conheca (neste ou noutro outsourcing) 
em que houvesse uma diferenca de poder entre as duas parses num outsourcing 
e isso tenha contribuido para uma diminuigAo da eficäcia do outsourcing'? 
(diminuicäo dos beneficios ou aumento dos custos) 
Problem 4: lark of trust 
Causa 1: 
V ProposiS-do. Sometimes the parties in oI cd in the outsourcing do not 
completely trust in each other. 
(1) Pergunta: Acha que o cliente eo fornecedor confiam sempre urn no outro? 
0 que quero dizer com isto" Por exemplo acha que: 
.0 cliente confia sempre na competencia que o 
fornecedor tem para the 
fornecer o servico que ele quer? (competence trust: expectation that the 
supplier has the necessary technical and management competencies at his 
disposal) 
.0 cliente ou o fornecedor confiam sempre que a outra pane v al respeitar 
sempre o contrato eo que foi acordado? (contractual trust: based on moral 
standards of honesty and keep the word) 
.0 cliente ou o fornecedor tem sempre lealdade um com outro e estäo sempre 
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prontos a entre ajudarem-se'? (good-will trust: based on the expectation that 
parties have an open commitment to each other) 
. Nenhuma das partes pratica 
jogos de etica no dia a dia para fugir a 
responsahilidades e deixar de cumprir compromissos? 
. Acha que as panes envolvidas no outsourcing nao tem receio que a outra pane 
passe informacäo importante para a concorrencia ou para o mercado, 
quebrando acordos de confidencialidade? 
.A existencia de diferencas culturais entre as duas panes pode criar 
desconfiancas'? 
6ý, I '(1ldo (le exemplo: 
" Acha que neste outsourcing as panes confiam uma na outra? 
. Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
"0 que achy que acontece nas outras empresas? Acha que as parses confiam 
sempre uma na outra" 
" Seth que podia dar urn exemplo? 
('onseyuencia 1: 
7 Proposi4-üo: When the parties involved in the outsourcing do not trust each 
other it is likely that behaviours which reduce outsourcing's effectiveness are 
adopted. 
C) Pergunta: Imagine se faz favor uma situacäo em que ndo hä confianca entre as 
dual parses envolvidas no outsourcing. 
O que acha que e possivel acontecer em tais situacöes em relacäo ao potencial de 
criacäo de problemas que afectem a eficäcia do outsourcing? 
Exemplos do que pole acontecer: 
Quando confianca estä ausente numa relacäo de outsourcing hä uma tendencia 
das partes para pensarem melhor nos riscos das suas situacöes e portanto terem 
comportamentos mail reservadas nas suas accöes (limitando potenciais 
beneficios do outsourcing) e tentarem controlar o outsourcing (para controlar 
melhor os riscos); 
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.D c\ ido ä falta de contianca as partes podem esconder 
infonnagAo da outra ou 
sentirem-se mais lk res para tirar partido de mo%imentos oportunistas; 
. Este tipo de situagbes tendem a reduzir o empenho 
das panes para o 
outsourcing (deixam de se pör as suas melhores präticas c capacidadcs naqucla 
relacäo) ea criar conflitos entre as panes. 
Peclido de eYemplo: 
. Sera que me podia dar um exemplo que conheca (neste ou noutro outsourcing) 
em que näo hü confianca entre as duas panes envolvidas no outsourcing e isso 
tenha contrihuido para uma diminuicAo da eficäcia do outsourcing" 
(diminuicäo dos beneficios ou aumento dos custos) 
Problem 5: Existence of conflicts 
Causa l: 
f'opoms -do: Sometimes there are contlicts bet, %cen the panic, u1 ol%cd to the 
outsourcing. 
Q) Pergunta: Acha que por vezes hä conflitos entre as panes em oI% idas no 
outsourcing'? 
O que quero diner com isto? Por exemplo acha que: 
\lotivos como o facto dos objectivos do cliente e do fornecedor serem 
diferentes, de os contratos muitas vezes näo estAo bem definidos ou completos, 
de os mecanismos para partilhar beneficios näo estarem bem definidos, de 
haver falta de respeito entre as parses, de as pessoas das equipas de gestäo näo 
serem talhadas para essas posicöes, de haver falta de confianca entre as panes 
ou de tentativas de controlar o outsourcing por uma das parses podem resultar 
em conflitos entre as parses? 
6k, Pedido (IC ee nplo: 
. Neste outsourcing hä conflitos entre as parses envolvidas no outsourcing? 
. Sera que podia dar um exemplo? 
.0 que acha que acontece nas outran empresas) Acha que costuma haver 
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contlitos entre as parses? 
. Seri que podia dar um exemplo'? 
Ec 
ººnsequencia 1: 
Conflicts bet\%cen the parties involved in the outsourcing may 
educe its effectiveness. 
f'crgunta: Imagine se faz favor uma situacäo em que hä conflitos entre as duas 
panes em olh idas no outsourcing. 
0 que achy que e possivel acontecer em tais situacöes em relacäo ao potencial de 
cria4äo de problemas que afectem a eficäcia do outsourcing? 
1. \eniplos do que Erde acontecer: 
.\e 
istencia de contlitos pode levar a uma reducäo da satisfacao das panes 
com o relacionamento, limitando a motiv acäo, empenho, cooperacäo e trabalho 
conjunto no outsourcing e portanto comprometer alguns dos beneficios 
possiv eis de ser atingidos corn o outsourcing. 
Conflicts in a relationship may be distinguished as functional or 
dysfunctional. Functional conflicts are disagreements that can be resolved 
friendly by the allies. Dysfunctional conflicts are disagreements that can 
not be resolved by the allies. They defend that while a big number of 
dysfunctional conflicts within an alliance affect negatively its 
effectiveness, functional conflicts have the potential to enhance an 
alliance's effectiveness. 
Pediclo de exemplo: 
. Serä que me podia dar urn exemplo que conheca (neste ou noutro outsourcing) 
em que tivesse havido conflito entre as partes envolvidas no outsourcing e isso 
tenha contribuido para uma diminuicäo da eficäcia do outsourcing? 
(diminuicäo dos beneficios ou aumento dos custos) 
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FECHO 
Utilidade da identificacäo e estruturagAo das gaps e dos problemas 
. Acha que a identificacäo e estruturacäo destas gaps e problemas que as causam pode 
ser ütil pars ajudar os gestores de outsourcing a perceber melhor a gestAo do 
outsourcing e portanto contribuir para a melhoria da sua gestäo? 
Por exemplo evitando alguns dos problemas ou pelo menos reduzir as suas 
consequencias. 
AQradecimento 
. Muito obrigado pelo tempo dispensado. 
. Espero que tenha achado uma discussäo interessante. 
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